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Balaton battle. Battles at Lake Balaton

The 1st Bulgarian Army occupied defenses on a wide front (about 190 km) along the northern bank of the Drava. It had 1,356 guns and mortars, mostly of German origin. The average artillery density at the army front did not exceed 7 guns per 1 km of front.

In the armies defending the main direction, strong army artillery and anti-aircraft artillery groups were created. Thus, the artillery group of the 26th Army consisted of two cannon artillery brigades and two batteries of a BM howitzer brigade (high power. - Note auto), a total of 59 guns; The artillery group of the 4th Guards Army included three cannon artillery brigades and two batteries of the BM howitzer brigade, for a total of 113 guns. Each of these groups was assigned corrective aviation units for reconnaissance and fire control. In the 57th Army, due to a lack of artillery, there was no army artillery group, but corps artillery groups consisting of 2-3 divisions each were created. Anti-aircraft artillery groups in the armies included three or four anti-aircraft artillery regiments.

Divisional artillery groups consisting of 2-3 divisions each were created in only two divisions of the 30th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, defending in the direction of the main attack. Regimental artillery groups were created in all regiments of the first echelon and included from 18 to 24 guns and mortars.

The main efforts of the troops were concentrated on holding the main strip. It housed up to 60% of all artillery. At the same time, it was necessary to retain a significant part of the artillery in the nearest tactical and operational depth in readiness to maneuver to threatened directions. To achieve this, 15% of all artillery was located in the second defense line and about 25% in the operational depth.

In accordance with the general defense plan, artillery control was centralized on a corps-army scale for the entire duration of the operation. In the developed artillery fire system, a special role was assigned to massive and concentrated fire. The fire of most of the corps' artillery, and, if necessary, the army's, was to be concentrated on the most important targets. The size of areas of such concentrations reached 40–60 hectares (ha). Thus, the 26th Army prepared eight areas of concentrated fire with an area of 20–60 hectares and 152 areas of concentrated fire with an area of 4–16 hectares each.

Barrage fire was prepared in front of the entire defensive front. In certain important areas, provision was made in advance for the conduct of stationary barrage fire - low-presence fire with doubled and even tripled density against the norms of the shooting rules. Combat experience has shown the high effectiveness of this type of fire in repelling an attack by enemy motorized infantry.

The front artillery headquarters paid special attention to ensuring the timely concentration of fire from a significant number of guns and mortars at one or another enemy target. In the last days before the operation, systematic training was carried out, as a result of which it was possible to sharply reduce the time required to prepare for opening fire. The target dates for the opening of concentrated fire achieved in this operation are given in the following table.

Scale of artillery fire control	4th Guards A		26 A		57 A
Scale of artillery fire control	By planned areas	For unplanned areas	By planned areas	For unplanned areas	By planned areas	For unplanned areas
Corps artillery	No data	No data	15–30 min.	No data	10 min.	15 minutes.
Division artillery	8–10 min.	15–25 min.	10–15 min.	20–30 min.	7 min.	10 min.
Art group or artillery regiment	3–5 min.	8–15 min.	4–10 min.	8–20 min.	3 min.	10 min.
Division	2–3 min.	3–6 min.	3–5 min.	6–15 min.	1–2 min.	5 minutes.
Battery	up to 2 min.	up to 5 min.	1.5–3 min.	5–8 min.	1 min.	2–3 min.

A significant reduction in the time it took to call for fire in the 57th Army was the result of the painstaking work of the army artillery command and headquarters at all levels of command. The control system created in the army made it possible to quickly concentrate a large number of batteries on a given target. At the same time, direct transmission of commands from the army command post to the batteries made it possible to sharply reduce the time for opening fire.

One of the most important elements of the overall system of defensive measures is artillery counter-preparation. The artillery headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had a lot of positive experience in this regard. However, in the operation under consideration, serious shortcomings were made in the organization and planning of artillery counter-preparation. Thus, the artillery headquarters of the 26th Army, due to lack of time and accurate information about the enemy, did not have time to develop an army-wide counter-preparation plan and did not provide the necessary assistance to the corps in this regard. During an inspection carried out on March 1, it was revealed that “countertraining plans in corps and divisions were drawn up mechanically and without connection with the actions of the infantry. The suppression areas were chosen randomly, without any analysis of possible enemy actions; in a number of areas there were no targets at all and there had never been any before.” This led to the fact that counter-training was not carried out at all in the 26th Army, which undoubtedly subsequently affected the combat operations of the troops.

The situation with the organization of counter-preparation in the 57th and 4th Guards armies was much better, since these armies had more time to prepare defense.

The anti-tank defense system of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the Balaton defensive operation included: battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas covered by a barrage system, artillery and anti-tank reserves, artillery (field, anti-aircraft and rocket), located in closed firing positions, and mobile barrage units. Battalion anti-tank units were created in almost all battalion defense areas located in tank-hazardous directions. Each of them had 6–8 anti-tank rifles and 5–11 guns, including 1–2 large-caliber guns.

In the operation under consideration, anti-tank areas were greatly developed, which were created using units of anti-tank, self-propelled and anti-aircraft artillery according to the plans of corps, armies and even the front. In the zone of the 4th Guards, 26th and 27th armies, 66 anti-tank areas were created. Each area had from 12 to 24 guns (that is, from a division to a regiment), including several guns of 122–152 mm caliber. The system of anti-tank areas covered all the most important tank-threat areas from the front line of defense to a depth of 35 km. The anti-tank areas located in the depths also included artillery stationed in closed firing positions. As a result, more than 60% of the armies' artillery was united in anti-tank areas and involved in the fight against tanks.

Much attention was paid to the creation, selection of location and preparation for maneuver of artillery and anti-tank reserves. In total, the front had 63 anti-tank artillery reserves, which included more than 25% of the entire anti-tank artillery of the front. The composition of anti-tank reserves, their distance from the front edge and the average time required for maneuver are shown in the table.

Reserves	Compound	Distance from the front edge in km	Average time required for maneuver
			during the day	at night
Front	12 iptabr, 170 labr, 208 sabr	50-190	3–6 hours	6–8 hours
	Total: 57 mm - 20; 76 mm - 64; SU-100 - 65
4th Guards A	438 arm. iptap, 117, 338 and 419 iptap	20-25	1–1.5 hours.	1.5–2 hours.
	Total: 56 mm - 9; 76 mm - 48
26 A	184, 1008, 1965 iptap	20-25	1–2 hours	1.5–3 hours.
	Total: 57 mm - 15; 76 mm - 39
57 A	374 arm. iptap and 864 sap SU-76	30-70	2–4 hours	3–6 hours
	Total: 76 mm - 17; SU-76 - 21
Corps	regiment - division	10-15	30–45 min.	45 min. - 1 hour 15 min.
Divisions	division - battery	to 10	up to 30 min.	up to 45 min.
Regiments	battery - platoon	up to 5	up to 20 min.	up to 30 min.

To prepare for the maneuver of anti-tank reserves, a thorough reconnaissance of routes and deployment areas was carried out. Preference was sometimes given not to the shortest route, but to the more convenient route, which ensured high speed of movement. Control measurements of routes were carried out; The time required to occupy deployment lines was determined by the deployment of individual guns, platoons and batteries to them day and night. Considering that anti-tank reserves are often forced to engage in battle on the move, armies and corps practiced occupying and changing artillery battle formations under the cover of smoke screens.

The front command also prepared artillery for combat operations at night. The experience of the January battles showed that the enemy often resorted to night operations and carried them out quite successfully, which was facilitated by the use of the aforementioned tank night vision devices, which made it possible to conduct targeted fire from a tank or self-propelled gun at a range of up to 300–400 m. In this regard, provision was made for illuminating the area in the zone of each division, for which searchlights, illuminating aerial bombs, shells and rockets, as well as improvised means were intended. To illuminate the terrain and enemy tanks, each rifle company and battery was supposed to set up signal and lighting posts, placing them in a certain system, echeloned, to the depth of the first and second positions.

Also, much attention was paid to the creation of minefields, which were created along the entire front. At the same time, the average density in the zone of the 4th Guards, 26th and 57th armies was 730 anti-tank and 670 anti-personnel mines per 1 km; in the most important tank-hazardous directions it reached 2700 and 2500 mines, respectively.

In addition to stationary minefields, it was planned to widely use mobile barrage detachments in defense - sapper units with a supply of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. In total, by March 5, there were 68 such units, numbering 73 vehicles, 164 carts, 30,000 anti-tank and 9,000 anti-personnel mines, as well as 9 tons of explosives. The front-line command had at its disposal three barrage detachments (on vehicles) consisting of a motorized engineering battalion and two sapper companies, each of which had at its disposal 4,500 anti-tank mines. The 4th Guards Army, on the basis of its engineer battalion, formed two such detachments in vehicles with 3,200 anti-tank and 1,000 anti-personnel mines in each. The 26th and 57th armies each had one detachment (a sapper company in four vehicles with 1000 anti-tank mines). Corps detachments, as a rule, consisted of a company - a platoon of sappers with a stock of 300-500 anti-tank mines, divisional - 10-25 sappers on one vehicle with 200-250 mines, regimental - 5-7 sappers with 100 anti-tank mines on carts.

Each detachment had its own plan for advancing to one direction or another, depending on the situation. Their actions were coordinated with anti-tank artillery and rifle units.

Based on the intelligence received, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front came to the conclusion that German units could launch an offensive at any time. Therefore, on the evening of March 5, the front headquarters warned the troops about the possibility of the enemy launching an offensive the next morning. The headquarters of the armies and corps gave the order to bring units and formations to full combat readiness. For example, the artillery headquarters of the 30th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army issued the following combat order.

“Observation revealed a busy movement of enemy vehicles and manpower towards the front line during the day. There is evidence that the enemy will conduct active operations. To timely prevent active enemy actions, the corps artillery commander ordered:

1. On the night from 5 to 6.3.45, all officers should be in their places; battery commanders and up to artillery commanders should be at the OP and check the readiness of all artillery to conduct massive fire in accordance with the counter-preparation plan. Artillery stationed on direct fire must be in full readiness to repel enemy tank attacks.

2. Personnel should be at the guns and at the OP (50% on duty, 50% resting).

3. Prepare ammunition for firing at enemy tanks and manpower.

4. Check communication and fire control from the division artillery commander to the battery commander of both regular and attached artillery. In the event of a break in the wired connection, immediately turn on the radio stations.

5. Confirm receipt, report execution.”

Progress of the battle

On March 6, 1945, German troops actually launched a counteroffensive, launching almost simultaneous attacks on three directions. The Weichs army group struck the first blow at one in the morning at the front of the 1st Bulgarian Army. The Germans suddenly crossed the Drava in the areas of Dolni Miholyac, Osijek, and Valpovo in five places and captured small tactical bridgeheads on its northern bank. The first blow from the Dolni Miholyac area hit units of the 4th Army Corps of the 1st Bulgarian Army under General Stoichev, and the second from the Volnovo area hit units of the 3rd Yugoslav Army. As already mentioned, the Germans managed to capture bridgeheads on the left bank of the Drava, then expanding them to 8 kilometers along the front and to 5 in depth.

At the same time, the 3rd and 11th infantry divisions of the Bulgarian army fled in panic, and the command of the formations could not gather their “disheveled army.” Only the intervention of the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was able to slightly correct the catastrophic situation. On this occasion, the directive of the front headquarters formulated the following task:

“Take measures to ensure that troops are ready for night operations, using tough measures to prevent the emergence of panic in all parts of the army (Bulgarian. - Note auto). About the facts of panic in units 3 and 11 of the Infantry Division, begin an immediate investigation and bring the guilty senior commanders to justice.”

Units of the 3rd Yugoslav Army - the 16th and 51st divisions of the NOAU - offered fierce resistance to the German troops and tried to throw the enemy from the occupied bridgehead with counterattacks. The Yugoslav units were equipped for the most part with Soviet weapons (and to a lesser extent with British ones), but had no experience in fighting as regular divisions.

On March 7, the 133rd Rifle Corps and artillery of the Red Army were transferred to the area of the newly formed German bridgeheads.

In the subsequent days of the offensive, the Germans failed to expand the bridgeheads they had occupied at the Drava. Crushing artillery fire and air strikes from the 17th Air Army did not allow the German command to transfer sufficient forces to the northern shore. All efforts of the Germans to move forward on this section of the front were unsuccessful, although individual “efforts” were noted until March 16.

At dawn on March 6, after a strong 45-minute artillery barrage, the enemy went on the offensive in the 57th Army zone.

The main enemy group went on the offensive against the 26th and 4th Guards Armies at 8:47 am. The attack was preceded by a powerful 30-minute artillery barrage. The enemy delivered the strongest blow in the Sheregelesh-Alshotarnocha sector with the forces of three tank, three infantry and two cavalry divisions. In the second echelons of the corps, four tank divisions were finishing their concentration.

The bulk of the artillery fire was aimed at suppressing our units occupying the main line of defense. Self-propelled guns and tanks were also involved in the final fire raid, which fired quite effectively at the front edge of the defense with direct fire from a distance of 800–1000 m. The shelling of German artillery from closed positions was less effective: the explosions often fell away from the targets and most of them Soviet batteries were out of fire.

The actions of the Luftwaffe during the artillery preparation and during the period of supporting the attack were greatly hampered by low clouds, snowfall and the poor condition of the airfields.

With the start of the enemy's artillery preparation, the artillery of the rifle divisions and army artillery groups of the 4th Guards and 26th Armies immediately opened fire back. However, the artillery of the 4th Guards and 26th armies could not disrupt or delay the enemy’s offensive, since artillery counter-training was not carried out in these armies due to shortcomings in its organization. Those fire raids that were carried out by the artillery of the 4th Guards and 26th armies against enemy concentration areas and batteries did not produce results, since they were carried out separately and did not provide the necessary density of fire. In contrast, the artillery actions of the 57th Army were quite effective.

With the beginning of the enemy’s artillery preparation, at a signal from the artillery commander of the 57th Army, the guns opened fire according to the “Storm” massive fire pattern, thus conducting counterpreparation. In total, 16 divisions took part in it, numbering 145 guns and mortars, from the artillery of the 6th Guards and 64th Corps. Due to the fact that the area at which the artillery fired during the counter-preparation period was located on the right flank of the 64th Corps (Shetel, Chikota area; front 3 km), it was necessary to maneuver trajectories.

At the same time, the artillery units of the 6th Guards Corps made a 90° turn to the south, and the artillery of the 64th Corps maneuvered to the northwest.

Artillery preparation was carried out in the form of fire raids in combination with methodical fire, and artillery fire continued even after the end of the enemy’s artillery preparation. Massive artillery fire inflicted huge losses on the enemy, part of his artillery was suppressed, and the start of the attack was delayed by 15 minutes.

With the beginning of the enemy offensive, fierce defensive battles unfolded on all sectors of the front. The enemy threw a large mass of tanks at the positions of our troops, with a density of up to 10 vehicles per 1 km of front. Nevertheless, the German troops were still able to be contained.

According to the recollections of the translator of the 104th Infantry Division (part of the 57th Army) A. A. Sinkliner, in early March the unit fought heavy defensive battles in the Kaposvar area. Then the transmitters of our headquarters picked up radio programs from Vienna and Graz, which bluntly said that Zhukov might enter Berlin, and the Wehrmacht would definitely drown Tolbukhin in the Danube. The leaflets that the Nazis dropped from airplanes were written in the same spirit. The enemy desperately rushed forward.

At the junction of the 4th Guards and 26th armies, in the direction of Sheregelesh, up to two infantry regiments and over 60 tanks from the Balk group (parts of the 1st TD and 356th Infantry Division) took part in the attack. At a signal from the commander of the 155th Infantry Division, the divisional and regimental artillery groups placed a dense curtain of stationary barrage fire in the path of the enemy infantry and tanks. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks, which, after passing through the barrage zone, were met by heavy fire from anti-tank guns. Thanks to the tenacity of the personnel of the 155th Infantry Division and the skillful use of massive artillery fire, the first powerful attack was repulsed. In the area of one 436th Infantry Regiment alone, the Germans left more than 200 corpses of soldiers and officers, 15 tanks and 5 armored personnel carriers.

The battle was less successful in the zone of the 1st Guards fortified region of the 4th Guards Army. It was there, in the direction of his main attack (Lake Velence - Sharviz Canal), that the enemy concentrated the main forces of his offensive group. The German command attacked the junction of the 1st Guards fortified area of the 4th Guards Army and the 30th Corps of the 26th Army. Here, at the junction of two army formations, the enemy launched two infantry and one tank divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, supported by heavy tanks, into the attack. Up to two infantry regiments and over 30 tanks from these formations attacked the positions of units of the 1st Guards fortified region and the right-flank units of the 155th division, striking in the direction of Sheregelesh. At a signal from the commander of the 155th division, the regimental and divisional artillery groups placed a full curtain of stationary barrage fire in the path of enemy infantry and tanks. The enemy infantry was cut off from the tanks, which, after passing through the zone of stationary barrage fire, were met by heavy fire from anti-tank guns from anti-tank area No. 021 and battalion anti-tank units of the 436th Infantry Regiment. As a result of the exceptional tenacity of the personnel of the 155th Division and the skillful use of massive artillery fire, the enemy attack on the division's sector was repulsed. On the battlefield, the enemy left more than 200 killed soldiers and officers, 15 burnt tanks and 5 broken armored personnel carriers. But on the neighbors' property - 1 guards. UR the situation was different.

In the units of the 10th artillery and machine gun battalion, which defended the village of Sheregelesh, monitoring of enemy actions and fire control were poorly organized. After the artillery preparation, which was followed by an offensive after a significant pause, the personnel were not called back to their combat positions. Enemy infantry and tanks, taking advantage of the limited visibility due to the onset of snowfall, immediately captured the first trench, pushing the battalion units behind the anti-tank artillery battle formations. The 1963rd Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment supporting this battalion, left without infantry cover, knocked out 10 tanks, but itself lost almost all its materiel and was withdrawn for replenishment on the same day. By 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy managed to capture the Sheregelesh stronghold, which created a real threat of breaking through the main line of defense at the junction of the 4th Guards and 26th armies.

To strengthen the defense of the junction of the armies, our command took decisive measures. The commander of the 155th Infantry Division transferred the second echelon of the division - the 786th Infantry Regiment - to the area south of Sheregelesh, reinforcing it with two artillery divisions, as well as the 407th Light Artillery Regiment and his anti-tank reserve - the 320th Anti-Tank Fighter Division. The corps reserve was also transferred here - the 104th Guards Rifle Regiment and a mobile barrage detachment.

At the same time, the commandant of the 1st Guards fortified area also began to take measures to strengthen the defense. He brings his reserve into battle - a company of machine gunners and two batteries of 484 iptap - and decides to transfer 1670 iptap, 2/188 minp, two batteries 562 iptap and 51 guards to the breakthrough site. Minp rocket artillery. At the same time, it was decided to urgently transfer 338 anti-tank tanks from the anti-tank reserve of the 4th Guards Army to the Sheregelesh area.

The commandant of the 1st Guards fortified area requested help from the command of the 4th Guards Army. At 13:30, the 338th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment, which was in the reserve of the 4th Guards Army, received an order to advance and at 15:30 entered the battle. At the same time, the 1670th anti-tank fighter regiment and a division of the 188th mortar regiment deployed north of Sheregelesh. The 51st and 58th Guards M-13 mortar regiments were brought closer to the front line. The artillery maneuver carried out in the zones of the 155th Division and the 1st Guards fortified area was timely. Enemy attempts in the afternoon to advance east from the Sheregelesh area were repulsed by concentrated artillery fire.

The successful use of massive artillery fire in the afternoon of March 6 was the result of urgently taken measures by the command of the 4th Guards and 26th armies to improve artillery fire control at the junction of the armies. The massing of artillery fire from indirect firing positions was achieved through wide maneuver of artillery trajectories of the 4th Guards and 26th Armies. Thus, in the Sheregelesh region, from where the enemy launched one attack after another, the fire of the 9th Guards was repeatedly concentrated. Pabr, 25 Gabr, 306 Ap and 58 Guards. Minp from the 26th Army and 17 Pabr, 124 Gap, 51 Guards. Ministry of Internal Affairs from the 4th Guards Army. At the same time, a subgroup of the 21st Guards Corps of the 4th Guards Army, consisting of 115 pabres, 127 pabres, 30 pabres, located north of Lake Velence, suppressed the enemy's echelons and the nearest rear areas in front of the front of the 1st Guards fortified area with concentrated fire.

As a result of the regrouping of artillery and maneuvering trajectories, our defense in the area of Sheregelesh was significantly strengthened. The enemy's superiority in artillery in this sector decreased sharply - from 2.7 to 1.2 times, which made it possible to stop the advance of German troops.

At the same time, the enemy launched an offensive west of the Sharviz Canal. It should be noted that his actions were noticeably affected by the separating influence of the Sharviz and Malom Chathorn canals, running parallel to each other. By March 6, as a result of the flood, the water level in the canals rose sharply, and the entire space between them was filled with water. Therefore, the main efforts of the 1st Cavalry Corps (3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions) and the 1st SS Panzer Corps (1 SS Tank Division and 12 SS Tank Division) were directed south along the Székesfehérvár - Tsetse highway at the junction of the 30th and 135th th rifle corps, which turned out to be insufficiently equipped in anti-tank terms.

Here the enemy managed to penetrate our defenses, creating a real threat of isolating units of the 68th Guards Rifle Division of the 30th Rifle Corps. This division, together with the 1966th anti-tank artillery regiment, pressed against the Charviz Canal, by the end of the day could hardly hold back the enemy’s onslaught (up to four infantry regiments with 60–80 tanks and assault guns were operating here; tanks were in the first echelon, followed by They are infantry on foot, in the second echelon - assault guns and infantry on armored personnel carriers. - Note auto).

As a result of the battle, the division found itself cut off from the rest of the corps and had direct contact only with its neighbor on the left - the 233rd Rifle Division of the 135th Rifle Corps. But thanks to a well-organized system of artillery fire, it was possible to cut off the German infantry from the tanks, and the latter found themselves in the fire zone of anti-tank guns located in battalion anti-tank units. As a result of the battle, only the guns of the 202nd Guards Rifle Regiment managed to knock out 11 tanks.

The German attack on the sector of the 233rd Infantry Division was met with artillery fire from closed positions in pre-targeted areas. But due to twilight and fog, the effectiveness of artillery fire was difficult to determine, so the commander of the 135th Rifle Corps ordered barrage fire to be opened. In addition, the infantry opened fire with small arms and guns positioned for direct fire. The first German attack was repulsed. Subsequently, having felt the boundaries of the regimental defense sectors, the Germans began an attack at the junctions of the units.

After 9 o’clock in the morning, the area in the Shoponya and Kaloz areas was covered in fog, visibility did not exceed 200 m. Because of this, the effectiveness of Soviet artillery fire from closed positions sharply decreased. Taking advantage of this, the German infantry, with the support of tanks, managed to come close to the front line and again attack the positions of the 68th Guards and 233rd Rifle Divisions. This time the enemy managed to push back the left-flank battalion of the 68th division and occupy a height dominating the terrain.

In the afternoon, after a powerful artillery barrage, parts of the 1st SS Panzer Corps - up to an infantry regiment with the support of several dozen tanks and self-propelled guns - again went on the attack, trying to break through to the Kaloz settlement. The commander of the 68th Guards Rifle Division brought all his reserves and all artillery into battle, including the 1966th anti-tank artillery regiment attached to the division, but the enemy attack could not be stopped. Having suffered heavy losses, the division began to retreat, and the bridgehead it occupied on the western bank of the Charviz Canal was sharply reduced in front and in depth.

At a critical moment of the battle on the evening of March 6, the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General N.A. Gagen, reassigned the 1965th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment from his reserve to this division, which immediately entered the battle, deploying to the west and south of Kaloz. But even with the onset of darkness, the German attacks did not stop - up to 20 tanks attacked the site of the 198th Guards Rifle Regiment at dusk. During the battle, an infantry company and six enemy tanks reached the position of one of the batteries of the 1966th anti-tank fighter regiment. By order of the battery commander, the scouts illuminated the area with rockets, while at the same time one platoon opened fire with armor-piercing shells at the tanks, and the other with grapeshot. For two days, the 1965th and 1966th regiments of the 43rd anti-tank brigade fought a fierce battle with enemy tanks, knocked out 22 and burned 21 tanks, destroyed more than two dozen armored personnel carriers, 7 vehicles, 3 guns, 12 machine guns. During the battle, these regiments lost 30 guns, three vehicles, 12 people killed and 46 wounded, and the next day they left with 6 guns for replenishment. Typically, artillery units that suffered heavy losses were withdrawn to a front-line resupply point and, having received new material, entered the battle again after 2-3 days.

The offensive of the 3rd and 4th cavalry divisions on the left flank of the 26th Army ended unsuccessfully - units of the 74th and 151st rifle divisions counterattacked the advance of the German troops. The documents of the 6th SS Panzer Army noted:

“The cavalry corps was able to advance only 300 meters along the Shifok-Lepshen highway, the enemy is continuously counterattacking from the Enying area.”

As for the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, due to delays in deployment, it went on the offensive on Aba Sharkerestour only at 18.30. At the same time, insignificant forces were brought into the battle, as a result of which there was practically no progress that day.

On the first day of the operation, bloody battles continued south of Lake Balaton, where the troops of the 57th and 1st Bulgarian armies fought hand in hand, mutually “rescuing” each other in battle. As already mentioned, with the beginning of the enemy’s artillery preparation, the artillery of the 57th Army conducted a 30-minute counter-preparation in the Nagybayom area, during which it was possible to suppress part of the artillery and inflict significant losses on the enemy.

The artillerymen of the 57th Army widely used ambush operations to combat tanks. Thus, the battery commander, Lieutenant P.P. Selishev, having received the task of ensuring the defense of a highway intersection, decided to place two guns in the depths of the defense and use fire to divert the enemy’s attention, and place one gun in an ambush. When three tanks managed to pass the front line of the defense and approach the gun lying in ambush, it opened fire and disabled these tanks with six shots.

Having determined the direction of the main attack, the commander of the 57th Army, Lieutenant General M.N. Sharokhin, decided to strengthen the 64th Rifle Corps with artillery and achieve at least equality in firepower in this direction (as of March 6, the 64th Rifle Corps had 102 guns and mortars against 400 enemy guns and mortars. - Note auto). There were no free artillery units in the army. The anti-tank reserves of the army and corps were used up. Under these conditions, it was necessary to remove a division of the 160th gun brigade, two divisions of the 843rd artillery regiment of the 299th rifle division, the 2nd division of the 972nd artillery regiment, the 563rd and 523rd mortars from the unattacked areas of the corps and transfer them to the threatened direction. regiments and the 71st anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Also, artillery and mortars were removed from one echelon of 64 sk.

At the same time, a regrouping of artillery from the right flank of the army to the south along the front began towards the site of the designated breakthrough. In total, 136 guns and mortars were transferred from the defense sector of the 6th Guards Corps during the day and night. To replenish the anti-tank reserves of the army and corps, the 12th Anti-Tank Fighter Brigade, the 184th Anti-Tank Fighter Regiment and the artillery of the 104th Infantry Division arrived from the front. The transfer of artillery continued in the following days. Its density in the area south of Nagybayom increased rapidly. If at the beginning of the battle it was equal to 8, by the morning of March 7 it increased to 47, and on the third day it reached 87, then on the fifth day it was already close to the figure of 112 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. In total, there were up to 690 guns and mortars of various calibers in this area.

Artillery maneuver was critical to the success of the 57th Army's defense. In search of a weak point in the defense of this army, the enemy subsequently changed the direction of his attacks twice and transferred the main efforts on March 10 to the junction zone with the 1st Bulgarian Army, and on March 14 to the zone of the 6th Guards Corps. In each case, he advanced only as long as he had fire superiority in a given area. When, due to the maneuver of our artillery, the forces were equalized, the enemy’s advance stopped.

When repelling the offensive of March 10–12 in the area north of Etvöskonyi, the maneuver of about 200 guns and mortars of the 1st Bulgarian Army into the 57th Army zone was important.

One of the signs of a failed offensive is the presence of prisoners from the attacking group. On the evening of March 11, 1945, when the battle in the village of Sabash died down, a German prisoner taken in this village was brought to the command post of the 104th Infantry Division. In the house of a Hungarian peasant there was a conversation with a chief corporal. He was very young and behaved confidently. Apparently, the captivity came as a surprise to him.

Which division?

Sixteenth Panzergrenadier SS.

How long have you been in this direction?

What is the task of your troops advancing here? - asked the translator.

Occupy Kaposvar, and then break through to the Danube.

In January, your troops near Budapest already tried to throw Soviet units into the Danube, but nothing happened.

Then we didn’t have enough strength. And now the SS tank army of General Dietrich was transferred to the theater of operations (from the West), which broke through the front of your allies in the West in the winter. Hungary is most important to us now. And we will achieve our goal.

Are you sure that Germany will win this war?

We must win. We need living space. We have a new powerful weapon.

The text of the interrogation shows that the bulk of the German soldiers, even in the SS formations, unlike the Wehrmacht generals, still believed in the success of the operation. Although hopes were fading before our eyes.

Thus, on the first day of his offensive, the enemy did not complete the assigned task. The main line of defense in the direction of the enemy's main attack remained unbroken. Only in the area of Sheregelesh did the enemy manage to advance 3–4 km in depth.

The first day of the operation confirmed the assumption that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Sheregelesh. In this regard, the front commander took a number of measures on the very first day, as a result of which the density of defense in the direction of the main attack of the German troops was increased. To do this, he ordered the commander of the 27th Army, Colonel General S.G. Trofimenko, to have the 35th Guards Corps ready, with the forces of which to support the first echelon troops, and to concentrate the 33rd Corps in the Dunafeldvar, Dunapentele area in readiness for actions to the east or west of the Sharviz Canal. Thus, the conditions were prepared for the entry into battle of the second operational echelon of the front - the 27th Army.

During March 6 and the night of March 7, the 3rd Guards Airborne Division of the 35th Guards Corps and the 21st Rifle Division of the 30th Corps were advanced to the second line of defense east of Sheregelesh, which occupied the second line of defense east n/a Sharkerestur. At the same time, two brigades of the 18th Tank Corps (110th and 170th) occupied a prepared line east and south of Sheregelesh with tank ambushes. To the left, at the Jakobsalas-Sarkerestur line, part of the forces of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was deployed.

In addition, a regrouping of artillery units was carried out - two howitzer and mortar brigades, as well as artillery, anti-tank, mortar regiments and a Katyusha regiment were transferred from the left bank of the Danube to the right and advanced to the defense areas of the 30th Rifle Corps. One brigade from the front reserve moved to the area of Kazol-Sharnerestur, to the junction of the defenses of the 36th and 68th Guards Rifle Divisions.

The German command was very restrained in assessing the results of the first day of Operation Spring Awakening. Thus, the commander of Army Group South, General Wöhler, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces (OKH), Colonel General Guderian (he would be removed from his post on March 28, 1945. - Note auto) on the evening of March 6:

“Tanks can hardly move across rough terrain due to heavy mud, and all roads are blocked by minefields and enemy artillery. Infantry units were unable to ensure a quick breakthrough of positions, and fierce fighting led to a large consumption of ammunition, as a result of which soldiers could be left without ammunition. It turned out that the enemy was expecting our attack and was preparing for it, although he did not know the exact start time and location of the main attacks.”

It should be noted that strengthening the defense with tanks and self-propelled artillery had a decisive influence on the subsequent course of the battles, and of particular importance was the strengthening of the anti-tank defense of the SU-100 and ISU-122, which, according to the Germans themselves, were “particularly dangerous weapons” for the Germans. tanks

On the morning of March 7, the enemy, having brought into battle all the forces of the first echelon: parts of the army group "Balk", the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps, resumed the offensive along the entire front - from Lake Velence to the Charviz Canal. The main directions of attacks were determined by Sheregelesh, Sharashd and Sharkerestur. The attack by German troops was preceded by 30–45 minutes of artillery preparation, supplemented by bombing and air assault strikes.

From the Sheregelesh area, the enemy, with the forces of two tank and one infantry divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, struck to the southeast - in the direction of the village of Sharkerestur. Another blow followed in the direction of Sharashd. In the 26th Army zone alone, up to 9 infantry regiments and over 170 enemy tanks, assault and self-propelled guns were advancing. Particularly stubborn fighting took place in the sector of the 155th Infantry Division, where German troops launched five attacks in succession. Units of the 155th Infantry Division of the 30th Infantry Division stubbornly defended every meter of the position, repelling 15 strong attacks during the day, each with a strength of a battalion to an infantry regiment and 25–65 tanks. The enemy's attacks were countered by the stamina and courage of Soviet soldiers, massive artillery fire, direct fire from guns, as well as fire from tanks and self-propelled guns from the spot and from ambushes. It got to the point that, due to the frequently changing situation, the artillerymen often had to turn their guns 90–100° to fire at the advancing German armored vehicles.

In order to prevent further advance of the enemy, the commander of 30 sk immediately moved the 110th and 170th tank brigades of the 18th tank corps, his artillery anti-tank reserve and a mobile barrage detachment to the position of divisional reserves. At the same time, the corps' artillery increased fire on the attacking enemy, as a result of which the enemy's advance was stopped.

Slowly moving forward, the enemy reached the position of the regimental reserves by the end of the day. Our command moved two tank brigades of the 18th Tank Corps, an artillery and anti-tank reserve of the 30th Rifle Corps and a mobile obstacle detachment to the position of divisional reserves. In total, 22 artillery and mortar regiments, consisting of more than 520 guns and mortars. As a result of a decisive and quick maneuver, the density and balance of forces in the artillery in the area of Lake Velence and the Charviz Canal changed in our favor by the end of March 8th. The statistics are shown in the following table.

date	Number of guns and mortars		Artillery ratio	Artillery density in the area Lake Velence - Szarviz Canal
date	1st Guards UR 30 sk 35 guards. sk	Enemy	Artillery ratio	Artillery density in the area Lake Velence - Szarviz Canal
By the morning of March 6	707	1400	1:2,0	38,6
By the end of March 6	1186	1400	1:1,2	52,0
By the end of March 7	1500	1400	1,1:1,0	65,0
By the end of March 8	2415	1756*	1,4:1,0	110,0

* Increase due to the introduction of 2 and 9 SS TD into the battle.

During the defensive battles, the maneuver of artillery and anti-tank reserves played an important role. Division and corps commanders brought their reserves into battle, as a rule, 2–6 hours after the start of the battle. Anti-tank reserves of the armies were introduced on the first or second day of the operation. The restoration of artillery and anti-tank reserves took place mainly at the expense of funds received from higher commanders.

But the most stubborn battles took place west of the Szarviz canal, in the Shoponya-Kaloz section. At 6.00 on March 7, units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps - up to 40 tanks and armored personnel carriers with infantry - attacked the positions of the 1965th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment. The tank attack was carried out at high speeds under the cover of fire from assault guns from behind cover. The Soviet artillerymen found themselves in an extremely difficult situation, since due to heavy fog visibility did not exceed 400 m. The batteries had to fight off enemy tanks and infantry at the same time. As a result of a heavy battle, the 6th battery knocked out six tanks, losing all of its guns to enemy assault gun fire. Three more combat vehicles were knocked out by the 3rd battery before its guns were crushed by the tracks of the tanks breaking through to the rear. However, a further attempt by German armored vehicles to break through the bridge over the Charviz Canal failed - with their fire, the 85-mm guns of two batteries of the 974th anti-aircraft artillery regiment located here knocked out four tanks, forcing the rest to retreat.

However, the Germans did not stop attacking Kaloz until the end of the day. The batteries of the 1965th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment that survived the morning battle fought until the last shell, and after the destruction of the guns, the artillerymen continued to fight like infantry. But, despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet units, by the evening of March 7, the 1st SS Panzer Corps occupied Kaloz.

To the north of this settlement, four batteries of the 1966th anti-tank fighter regiment fought throughout the day, being semi-surrounded. They managed to repel three German attacks, but, having lost all their guns, were forced to retreat.

By the evening of March 7, the situation in this direction had become so seriously complicated that the commander of the 68th Guards Rifle Division put almost all of the division’s artillery on direct fire, which had difficulty holding back the advance of SS tanks and infantry on the bridgehead, which had been reduced to 3–4 kilometers along the front and 1.5–2 deep. As darkness fell, the battle died down, and parts of the division began to retreat to the eastern bank of the Sharviz Canal.

As already mentioned, over two days of battle, the 1965th and 1966th artillery regiments reported the knocking out and destruction of 54 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers, 7 vehicles, 3 guns and 12 machine guns. Its losses amounted to 30 guns, 3 vehicles, 12 people killed, 46 wounded and 23 missing. With six remaining guns, the regiments were transferred to the front reserve for replenishment.

Units of the 233rd and neighboring 74th divisions of the 135th Rifle Corps, under pressure from units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps, retreated to a new position south of the Kaloz settlement by the evening of March 7. By this time, the 233rd division had only 62 guns on 7 kilometers of the defense front, and the 74th division had only 35 guns on 14 kilometers. Despite this, the personnel of these divisions offered fierce resistance to the Germans; attacks often ended in hand-to-hand combat, after which the Soviet units retreated to the next line.

On the morning of March 8, the German command, having failed to break through the main line of defense with the forces of the first echelon, brought the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" into the battle, directing its main efforts to capture the strongholds of Sharkerestur and Sharashd. From 250 to 320 enemy tanks and assault guns were simultaneously operating on the battlefield. As a result of the twelfth attack, German tanks managed to break through to the Sharashd-Aba road, but they were stopped by massive fire from our artillery, tanks and especially heavy self-propelled artillery units and, having lost 24 tanks, were forced to retreat.

West of the Charviz Canal, the 1st SS Panzer Corps, attacking on a wide front, forced units of the 233rd and 74th Rifle Divisions to retreat to the second line of defense by the evening of March 8th. The 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions also managed to slightly push back the Soviet units at Lake Balaton.

The command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front took decisive measures to surround the penetration area with fresh units, primarily artillery.

By March 9, additional artillery regiments of the 3rd Guards were deployed north of Sheregelesh. Airborne Division, 78th and 163rd Infantry Division, 35th Guards. sk; 338 iptap from the reserve of the 4th Guards Army; 452 sap 18 tk; 49th Guards pabr from the front artillery reserve. East and south of Sheregelesh, 1000 iptap and 292 minp were deployed; 1639, 1694 and 1114 zenap; 1438 sap and 363 tsap 18 tk; 367 minp, 1453, 282 1821, 382 saps and 407 ogmd 1gv. mk; 173 tabr, 15 tminbr, 170 labr from the front artillery reserve.

In total, 22 artillery and mortar regiments, numbering more than 520 guns and mortars, were brought to the breakthrough site in three days.

As a result, the artillery density on this section of the front increased from 38.6 to 65 guns and mortars per 1 km, and the artillery ratio changed in our favor.

All day on March 9, German units continued persistent attacks along the entire defense line of the 26th Army and in the Lake Velence - Sheregelesh section. Thus, in the defense zone of the 1st Guards fortified region, the army group Balka managed to advance along Lake Velence to Gardon, where it was stopped. In the battles in this direction, units of the 24th anti-tank artillery brigade of Colonel Vlasenko played a major role, occupying a number of anti-tank areas in the defense zone of the 1st Guards fortified area on a front of about 10 km. During the battles from March 6 to 9, the brigade knocked out and destroyed 39 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers, while losing 16 of its guns.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps continued its offensive in a southeast direction. At the same time, units of the 9th SS Panzer Division "Hohenstaufen" launched a concentrated attack over a 1.5-kilometer area on units of the 36th Guards Rifle Division, trying to break through in the direction of Aba, Sharkerestur. However, the division repulsed all attacks in this direction with the support of massive artillery fire. The SS men also failed to achieve significant results in the sector of the 155th Infantry Division, which repelled nine tank attacks during the day.

In the sector of the 135th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps launched an attack on the night of March 8-9. In this case, the main blow fell on the positions of the 233rd Infantry Division in the Aranyosh region. The division's small artillery was unable to provide the necessary support to its units. The corps' artillery also turned out to be unable to conduct effective massive fire at night in the breakthrough area. As a result, German tanks managed to break through the second line of defense under the cover of night darkness. True, the situation was somewhat alleviated by the fact that the Germans also acted uncertainly under these conditions and therefore were unable to realize the success of the initial attack. Taking advantage of this, units of the 233rd and 236th Rifle Divisions began an organized retreat to the south.

On March 8, the command of the 26th Army decided to strengthen the 135th Rifle Corps and transferred to it the 208th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade from the front reserve. Such a powerful and mobile formation (63 SU-100) could have a significant impact on the course of hostilities. But the corps command was clearly late in bringing it into battle. The brigade received the task by 7.00 on March 9 to take two regiments with ambushes at the Nagyherczek, Deg line and, in cooperation with units of the 233rd and 236th rifle divisions with the support of the 1008th and 1245th anti-tank fighter regiments, prevent a breakthrough of tanks and infantry enemy along the western bank of the Charviz Canal. At the same time, the third regiment of the brigade remained in the army reserve in the Shar area.

The movement of brigade units was slow, there was no communication between the brigade commander and the divisions operating ahead, and reconnaissance was carried out in a haphazard manner. As a result, the 1068th self-propelled artillery regiment, marching along the Tsetse-Székesfehérvár highway, was unexpectedly attacked by German tanks that had broken through and, having lost 14 SU-100 out of 21 as a result of a fleeting battle, hastily retreated to the Shar Egres area.

The tanks of the enemy's 23rd Tank Division, which broke through along the highway, were stopped north of Shar Egres by units of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division. The attempt of enemy tanks to break through the army line and seize crossings across the Kaposh Canal was unsuccessful.

In repelling enemy attacks in the direction of Tsetse with the aim of capturing the crossing over the Charviz Canal, a powerful anti-tank area created on the morning of March 9 in the Tsetse-Simontornia area played a major role. The commander of the 49th anti-tank artillery brigade, Colonel Shpeck, was appointed its commandant. In addition to the two regiments of the brigade (1008th and 1249th), this area included a division of the 407th light artillery regiment, 1089th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 227th separate anti-aircraft artillery division, 117th anti-tank fighter regiment, 1953 1st self-propelled artillery regiment of the 209th self-propelled artillery brigade, “Avenger” division (formed on January 6–10, 1945 as part of the 4th anti-aircraft division by order of the artillery commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, was intended to fight tanks and was armed with captured 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. - Note auto) and the 268th Guards Anti-Aircraft Regiment, with a total of more than 100 guns and self-propelled guns. With the support of dismounted units of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division deployed to this area, this anti-tank area during March 9 and 10 repelled all German attempts to seize the crossings across the Charviz and Kaposh canal in the Tsetse and Shimontornia area and held its positions.

Thus, during the four days of the offensive, the German troops, despite the introduction of a large number of tanks into battle, failed to break through our tactical defense in the direction of the main attack. The enemy's tank divisions lost from 40 to 60% of their manpower and equipment from the fire of our artillery, tanks and aviation. A prisoner of the 2nd Panzer Division "Das Reich", captured on March 9, testified that before the start of the offensive, there were 70-80 soldiers in the companies of the Deutschland motorized regiment, and 118 tanks in the tank regiment. In the battles of March 8 and 9, the 9th company was completely destroyed, and the 10th company lost 60 people. The tank regiment lost 45 tanks.

During four days of fighting, the front command took measures aimed at strengthening the defense. In the area from Lake Velence to the Charviz Canal, the 27th Army, introduced into the battle from the second echelon of the front, was deployed. West of the canal, on a narrower front, the 26th Army continued to defend.

The next day, actions in the main direction reached their highest tension. Up to 450 German tanks and assault guns rushed to the defensive positions of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, attacking our troops in dense formations. As it turned out later, Hitler gave a personal order to the troops on March 10 to reach the Danube.

However, despite this, by the evening of March 9, the position of the units of the 3rd Ukrainian became greatly complicated. East of the Charviz Canal, units of the 1st SS Tank Corps and the 1st Cavalry Corps (3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions) completely broke through the main line of defense: units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps of the 26th Army had great difficulty restraining the enemy in the intermediate positions. In the defense zone of the 135th Rifle Corps, the Germans reached the army line, creating Velence and the Danube at a previously prepared line. The defense of the front section from Lake Velence to the Charviz Canal and further along the eastern bank of the canal to Tsetse was assigned to the 27th Army, and the defense on the front section from Tsetse to Lake Balaton was assigned to the 26th Army.

The 1st Guards fortified area and the 30th Rifle Corps with all reinforcements, as well as the 1st Guards Mechanized and 18th Tank Corps, which were in front reserve and brought into battle, were transferred to the 27th Army, and the 33rd 1st Rifle Corps, 208th and 209th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigades SU-100 - to the 26th Army.

The 23rd Tank Corps with the 207th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade, as well as the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, were transferred to the front reserve. At the same time, the 33rd Rifle Corps, reinforced by two self-propelled artillery brigades, replaced units of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and took up defensive positions at the Shar Egres, Shimontornia, Ozora line.

To strengthen the 27th Army, the following were transferred from the 4th Guards Army: anti-tank, mortar and artillery brigades, as well as four artillery regiments; from the 26th Army - a breakthrough artillery division, an anti-aircraft artillery division, an anti-tank brigade, five artillery and mortar regiments , as well as a breakthrough artillery division from the front reserve.

On March 10, fighting broke out with renewed vigor along the entire front. In the area north of Sheregelesh, the Germans brought the 3rd Panzer Division into battle. Taking advantage of the thick snowfall, enemy infantry and tanks, advancing in a north-eastern direction from the area north of Sheregelesh, at dawn on March 10, quietly approached Soviet positions and began to push back units of the 1st Guards fortified region and the 3rd Guards Air Force. airborne division. In other sectors, the Germans also stubbornly tried to break through the defenses and, despite the losses, moved forward.

The command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was forced to bring its last reserve into battle in this sector - units of the 23rd Tank Corps and the 207th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade. The artillery and tanks of these formations, deployed at the Agard-Chirib line, significantly strengthened the defense of the troops of the 27th Army.

Despite this, by the evening of March 10, German tanks reached the second defensive zone, occupied by the second echelon division of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. The 3rd Guards Airborne Division of this corps occupied a cutting-off position facing north.

In the battles for the intermediate position on March 10, the brunt of the fight against tanks again fell on the anti-tank, self-propelled and anti-aircraft artillery units. Thus, the artillery regiments and divisions operating in the zone of the 30th Rifle Corps repelled 16–18 German attacks per day.

The fighting did not stop at night. Thus, in the zone of the 155th Infantry Division, during March 9 and 10, there was a fierce battle for the capture of the dominant terrain at a height of 159.0, on which the command post of the corps and division commander was located. During the day of March 9, the enemy attacked the heights five times, but all attacks were successfully repelled by Red Army units supported by massive artillery fire.

Having failed to achieve success with frontal attacks, the Germans tried to advance around the heights. A group of tanks managed to penetrate our defenses in the Aba area, but it was destroyed by tank fire from the 110th Tank Brigade from ambushes.

As darkness fell, the attacks on the heights did not stop. Moving slowly, the enemy tanks covered the height in a semi-ring, and then opened machine-gun fire with incendiary tracer bullets at a group of individual houses and buildings located on it. The buildings caught fire, and some of the Soviet guns and tanks stationed near them were at a disadvantage: their crews were blinded, and they themselves became clearly visible. German tanks opened intense fire and began to approach. The guns of the 155th Division, in turn, fired at the flashes of tank shots, but the shooting was ineffective, and the fire from enemy tanks (among them were vehicles with infrared devices) turned out to be more accurate.

At a critical moment in the battle, the commander of the 1964th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment ordered one battery to move to the flank of the attacking tanks. Quickly turning around, the guns opened fire at the moment when the enemy’s lead tank approached the position at 50 m. By aiming along the barrel, the artillerymen managed to knock out three tanks, which somewhat delayed the attack and made it possible for the Soviet units to withdraw from the heights in an orderly manner to new positions.

Meanwhile, the command of the 27th Army brought into battle from its reserve the 363rd heavy self-propelled artillery regiment (ISU-152 - 6, ISU-122 - 11), which deployed at the line 1-1.5 kilometers east and southeast height 159.0 and stopped the advance of German tanks with his fire. Taking advantage of this, the commander of the 1964th artillery regiment withdrew his batteries from the height. In this night battle, the regiment's batteries knocked out up to 10 tanks and armored personnel carriers, losing 8 guns.

Simultaneously with the night attack on height 159.0, up to two battalions of German infantry with tanks launched an offensive in the direction of Sharashd and captured the Chillag stronghold. The command of the 27th Army brought the 68th Guards Rifle Division into battle in this direction. At 4 o'clock in the morning, the 200th regiment of this division (two battalions) with an unexpected counterattack drove the Germans out of Chillag. At the same time, all the artillery of the division was used to provide artillery support for the attack. It is curious that the 2nd division of the 320th howitzer artillery regiment fired illumination shells throughout the battle, continuously illuminating an area up to 5 km along the front and up to 3 km in depth. In two hours, the division used up about a thousand illumination shells.

Thus, our troops countered the German tank ramming with a decisive concentration of anti-tank weapons in the threatened direction, namely anti-tank, self-propelled and rocket artillery. In tank-hazardous areas, the density of artillery weapons capable of fighting heavy and super-heavy enemy tanks reached 30–40 guns per 1 km of front.

Particularly effective in these conditions was the fire of anti-tank and self-propelled guns from ambushes and from behind shelters, as well as the organization of fire pockets where enemy tanks were subjected to cross-fire. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through the main line of defense on a narrow section of the front in the zone of the 35th Guards Corps and advance into the depth of our defense up to 10 km. It seemed to the German command that one more effort would be enough and the tank divisions would break through to the Danube.

Under the leadership of experienced Soviet military leaders, even inexperienced and weakly resistant Bulgarian units fought stubbornly. On the very left flank of the 57th Army, the 12th Infantry Division of the 1st Bulgarian Army occupied positions. German troops more than once tried to break through at the junction of the Soviet and Bulgarian formations. On March 10, this section of the Allied defense was attacked by about five infantry regiments and up to 40 tanks. In these bloody battles, the soldiers of the 31st Bulgarian Infantry Regiment withstood the German onslaught and provided all possible assistance to the neighboring 299th Soviet Division. The commander of the 64th Corps, General I.K. Kravtsov, called the 31st Regiment of the 12th Division of the Bulgarian Army his regiment and congratulated its soldiers on the victory (the Bulgarian unit was temporarily under the operational subordination of the corps).

Over the next five days, the Germans sought to break through to the Danube, daily changing the direction of their tank attacks in order to find a weak point in our defenses. On March 14, the enemy brought into battle its last reserve - the 6th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht and the tank regiment of the 5th SS Viking Panzer Division. However, even after this he was unable to overcome the defenses of our troops and on March 15 he was forced to stop the offensive in the direction of his main attack.

The successful actions of our troops in the main direction decisively influenced the development of military operations in other directions.

For more than three days the battles continued for the artillery anti-tank area, equipped in the settlements of Shimontornia and Tsetse, without stopping day or night. Under our artillery fire and air strikes, the enemy suffered heavy losses. In night battles with tanks, the artillery of the anti-tank area successfully used searchlights, luminous aerial bombs and improvised means. The artillerymen of the 227th separate anti-aircraft artillery division, located on the northern outskirts of Simontornia, successfully destroyed enemy tanks. Only on March 10, the division, repelling attacks, destroyed 14 tanks that broke through into the depths of our defense.

On March 12 at night, taking advantage of the fog, the enemy captured the village of Shimontornia with large forces of tanks and crossed the canal. But he was unable to advance further and on March 16 he was forced to go on the defensive in this direction as well.

Having repelled the enemy's offensive near Balaton, the troops of the right wing of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the 2nd Ukrainian Front went on the offensive on March 16. The Vienna offensive operation began.

Results of the operation

In a ten-day defensive battle, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front bled out a large enemy group. At the cost of enormous losses (45 thousand killed and captured, 324 tanks and assault guns, 120 armored personnel carriers were destroyed, 332 tanks and self-propelled guns and 97 armored personnel carriers were knocked out; 280 field guns and mortars and 50 aircraft were also destroyed) German troops managed to wedge in some areas into our defense to a depth of 4 to 12 km, and only west of the Charviz Canal they overcame the tactical zone of our defense and advanced to a depth of 30 km. Soviet losses during 10 days of fighting amounted to 165 tanks and self-propelled guns, most of them were “thirty-four” - 84 units and medium self-propelled guns SU-100 - 48 vehicles. In the successful implementation of the defensive operation, a significant role belonged to the front artillery, which operated in close cooperation with other branches of the military.

The defense created in a short time was able to withstand the attack of a very large enemy tank group thanks to the deep echelon of troops, the decisive concentration of artillery and tanks in decisive areas and the rapid increase in troop efforts in threatened areas.

The high activity and stability of our defense was achieved through the maximum use of fire and terrain, stubborn resistance of all branches of the military and wide maneuver of artillery and tanks. During the defensive battle, more than 45 artillery units and formations took part in the maneuver. The experience of the operation under consideration shows that artillery maneuver is a factor of operational significance, therefore its organization is a function of not only the army, but also the front-line command.

In comparison with the defense at Stalingrad and Kursk, in the operation under consideration, anti-tank defense was further developed, absorbing the experience of the entire war. It was created on the basis of a single plan and included the use of assets from all branches of the military. Anti-tank defense consisted of company anti-tank strongholds, combined into battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas and reserves, which by this time had already become an obligatory element of the combat formations of the troops.

To increase the stability of our defense, ambush actions by tanks and self-propelled artillery units, as well as their maneuver into threatened areas, were of particular importance. The rapid restoration of the combat effectiveness of artillery units that suffered losses at front-line manning points is noteworthy.

In the Balaton operation, the enemy widely used night operations, using night vision devices. Our artillery, using artificial illumination of the area, successfully fought tanks at night. The positive experience of fighting tanks at night in this operation deserves special attention.

The high skill of artillery fire control and its careful preparation at all levels, the massive heroism of soldiers and officers ensured the significant effectiveness of our artillery fire, as was repeatedly testified by prisoners.

Along with the positive aspects, there were also disadvantages. In particular: the concentration areas of the tank divisions of the 6th SS Panzer Army were insufficiently reconnoitered, night air surveillance was not conducted; counterpreparations in the direction of the main attack were not carried out; The weak point of the defense remained the junctions of units and formations, where the enemy, as a rule, struck and always had the greatest success.

The difficult struggle in Hungary ended in victory for our troops. The important military-political significance of the Balaton defensive operation lies in the fact that during it the Nazi plans to restore strong defenses on the Danube and retain important economic regions of Western Hungary and Austria actually collapsed.

Thoughts about the approaching military catastrophe began to reach even the most die-hard Nazis. On March 16, the translator of the 104th Infantry Division had to interrogate another captured corporal, who at first did not even want to answer questions. Here is what Lieutenant A. A. Sinkliner recalled about this interrogation:

“We enter the house where the prisoner is. Calm look, no anger in the eyes, rather fatigue. And the rank is only corporal. Let's start a conversation.

Why don't you answer the lieutenant's questions?

I swore an oath to the Fuhrer. I have no right to reveal military secrets to the enemy. This is betrayal.

Do you know that the Red Army is already on the Oder, and north of Lake Balaton our troops are moving towards the Austrian border?

Yeah, I know.

And you think you'll win? Germany on the eve of defeat. What is your loyalty to the Fuhrer worth, whose cause is lost?

The prisoner is silent. I feel like I'm thinking.

Do you have children? - I continue.

I have two children: a boy and a girl.

I knew that cruelty and sentimentality coexist in the German soldier. In the summer of 1944, a corporal who was awarded the Iron Cross was captured. Even before the conversation with him began, when he was pulling documents out of his uniform pocket, a photo card fell out of his soldier’s book. A woman and two children were watching from it. Seeing the photograph, the corporal covered his face with his hands and said through tears: “Don’t shoot me, I’ll tell you everything.” Of course, no one was going to shoot him. He had two children, and this stubborn interlocutor of mine had the same number. Similar situation.

“Think better about your family, not about the Fuhrer,” I said.

Heavy hands lie on your knees. Shoulders dropped. The head bows even lower. He is silent for several minutes. Then he looks up.

So what regiment are you?

The Fuhrer's faithful servant spoke. Common sense prevailed over stubbornness and fanaticism.”

Having exhausted and bled the enemy strike force in defensive battles, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front prepared favorable conditions for launching a decisive offensive in the Vienna direction, which ended with the liberation of Western Hungary and Eastern Austria.

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9. Camp E. Top German commanders in World War II. Translation from English by G. G. Vershubskaya. M., ACT Publishing House LLC, Astrel Publishing House LLC, 2003, 61 (3) p., 8 colors. ill.

10. Williamson G. The SS is an instrument of terror. Translation from English by A. V. Bushuev, I. S. Sokolov. Smolensk, “Rusich”, 1999. 416 p.

11. Warwall N. SS troops. Bloody trail. Translation from German and compilation by N. Lavrov. Rostov n/a, “Phoenix”, 2000. 352 p.

The general plan of the German command, the directions of attacks of German troops and the artillery maneuver in the central sector of the 3rd Ukrainian Front from March to March 16, 1945

Notes:

Report on the actions of the armored forces of the South-Eastern Front from August 7 to September 10, 1942 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80038 ss, d. 44, l. 54).

Report on the actions of the armored forces of the South-Eastern Front from August 7 to September 10, 1942 (TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 80038 ss, d. 44, l. 55).

Malakhov M. From Lake Balaton to Vienna. M., Voenizdat, 1959, p. 62.

The 57th Army had occupied the defense at this line since January 1945. The 2nd Tank Army that opposed it was tank only in name and had four infantry divisions, one motorized brigade and four battle groups.

The table was compiled based on the inspection reports of army artillery by the front commission (TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 202825, d. 1, pp. 17–26).

TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 202825, no. 1, ll. 115–117.

The table is compiled based on materials from TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 30070, no. 1/2.

Guderian G. Tanks - forward! M., Voenizdat, 1957, p. 31.

TsAMO RF, f. 381, op. 20385, no. 2, l. 9.

TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 20607, no. 9, l. 21.

TsAMO RF, f. 413, op. 216534, building 1, l. 56.

Guderian G. Tanks - forward! M., Voenizdat, 1957, p. 133.

The table was compiled based on the report of the artillery commander of the 26th Army (TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 20607, d. 8, pp. 95–121).

Archive of the Spacecraft Artillery Headquarters, f. 1, op. 920, d. 70, l. 75.

TsAMO RF, f. 413, op. 20388, no. 3, no. 45–46.

Malakhov M. M. From Lake Balaton to Vienna. M., Voenizdat, 1959, p. 111.

Scale of artillery fire control	4th Guards A		26 A		57 A
Scale of artillery fire control	By planned areas	For unplanned areas	By planned areas	For unplanned areas	By planned areas	For unplanned areas
Corps artillery	No data	No data	15–30 min.	No data	10 min.	15 minutes.
Division artillery	8–10 min.	15–25 min.	10–15 min.	20–30 min.	7 min.	10 min.
Art group or artillery regiment	3–5 min.	8–15 min.	4–10 min.	8–20 min.	3 min.	10 min.
Division	2–3 min.	3–6 min.	3–5 min.	6–15 min.	1–2 min.	5 minutes.
Battery	up to 2 min.	up to 5 min.	1.5–3 min.	5–8 min.	1 min.	2–3 min.

The situation with the organization of counter-preparation in the 57th and 4th Guards armies was much better, since these armies had more time to prepare defense.

Reserves	Compound	Distance from the front edge in km	Average time required for maneuver
			during the day	at night
Front	12 iptabr, 170 labr, 208 sabr	50–190	3–6 hours	6–8 hours
	Total: 57 mm - 20; 76 mm - 64; SU-100 - 65
4th Guards A	438 arm. iptap, 117, 338 and 419 iptap	20–25	1–1.5 hours.	1.5–2 hours.
	Total: 57 mm - 9; 76 mm - 48
26 A	184, 1008, 1965 iptap	20–25	1–2 hours	1.5–3 hours.
	Total: 57 mm - 15; 76 mm - 39
57 A	374 arm. iptap and 864 sap SU-76	30–70	2–4 hours	3–6 hours
	Total: 76 mm - 17; SU-76 - 21
Corps	regiment - division	10–15	30–45 min.	45 min. 1 hour. 15 minutes.
Divisions	division - battery	to 10	up to 30 min.	up to 45 min.
Regiments	battery - platoon	up to 5	up to 20 min.	up to 30 min.

In addition to stationary minefields, it was planned to widely use mobile barrage detachments in defense - sapper units with a supply of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. In total, by March 5, there were 68 such units, numbering 73 vehicles, 164 carts, 30,000 anti-tank and 9,000 anti-personnel mines, as well as 9 tons of explosives. The front-line command had at its disposal three barrage detachments (on vehicles), consisting of a motorized engineering battalion and two sapper companies, each of which had at its disposal 4,500 anti-tank mines. The 4th Guards Army, on the basis of its engineer battalion, formed two such detachments in vehicles with 3,200 anti-tank and 1,000 anti-personnel mines in each. The 26th and 57th armies each had one detachment (a sapper company in four vehicles with 1000 anti-tank mines). Corps detachments, as a rule, consisted of a company - a platoon of sappers with a stock of 300-500 anti-tank mines, divisional - 10-25 sappers on one vehicle with 200-250 mines, regimental - 5-7 sappers with 100 anti-tank mines on carts.

Each detachment had its own plan for advancing to one direction or another, depending on the situation. Their actions were coordinated with anti-tank artillery and rifle units.

Based on the intelligence received, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front came to the conclusion that German units could launch an offensive at any time. Therefore, on the evening of March 5, the front headquarters warned the troops about the possibility of the enemy launching an offensive the next morning. The army and corps headquarters gave the order to bring units and formations to full combat readiness. For example, the artillery headquarters of the 30th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army issued the following combat order.

“Observation revealed a busy movement of enemy vehicles and manpower towards the front line during the day. There is evidence that the enemy will conduct active operations. To timely prevent active enemy actions, the corps artillery commander ordered:

1. On the night from 5 to 6.3.45, all officers should be in their places; battery commanders and up to artillery commanders should be at the OP and check the readiness of all artillery to conduct massive fire in accordance with the counter-preparation plan. Artillery stationed on direct fire must be in full readiness to repel enemy tank attacks.

2. Personnel should be at the guns and at the OP (50% on duty, 50% resting).

3. Prepare ammunition for firing at enemy tanks and manpower.

4. Check communication and fire control from the division artillery commander to the battery commander of both regular and attached artillery. In the event of a break in the wired connection, immediately turn on the radio stations.

5. Confirm receipt, report execution.”

Progress of the battle

“Take measures to ensure that troops are ready for night operations, using tough measures to prevent the emergence of panic in all parts of the army (Bulgarian. - Note auto). About the facts of panic in units 3 and 11 of the Infantry Division, begin an immediate investigation and bring the guilty senior commanders to justice.”

On March 7, the 133rd Rifle Corps and artillery of the Red Army were transferred to the area of the newly formed German bridgeheads.

In the subsequent days of the offensive, the Germans failed to expand the bridgeheads they had occupied at the Drava. Crushing artillery fire and air strikes from the 17th Air Army did not allow the German command to transfer sufficient forces to the northern shore. All attempts by the Germans to move forward on this section of the front were unsuccessful, although individual attempts were noted until March 16.

At dawn on March 6, after a strong 45-minute artillery barrage, the enemy went on the offensive in the 57th Army zone.

The main enemy group went on the offensive against the 26th and 4th Guards Armies at 8:47 am. The attack was preceded by a powerful 30-minute artillery barrage. The enemy delivered the strongest blow in the Sheregelesh-Apshotarnocha sector with the forces of three tank, three infantry and two cavalry divisions. In the second echelons of the corps, four more tank divisions were finishing their concentration.

The bulk of the artillery fire was aimed at suppressing our units occupying the main line of defense. The final fire raid also involved self-propelled guns and tanks, which fired quite effectively at the front edge of the defense with direct fire from a distance of 800–1000 m. The shelling of German artillery from closed positions was less effective: the explosions often fell away from the targets and most of them Soviet batteries were out of fire.

The actions of the Luftwaffe during the artillery preparation and during the period of supporting the attack were greatly hampered by low clouds, snowfall and the poor condition of the airfields.

At the same time, the artillery units of the 6th Guards Corps made a 90° turn to the south, and the artillery of the 64th Corps maneuvered to the northwest.

Artillery preparation was carried out in the form of fire raids in combination with methodical fire, and the fire of our guns continued even after the end of the enemy’s artillery preparation. Massive artillery fire inflicted huge losses on the enemy, part of his artillery was suppressed, and the start of the attack was delayed by 15 minutes.

According to the recollections of the translator of the 104th Infantry Division (part of the 57th Army) A. A. Sinkliner, in early March the unit fought heavy defensive battles in the Kaposvár area. Then the transmitters of our headquarters picked up radio programs from Vienna and Graz, which bluntly said that Zhukov might enter Berlin, but the Wehrmacht would definitely drown Tolbukhin in the Danube. The leaflets that the Nazis dropped from airplanes were written in the same spirit. The enemy desperately rushed forward.

At the same time, the commandant of the 1st Guards fortified area also began to take measures to strengthen the defense. He brings his reserve into battle - a company of machine gunners and two batteries of 484 iptap - and decides to transfer 1670 iptap, 2/188 minp, two batteries 562 iptap and 51 guards to the breakthrough site. Minp rocket artillery. At the same time, it was decided to urgently transfer 338 tanks from the anti-tank reserve of the 4th Guards Army to the Sheregelesh area.

The successful use of massive artillery fire in the afternoon of March 6 was the result of urgently taken measures by the command of the 4th Guards and 26th armies to improve artillery fire control at the junction of the armies. The massing of artillery fire from indirect firing positions was achieved through wide maneuver of artillery trajectories of the 4th Guards and 26th Armies. Thus, in the Sheregelesh region, from where the enemy launched one attack after another, the fire of the 9th Guards was repeatedly concentrated. Pabr, 25 Gabr, 306 Ap and 58 Guards. minp from the 26th army and 17th brigade, 124 ran, 51st guards. Ministry of Internal Affairs from the 4th Guards Army. At the same time, a subgroup of the 21st Guards Corps of the 4th Guards Army, consisting of 115 pabres, 127 pabres, 30 pabres, located north of Lake Velence, suppressed the enemy's echelons and the nearest rear areas in front of the front of the 1st Guards fortified area with concentrated fire.

At the same time, the enemy launched an offensive west of the Sharviz Canal. It should be noted that his actions were noticeably affected by the separating influence of the Sharviz and Malom Chathorn canals, running parallel to each other. By March 6, as a result of the flood, the water level in the canals rose sharply, and the entire space between them was filled with water. Therefore, the main efforts of the 1st Cavalry Corps (3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions) and the 1st SS Panzer Corps (1 SS Tank Division and 12 SS Tank Division) were directed south along the Székesfehérvár - Tsetse highway, at the junction of the 30th and 135th Rifle Corps, which turned out to be insufficiently equipped in anti-tank terms.

After 9 o’clock in the morning, the area in the area of Shoponya and Kaloz was covered in fog, visibility did not exceed 200 m. Because of this, the effectiveness of Soviet artillery fire from closed positions sharply decreased. Taking advantage of this, the German infantry, with the support of tanks, managed to come close to the front line and again attack the positions of the 68th Guards and 233rd Rifle Divisions. This time the enemy managed to push back the left-flank battalion of the 68th division and occupy a height dominating the terrain.

“The cavalry corps was able to advance only 300 meters along the Shifok-Lepshen highway, the enemy is continuously counterattacking from the Enying area.”

Artillery maneuver was critical to the success of the 57th Army's defense. In search of a weak point in the defense of this army, the enemy subsequently changed the direction of his attacks twice and transferred the main efforts on March 10 to the junction with the 1st Bulgarian Army, and on March 14 - to the zone of the 6th Guards Corps. In each case, he advanced only as long as he had fire superiority in a given area. When, due to the maneuver of our artillery, the forces were equalized, the enemy’s advance stopped.

When repelling the offensive of March 10–12 in the area north of Etvöskonyi, the maneuver of about 200 guns and mortars of the 1st Bulgarian Army into the 57th Army zone was important.

Which division?

Sixteenth Panzergrenadier SS.

How long have you been in this direction?

What is the task of your troops advancing here? - asked the translator.

Occupy Kaposvar, and then break through to the Danube.

In January, your troops near Budapest already tried to throw Soviet units into the Danube, but nothing happened.

Are you sure that Germany will win this war?

We must win. We need living space. We have a new powerful weapon.

In addition, a regrouping of artillery units was carried out - two howitzer and mortar brigades, as well as artillery, anti-tank, mortar regiments and a Katyusha regiment were transferred from the left bank of the Danube to the right and advanced to the defense areas of the 30th Rifle Corps. One brigade from the front reserve moved to the area of Kazol-Sharkerestur, at the junction of the defenses of the 36th and 68th Guards Rifle Divisions.

The German command was very restrained in assessing the results of the first day of Operation Spring Awakening. Thus, the commander of Army Group South, General Wöhler, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces (OKH), Colonel General Guderian (who would be removed from his post on March 28, 1945. - Note auto) on the evening of March 6:

“Tanks can hardly move across rough terrain due to heavy mud, and all roads are blocked by minefields and enemy artillery. Infantry units were unable to ensure a quick breakthrough of positions, and fierce fighting led to a large consumption of ammunition, as a result of which soldiers could be left without ammunition. It turned out that the enemy was expecting our attack and was preparing for it, although he did not know the exact start time and location of the main attacks.”

On the morning of March 7, the enemy, having brought into battle all the forces of the first echelon - parts of the army group "Balk", the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Corps, resumed the offensive along the entire front - from Lake Velence to the Charviz Canal. The main directions of attacks were determined by Sheregelesh, Sharashd and Sharkerestur. The attack by German troops was preceded by 30–45 minutes of artillery preparation, supplemented by bombing and air assault strikes.

During stubborn battles, only after the engineering defense structures were destroyed by enemy artillery fire and aviation, and the anti-tank artillery suffered heavy losses, the enemy captured the first position - several strong points south of Sheregelesh. In the sector of the 1st Guards fortified area, transferred to the 27th Army on March 7, German troops also expanded their breakthrough area towards Lake Velence. In order to prevent further advance of the enemy, the commander of 30 sk immediately moved the 110th and 170th tank brigades of the 18th tank corps, his artillery anti-tank reserve and a mobile barrage detachment to the position of divisional reserves. At the same time, the corps' artillery increased fire on the attacking enemy, as a result of which the enemy's advance was stopped.

date	Number of guns and mortars		Artillery ratio	Artillery density in the area Lake Velence - Szarviz Canal
date	1st Guards UR, 30 sk, 35 guards. sk	Enemy	Artillery ratio	Artillery density in the area Lake Velence - Szarviz Canal
By the morning of March 6	707	1400	1:2,0	38,6
By the end of March 6	1186	1400	1:1,2	52,0
By the end of March 7	1500	1400	1,1:1,0	65,0
By the end of March 8	2415	1756*	1,4:1,0	110,0

* Increase due to the introduction of 2 and 9 SS TD into the battle.

However, the Germans did not stop attacking Kaloz until the end of the day. The batteries of the 1965th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment that survived the morning battle fought until the last shell, and after the destruction of the guns, the artillerymen continued to fight like infantry. But despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet units, by the evening of March 7, the 1st SS Panzer Corps occupied Kaloz.

As already mentioned, in two days of battle, two 1965th and 1966th artillery regiments reported knocking out and destroying 54 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers, 7 vehicles, 3 guns and 12 machine guns. Its losses amounted to 30 guns, 3 vehicles, 12 people killed, 46 wounded and 23 missing. With six remaining guns, the regiments were transferred to the front reserve for replenishment.

The command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front took decisive measures to surround the penetration area with fresh units, primarily artillery.

By March 9, additional artillery regiments of the 3rd Guards were deployed north of Sheregelesh. Airborne Division, 78th and 163rd Infantry Division, 35th Guards. sk; 338 iptap from the reserve of the 4th Guards Army; 452 sap 18 tk; 49th Guards pabr from the front artillery reserve. East and south of Sheregelesh, 1000 iptap and 292 minp were deployed; 1639, 1694 and 1114 zenap; 1438 sap and 363 tsap 18 tk; 367 minp, 1453, 1821, 382 saps and 407 ogmd 1st guards. mk; 173 tabr, 15 tminbr, 170 labr from the front artillery reserve.

In total, 22 artillery and mortar regiments, numbering more than 520 guns and mortars, were brought to the breakthrough site in three days.

As a result, the artillery density on this section of the front increased from 38.6 to 65 guns and mortars per 1 km, and the artillery ratio changed in our favor.

The movement of brigade units was slow, there was no communication between the brigade commander and the divisions operating ahead, and reconnaissance was carried out in a haphazard manner. As a result, the 1068th self-propelled artillery regiment, marching along the Tsetse-Székesfehérvár highway, was unexpectedly attacked by German tanks that had broken through, and, having lost 14 out of 21 SU-100s as a result of a fleeting battle, hastily retreated to the Shar Egres area.

In repelling enemy attacks in the direction of Tsetse with the aim of capturing the crossing over the Charviz Canal, a powerful anti-tank area created on the morning of March 9 in the Tsetse-Simontornia area played a major role. The commander of the 49th anti-tank artillery brigade, Colonel Shpeck, was appointed its commandant. In addition to the two regiments of the brigade (1008th and 1249th), this area included a division of the 407th light artillery regiment, 1089th anti-aircraft artillery regiment, 227th separate anti-aircraft artillery division, 117th anti-tank fighter regiment, 1953rd self-propelled artillery regiment of the 209th self-propelled artillery brigade, “Avenger” division (formed January 6–10, 1945 as part of the 4th anti-aircraft division by order of the artillery commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, intended to fight tanks and was armed with captured 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. - Note auto) and the 268th Guards Anti-Aircraft Regiment, with a total of more than 100 guns and self-propelled guns. With the support of dismounted units of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division deployed to this area, the fighters of the anti-tank area during March 9 and 10 repelled all German attempts to seize the crossings across the Sharviz and Kaposh canal in the Tsetse and Shimontornia area and held their positions.

Thus, during the four days of the offensive, the German troops, despite the introduction of a large number of tanks into battle, failed to break through our tactical defense in the direction of the main attack. The enemy's tank divisions lost from 40 to 60% of their manpower and equipment from the fire of our artillery, tanks and aviation. A prisoner of the 2nd Panzer Division "Reich", captured on March 9, testified that before the start of the offensive, there were 70-80 soldiers in the companies of the Deutschland motorized regiment, and 118 tanks in the tank regiment. In the battles of March 8 and 9, the 9th company was completely destroyed, and the 10th company lost 60 people. The tank regiment lost 45 tanks.

However, despite this, by the evening of March 9, the position of the units of the 3rd Ukrainian became greatly complicated. East of the Charviz Canal, units of the 1st SS Panzer Corps and the 1st Cavalry Corps (3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions) completely broke through the main defense line; units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps of the 26th Army had great difficulty restraining the enemy in an intermediate position. In the defense zone of the 135th Rifle Corps, the Germans reached the army line. The defense of the front section from Lake Velence to the Charviz Canal and further along the eastern bank of the canal to Tsetse was assigned to the 27th Army, and the defense on the front section from Tsetse to Lake Balaton was assigned to the 26th Army.

Particularly effective in these conditions was the fire of anti-tank and self-propelled guns from ambushes and from behind shelters, as well as the organization of fire pockets where enemy tanks were subjected to cross-fire. At the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to break through the main line of defense on a narrow section of the front in the zone of the 35th Guards Corps and advance into the depth of our defense up to 10 km. It seemed to the German command that one more effort was enough, and the tank divisions would break through to the Danube.

The successful actions of our troops in the main direction decisively influenced the development of military operations in other directions.

Results of the operation

To increase the stability of our defense, ambush actions by tanks and self-propelled artillery units, as well as their maneuver into threatened directions, were of particular importance. The rapid restoration of the combat effectiveness of artillery units that suffered losses at front-line manning points is noteworthy.

The difficult struggle in Hungary ended in victory for our troops. The important military-political significance of the Balaton defensive operation lies in the fact that during it the enemy’s plans to restore strong defenses on the Danube and retain important economic regions of Western Hungary and Austria actually collapsed.

“We enter the house where the prisoner is. Calm look, no anger in the eyes, rather fatigue. And the rank is only corporal. Let's start a conversation.

Why don't you answer the lieutenant's questions?

I swore an oath to the Fuhrer. I have no right to reveal military secrets to the enemy. This is betrayal.

Do you know that the Red Army is already on the Oder, and north of Lake Balaton our troops are moving towards the Austrian border?

Yeah, I know.

And you think you'll win? Germany on the eve of defeat. What is your loyalty to the Fuhrer worth, whose cause is lost?

The prisoner is silent. I feel like I'm thinking.

Do you have children? - I continue.

I have two children: a boy and a girl.

I knew that cruelty and sentimentality coexist in the German soldier. In the summer of 1944, a corporal who was awarded the Iron Cross was captured. Even before the conversation with him began, when he was pulling documents out of his uniform pocket, a photo card fell out of his soldier’s book. A woman and two children were watching from it. Seeing the photograph, the corporal covered his face with his hands and said through tears: “Don’t shoot me, I’ll tell you everything.” Of course, no one was going to shoot him. He had two children, and this, my stubborn interlocutor, had the same number. Similar situation.

“Think better about your family, not about the Fuhrer,” I said.

Heavy hands lie on your knees. Shoulders dropped. The head bows even lower. He is silent for several minutes. Then he looks up.

So what regiment are you?

The Fuhrer's faithful servant spoke. Common sense prevailed over stubbornness and fanaticism.”

1. Materials from the archives of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF).

2. Materials from the archive of the Red Army Artillery Headquarters.

3. Soviet artillery in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945. M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960. 800 pp., incl.

4. Isaev A., Kolomiets M. The defeat of the 6th SS Panzer Army. Panzerwaffe grave. M.: Yauza, Eksmo, KM Strategy, 2009. 160 p., with illus.

5. Malakhov M. M. From Lake Balaton to Vienna. M., Voenizdat, 1959. 480 p.

6. Sincliner A.A. Notes of a military translator. Stavropol: Stavropol Book Publishing House, 1989, 176 p.

7. G. Guderian. Tanks - forward! M.: Voenizdat, 1957, 520 p.

8. From “Barbarossa” to “Terminal”: A view from the West. Comp. Yu. I. Loginov. Translation. M., Politizdat, 1988. 463 p.

9. Camp E. Top German commanders in World War II. Translation from English by G. G. Vershubskaya. M.: ACT Publishing House LLC, Astrel Publishing House LLC, 2003. 61 (3) pp., 8 colors. ill.

10. Williamson G. The SS is an instrument of terror. Translation from English by A. B. Bushuev, I. S. Sokolov. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 416 p.

11. Warwall N. SS troops. Bloody trail. Translation from German and compilation by N. Lavrov. Rostov n/d: Phoenix, 2000. 352 p.6 4

TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 202825, no. 1, ll. 115–117.

The table is compiled based on materials from TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 30070, no. 1/2.

Guderian G. Tanks - forward! M.: Voenizdat, 1957, p. 31.

TsAMO RF, f. 381, op. 20385, no. 2, l. 9.

TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 20607, no. 9, l. 21.

TsAMO RF, f. 413, op. 216534, building 1, l. 56.

Guderian G. Tanks - forward! M.: Voenizdat, 1957, p. 133.

The table was compiled based on the report of the artillery commander of the 26th Army (TsAMO RF, f. 243, op. 20607, d. 8, pp. 95–121).

Archive of the Spacecraft Artillery Headquarters, f. 1, op. 920, d. 70, l. 75.

TsAMO RF, f. 413, op. 20388, no. 3, no. 45–46.

Malakhov M. M. From Lake Balaton to Vienna. M.: Voenizdat, 1959, p. 111.

Both Battles of Balaton, which took place in January and March 1945 in the area of Lake Balaton in Hungary, are rather poorly documented on both the Soviet and especially the German sides. The main documents on these battles have not yet been published. Even worse, the main German documents related to the battles at Lake Balaton have not yet been studied and put into scientific use. Most of them were captured by the Red Army as trophies in the last days of the war and, most likely, are still stored undisassembled in the Special Archive in Moscow. Due to the weakness of the documentary base, we are deprived of the opportunity to objectively compare the number of troops, weapons and military equipment and the losses of the parties. Relying heavily, especially on the German side, on memoirs. When writing this chapter, we used the research of M. Svirin, O. Baronov, M. Kolomiets and D. Nedogonov “Battles at Lake Balaton.”

The first Battle of Balaton in January 1945, in which the German 6th Army, which included the IV SS Panzer Corps, tried to relieve Budapest and restore defenses along the Danube, began to be prepared by the German command even before the encirclement of the Hungarian capital. Such close attention to Hungary was explained by the fact that by the end of 1944, Germany had lost the oil fields and oil refineries of Romania, which had gone over to the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition. In addition, almost all German plants producing synthetic fuel were destroyed by Anglo-American aircraft. The only oil fields and refineries remaining at the disposal of the Reich were in Zisterdorf, Austria, and in Hungarian territory west of Lake Balaton. As the former commander of Army Group South, Colonel General Hans Friessner, recalls, “the army group received the so-called “directive instructions from the Fuhrer” on the procedure for using newly arrived tank formations in offensive operations - the 3rd, 6th and 8th tank divisions and three battalions of T-V Panther tanks. Hitler limited their use to only two sections of the front: between lakes Balaton and Velence or in the northeastern section of the Budapest bridgehead. Hitler preferred an offensive between lakes Balaton and Velence in a southeast direction and insisted on its speedy implementation. However, poor road conditions and marshy terrain in the area did not allow the tank forces to carry out a wide operational maneuver. On December 14, the army group command drew the attention of the OKH to this circumstance, stating “that it cannot take responsibility for an immediate offensive with the tank forces provided to it in muddy conditions. It considers it necessary to wait for the onset of frost, when it will be possible to conduct operations without adhering to hard dirt roads.

The new operation of the army group, codenamed “Late Harvest,” was prepared in such a way as to begin it immediately, as soon as weather conditions permitted and all the prerequisites for successful operations of the troops were created.”

German troops were still not ready to launch a counterattack, although the encirclement of Budapest was becoming an increasingly real prospect. The troops that were soon surrounded in the Hungarian capital numbered only 79 thousand people - 41 thousand Germans and 38 thousand Hungarians. By that time, the Hungarian units had very low morale and even defended their own capital without enthusiasm, anticipating inevitable defeat and the imminent end of the war. But the majority of the German troops in the Budapest garrison did not have very high fighting qualities. There were both newly formed Hungarian SS divisions and People's Grenadier divisions hastily sent to the front. Hitler did not attach much value to him and was ready to sacrifice if only he would draw back Soviet troops and slow down the Soviet offensive in Western Hungary. Then, if the counterattack of the SS tank divisions was successful, he hoped to recapture the Hungarian capital and restore the defenses along the Danube.

Friesner recalled: “On December 17, the main command of the ground forces demanded an urgent counterattack with tank forces from the lake defile area near Szekesfehervár. I ordered once again to study and check all the initial data for the counterattack, in which the leadership of the troops was to be taken over by the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Corps. The corps command reported:

“The offensive can only be carried out if there is severe frost, which will make the swampy terrain in this area passable for tanks. At the moment the terrain is not conducive to the operation. The experience of the 3rd Tank Corps in the battle of Cherkassy suggests that such conditions are fraught with the loss of most of the tanks brought into the offensive. Even if the situation develops favorably, tanks can get stuck in the mud and fail on the second day of the offensive.”

The supply situation (the distribution of ammunition and fuel to the troops had not yet been completed) also indicated that the operation could not be carried out at the moment. I was once again convinced of this by making an inspection tour of the troops, which ended with me getting stuck with my car in the mud. Rain alternated with snow. The roads were completely washed out. Under these conditions, I rejected the OKH demand for an offensive and asked to postpone the start date until the frost made it possible to use tank units and, above all, until sufficient ammunition and fuel were available. Under the existing circumstances, I could not take responsibility for the success of the counterattack, especially considering the general operational situation. Nevertheless, Guderian in the afternoon once again demanded that the offensive be launched immediately. A heated telephone argument broke out between us, after which I decided to fly to Budapest. The Hungarian capital by that time was still full of people. The city presented a peaceful Christmas scene, although the enemy stood at its very gates. All shops were open, city transport functioned as if nothing had happened. The streets were lively. The townspeople were buying Christmas gifts. The enemy only fired at the city from long-range guns from time to time, at night. Air raids on the city were rare. Despite repeated representations to the Hungarian government, the evacuation of the city was constantly postponed. It is possible that practically it was no longer possible to implement it.

Seeing all this, I was of the opinion that Budapest should not be considered a “fortress,” especially since there were still hospitals in the city. Only a utopian or a fanatic could conduct battles in the city, as Hitler demanded, and turn every house, every crossroads into a center of defense, and even involve the townspeople themselves in the defense of the city.

I did not flatter myself with hopes of successfully defending a vast bridgehead against enemy forces that were many times superior to us, and certainly did not believe in the success of the street fighting prescribed by Hitler’s order. Street fighting could only lead to exhaustion of forces. In addition, the enemy, according to all data, did not even think about street fighting. He was probably going to encircle Budapest along with the four divisions defending it with a strike from the western bank of the Danube, as it eventually happened.

Given the general situation, I was of the opinion that all the troops operating in the eastern part of the Budapest bridgehead should be used to strengthen the well-thought-out and deeply echeloned defense on the heights in the Székesfehérvár area. I have not changed my views and to this day I believe that with such an organization of defense, the enemy would not have been able to make such a quick and deep breakthrough. In addition, both the troops defending Budapest and the city itself would have been able to avoid the troubles that occurred later.”

The Germans realized that they could not rely on the Hungarian army. On March 19, 1945, Goebbels received the new Hungarian envoy in Berlin, Mecher. After the meeting, the Gauleiter of Berlin wrote in his diary: “The Magyars cannot be relied upon at all. They have already died without being dead yet. Envoy Mecher describes to me real horrors, telling about the Bolshevik atrocities in the captured Hungarian cities that make my blood run cold. He adds that he informed the papal nuncio in Berlin about this, but the nuncio only shrugged his shoulders. Apparently, the nuncio in Berlin thinks the same way as the pope, namely, that one should not tease the powers that be, but should try not to argue with them, no matter what dirty deed they are doing.”

The 8th Panzer Division had to be used for a counterattack at Ipolseg, where the motorized infantry of the 3rd and 6th Panzer Divisions was also sent. The tanks of these divisions came under a powerful blow from the Soviet infantry, which began an assault on the Margarita position on December 20.

On December 23, Friesner, skeptical about the possibility of holding Budapest, was removed from his post and replaced by General Otto Wöhler. The next day, December 24, Budapest was completely surrounded.

Here is what Paul Hausser writes about the battles at Lake Balaton: “Without the knowledge of the High Command of the Ground Forces (Heinz Guderian), the High Command of the Wehrmacht on December 24 gave the order to transfer the headquarters of the IV SS Panzer Corps (Herbert Gille) with the SS divisions “Totenkopf” and “Viking” to Hungary and liberate Budapest. The front line of the German front ran from Lake Balaton through Stuhlweissenburg (Szekesfehervár), Mor, beyond the Altal River, at Tatabanya, to the Danube east of Komárno...

The counterattack with the aim of releasing the blockade of Budapest was carried out by the 6th Army of General Hermann Balck. In addition to the SS Corps, it included the 6th Panzer and 96th and 711th Infantry Divisions, as well as the Hungarian cavalry.

Guderian protested against the transfer of the IV SS Panzer Corps to Hungary. In “Memoirs of a Soldier” he stated: “December 25, the first day of Christmas, I went by train to Zossen. I was on the road when Hitler, behind my back, ordered the transfer of Gille's SS Corps, which included two SS divisions, from the area north of Warsaw, where it was concentrated in the rear of the front as a reserve for Reinhardt's Army Group, to Budapest to break through the encirclement around of this city. Reinhardt and I were in despair. This step by Hitler led to an irresponsible weakening of the already overextended front. All protests went unheeded. Liberation from the blockade of Budapest was more important to Hitler than the defense of East Germany. He began to give foreign policy reasons when I asked him to cancel this ill-fated event, and sent me out. Of the reserves collected to repel the Russian advance (fourteen and a half tank and motorized divisions), two divisions were sent to another front. There were only twelve and a half divisions left on a 1,200 km front.”

Of course, Guderian was much more concerned about the defense of his native Pomerania than the relief of Budapest. But Hitler was absolutely right that it was impossible to continue the fight without fuel. It is not clear what Guderian was counting on. An experienced commander, he probably realized that two extra tank divisions would not help defeat the Red Army in East Germany. Most likely, Guderian and other Wehrmacht generals even then, at the end of December 1944, when the failure of the Ardennes counteroffensive had already been determined, tried at all costs to delay the Soviet troops as far as possible from Berlin, hoping that the Anglo-American troops would be able to occupy the main part of Germany, including its capital, and the German troops will be able to surrender to them, and not to the Red Army. However, the collapse of resistance on the Western Front would inevitably lead to the collapse of resistance on the Eastern Front. The troops of the Eastern Front would try to quickly retreat to the West in order to quickly surrender to the British and Americans, ceding territory to the Red Army. But then, at the end of 1944, she was much closer to Berlin than the Western allies.

And from the point of view of supplying fuel, it was more expedient to keep tank divisions closer to the last oil refineries remaining in German hands in Austria and Hungary. It was very difficult to supply tanks in Pomerania from there in conditions when Anglo-American aviation completely dominated the skies over the Reich, and transportation by rail was extremely difficult.

Hitler at that time was considering a plan for the long-term defense of the “Alpine Fortress”, and for the success of such a defense it was necessary to retain the oil fields and refineries of Western Hungary and Eastern Austria at any cost. It was possible to hold this area more or less reliably only by moving the line of defense to such a serious water barrier as the Danube. The operation to release the siege of Budapest was supposed to achieve this goal.

It should be emphasized once again that the combat effectiveness of the Hungarian army by that time was low. As the former commander of Army Group South, General Hans Friessner, recalled, “even in the hitherto considered reliable 10th and 12th Hungarian divisions, operating east of Budapest, the first signs of decay appeared. Hungarian soldiers, individually and in large groups, up to 100 people, with white flags, went over to the enemy’s side. In just 2–3 days, 5 officers and 1,200 soldiers ran over to the Russians. Confidence in the Hungarian army was completely lost, and it was no longer possible to bet on it.”

The same Friesner stated: “The path to Vienna through Novy Zamky and Bratislava was then completely free. The entire area between the Danube and the Slovak border was a vacuum in which there was almost no German soldier. Now, under the cover of the Danube, it was easy for the 2nd Ukrainian Front to strike in the direction of Vienna. If Malinovsky had known how few German forces opposed him here at that time, he would not have had to rack his brains for long over this decision. However, he did not make such a decision.”

However, at that moment, the Soviet command was thinking about an attack on Budapest, the rapid capture of which Stalin demanded, and had no information about the weakness of the German troops in the Vienna direction.

According to the "Last Harvest" plan, both SS panzer divisions were supposed to break through between Tatabanya and the Danube. “Viking” was supposed to attack on the right flank of the corps, and “Totenkopf” - on the left. Having reached the Danube, both divisions had to turn southeast and bypass Mount Vertes from the north with forests in order to reach the Bischke-Zhambek line. The corps' neighbor on the left was supposed to cross the Danube and hit the rear of the Soviet troops, and then protect the flank of the "Death's Head" during the corps' rush to Budapest.

The offensive began on January 1, 1945 at 18:00 Berlin time (20:00 Moscow time), without artillery preparation. The whole calculation was based on surprise. The German command hoped that Soviet soldiers and officers had not yet recovered from the New Year celebrations. An offensive in the dark ensured that the attackers would not be affected by the Soviet aviation that dominated the air. There was no point in carrying out our own artillery preparation in the dark due to its low effectiveness, so it was abandoned.

From the very first hours, the attackers encountered dense minefields at the exits from the mountains. The roads were blocked by anti-tank barriers. Units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front expected an enemy attack and were preparing to repel it. However, tactically, in time and place, the German offensive was sudden. Therefore, the attackers achieved their initial goals quite quickly. On January 5, the SS divisions reached the Bischke-Zhambek line, breaking away from their neighbors. Here the SS tankers were forced to stop, since the defense of the open flanks consumed too much strength, and the Soviet counterattacks became more and more fierce.

The German breakthrough in this direction forced Marshal Tolbukhin to give the order on January 3 for the urgent creation of a second line of defense at the Esztergom - Bichke line and the deployment of a tank and two mechanized corps there. Artillery from unattacked areas was also brought in here.

Already on the morning of January 4, a frontal defensive barrier was created in a strip about 25 kilometers wide. The main roads and exits from the mountain defile, the outskirts of settlements and the edges of groves were occupied by motorized infantry, tanks and artillery batteries up to 152 mm, as well as anti-aircraft guns capable of hitting the “royal tigers”. Anti-tank artillery regiments deployed on the flanks. Mortar, howitzer and heavy cannon regiments were located in closed firing positions. Two YPTAPs remained in the front commander's reserve.

The average density of artillery weapons in the direction of the enemy's main attack was increased to 56 guns and mortars per 1 kilometer of front, and the depth of anti-tank defense reached 10–14 kilometers.

The main blow was directed against the 4th Guards Army, which captured Székesfehérvár, or more precisely, against its 31st Guards Rifle Corps. The army command expected an enemy offensive in the sector of the 20th Guards Rifle Corps, so the enemy attack was tactically sudden. The corps was able to oppose the enemy with only 217 guns from 45 to 122 mm, the density of which was half that on the front of the 4th Guards Army. In the Dunalmash - Bankhida sector, the front of the 31st Guards Corps was broken through. The Germans advanced up to 30 km.

In turn, the Budapest group of German-Hungarian troops, trying to break through the encirclement, pushed back units of the 46th Army and captured Esztergom, but was unable to advance further.

During the breakthrough of the front of the 4th Guards Army, it turned out that the infantry, under the pressure of tanks, was retreating in disarray and leaving the artillery without cover. German tanks were able to bypass most of the anti-tank obstacles. As a result, the artillery of the 31st Guards Corps lost 70% of its equipment and up to two-thirds of its personnel, as many batteries and strong anti-tank points were surrounded.

On January 2, the planes of the Soviet 17th Air Army, commanded by General V.A. Sudets, made 671 sorties, and the planes of the German 4th Air Fleet, limited by severe fuel shortages, made only 450.

When the divisions of the IV Tank Corps reached the Tat area on January 4, they were met here by the 12th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade from the reserve of the 46th Army. Units of the 86th Infantry Division withdrew in disarray, and the artillerymen were again left without infantry cover. Because of this, the 1255th Anti-Tank Destroyer Regiment lost 14 guns, 4 vehicles, 12 tractors and 45 people killed and wounded and was forced to retreat.

It must be taken into account that at that moment the Soviet soldiers were already largely subject to moral decay. Vivid evidence of this in relation to Hungary is contained in the memoirs of Alain Polz, who later became a famous psychologist. She recalls: “...at night a whole detachment burst into our room, then they threw us to the floor, it was dark and cold, they were shooting all around. The picture remains in my memory: eight to ten Russian soldiers are squatting around me, and each one in turn lies on me. They set a standard - how many minutes for each. They looked at their wristwatches, lit matches every now and then, one even had a lighter - they kept track of the time. They hurried each other. One asked: “Is the robot good?”...

How much time passed and how many there were - I don’t know. By dawn, I understood how a spinal fracture occurs. They do this: they put the woman on her back, throw her legs over her shoulders, and the man enters from above, kneeling. If you apply too much pressure, the woman's spine will crack. This turns out to be unintentional: simply in the frenzy of violence, no one restrains himself. The spine, twisted like a snail, is constantly being squeezed, rocked at one point and not noticed when it breaks. I also thought that they would kill me, that I would die in their hands. My spine was damaged, but not broken. Since in this position you constantly rub your back against the floor, the skin from my back was torn off, my shirt and dress stuck to the abrasion - it bled, but I paid attention to it only later. And then I didn’t notice it - my whole body hurt so much.”

And there are many similar episodes in these memoirs. True, Polz stipulates that in Russian villages, Hungarian soldiers behaved only slightly better. And she still had warmer memories of the Russian soldiers than of the Germans, especially since during the battles her town of Chakvao changed hands several times: “The Germans returned, then the Russians again. I was always more afraid of the Germans. If they say “execution,” you can be sure that they will probably execute you. The fear began with the Gestapo, and there was something atavistic in it. The persecution of Jews only deepened it.

With the Russians it was never possible to foresee or predict anything; It’s amazing how, with their lack of organization, they managed to do anything at all. If they left, they never said goodbye, but simply disappeared. Returning, they greeted us with incredible joy, with loud shouts, picked us up, threw us into the air, as if they had met our closest and dearest people. They were people with kind hearts, but incredibly wild.”

However, what is important in this case, mass rape, robbery and execution of civilians was corrupting the Red Army, which had many recruits from recently liberated territories. Due to the huge irretrievable losses, ten times higher than the German ones, the proportion of soldiers who had combat experience and were accustomed to military discipline was extremely small by the end of the war. This was especially true of the infantry, where losses were especially high. Therefore, it largely lost its combat effectiveness by the end of the war. On the contrary, in artillery the losses were relatively smaller, and accordingly, the proportion of experienced soldiers and officers was higher. Therefore, they were able to successfully resist enemy tanks.

It is characteristic, by the way, that no one has ever accused the fighters of the SS divisions of war crimes or crimes against humanity during the fighting in Hungary.

Meanwhile, the anti-tank reserves of the 46th Army were transferred to the breakthrough site: two cannon regiments, a howitzer regiment, as well as a mortar regiment, a regiment of guards mortars and a combined battalion of captured Panther tanks. Other significant reserves from the 2nd Ukrainian Front were transferred to the Zhambek - Bichke line. By January 5, the advancing German group was opposed by 31 artillery regiments of the RVGK, 8 artillery divisions and 8 regiments of heavy and guards mortars. The second line of defense was occupied by the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps of General Russiyanov, the 18th Tank Corps of General Govorunenko and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of General Gorshkov. In total, the Soviet group had 1,305 guns and large-caliber mortars and 210 tanks and self-propelled guns (SU-76). Among the tanks were more than 70 American M-4 Shermans.

By the evening of January 5, the German offensive was stopped. After the end of the fighting, the captured team of the 4th Guards Army discovered 5 destroyed “royal tigers”, 2 “tigers”, 7 “panthers”, 19 T-IV, 6 T-III, 5 75-mm assault guns, 19 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles. According to reports from Soviet units, 120 German tanks and assault guns and about 100 armored personnel carriers were knocked out in these battles.

Having failed to organize a breakthrough to Budapest from Komárno, the German command hastily planned a second counterattack - from the area northwest of Székesfehérvár. The offensive was supposed to be carried out in two directions: from the northwest to Bichke and from the southwest to Zamol: This was supposed to lead to the encirclement of the formations of the 3rd Ukrainian Front operating near Bichke. After this, both German groups had to make their way to Budapest.

The offensive was led by three German tank divisions in each grouping.

The attack on Zamol began at 8:40 a.m. on January 7. More than 120 tanks and assault guns attacked the battle formations of the 5th Guards Airborne Division of the 20th Guards Rifle Corps under Major General N.I. Biryukov. 40 minutes later, German attacks resumed in the zone of the 31st Guards Rifle Corps in the direction of Bischke.

The artillerymen of the 9th and 42nd anti-tank artillery brigades of Colonels I.V. Grishchenko and K.A. Leonov fought especially staunchly and inflicted great damage on the enemy in the area of Szekesfehérvár and Zamol. For example, the battery of Major A.N. Borodai burned 5 and knocked out 4 enemy tanks in 40 minutes of battle.

In five days in the Székesfehérvár area, the Germans advanced only 7 kilometers, and near Bichke they remained almost at their original positions.

Due to continuous cloud cover and frequent snowfalls and rain, Soviet aerial reconnaissance was unable to determine where the German tank divisions were regrouping. Front headquarters received conflicting reports on this matter.

Guderian was skeptical about the results of the first days of the offensive on Budapest. In his memoirs, he wrote: “On January 1, I again went to Hitler to report to him that Gille’s SS Corps, as part of Balck’s 6th Army, would begin an attack on Budapest that evening. Hitler had high hopes for this offensive. I was skeptical, since there was very little time to prepare the offensive, the command and troops did not have the same impulse that they had before. Despite the initial success, the offensive failed... Over the course of several days, from 5 to 8 January 1945, I visited General Wöhler, Friesner's successor as commander of Army Group South, General Balck and SS General Gille and discussed with them the continuation of operations in Hungary. I received information about the reasons for the failure of the attack on Budapest. In all likelihood, this happened because the initial success of the evening battle on January 1 was not used during the night to make a decisive breakthrough. We did not have more officers and soldiers in 1940, otherwise we might have reached the direction where the command of the 6th German Army managed to secretly transfer two tank corps against the left flank of the 4th Guards Army by January 17th.

Now five German tank divisions and several Hungarian infantry and cavalry units took part in the counterattack. They had 600 tanks and 1,200 guns and mortars.

The Germans were going to break through the Soviet defenses between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton and with a swift throw to the Danube, cut the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front into pieces, and then, turning north, reach Budapest.

The offensive in the area between Balaton and Berchida began on January 18 at 4.30 am (the weather was bad on that day). He was not expected here. The goal of the offensive was to break through the positions of the 4th Guards Army and reach Budapest from the south. On this day, Soviet aviation still made 718 sorties, but its actions were ineffective. The entire first day was spent slowly gnawing away at the defense, where the main obstacles were minefields and electrified wire fences. The attack was taken by the formations of the 135th Rifle Corps of Major General P.V. Gnedin. Thanks to the surprise of the attack, German tank divisions broke through the defenses and on the morning of January 20 reached the Danube in the Dunapentele and Adon areas. Separate tank units also reached the approaches to Dunafeldvar, where the front headquarters was located, guarded by only one battery of 45-mm anti-tank guns. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was cut in two. The situation was complicated by the fact that the day before a strong ice drift had demolished all the pontoon crossings across the Danube.

Having shot down parts of the 135th Rifle Corps, German tanks began to cover Székesfehérvár from the north and south. German troops continued fighting at night. These actions were carried out in small groups (1-3 tanks or assault guns) supported by cars, tractors or armored personnel carriers with lights on, creating the appearance of a large tank unit. Sometimes, for this purpose, mock-ups of tanks with lit headlights were used, designed to attract Soviet artillery fire.

Thanks to night vision devices with infrared night sights, which were used for the first time during the offensive against Budapest, which ensured firing at a distance of up to 400 meters, German tanks and assault guns fired very accurately at night.

On January 19, a knocked out assault gun with such a device was captured in the defense zone of the 18th Tank Corps. After that, to combat this innovation, the Red Army soldiers began to prepare fuel and, when enemy tanks approached, light fires, which were supposed to disorient night vision devices that detected thermal radiation.

For their part, the Soviet troops tried to illuminate the night battlefield with flares and searchlights, but this did not have much effect. Moreover, the searchlights themselves were good targets for German tanks.

Panthers and other German tanks also received night vision devices, which led to heavy losses of Soviet tanks in both battles of Lake Balaton.

On January 19, the Viking crossed the Charviz Canal at Kalosh and Shoponya. By that time, the Soviet rifle units, according to tradition, were the first to retreat to the eastern bank of the canal, leaving artillerymen on the western bank, who almost all died, but detained the enemy. To meet the group that had broken through, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front advanced the 133rd Rifle Corps with two IPTAPs and the 18th Tank Corps with a SU-76 regiment. These troops entered the battle on the move, scattered and without proper preparation. They were defeated by Viking tankers and were partially surrounded, although due to the small number of German troops the ring was not tight. On January 21, the remnants of the encircled men reached the location of the 57th Army. At the same time, almost all the artillery was lost, since the retreating infantrymen requisitioned artillery tractors and horses to make it easier to escape from the Germans. The 18th Tank Corps irretrievably lost half of its tanks, including due to the lack of fuel, as well as tractors for evacuating damaged vehicles. The 110th tank brigade of the corps drove 20 of its tanks into a swamp, where they remained inactive for several days.

It was necessary to urgently create a defense zone between Lake Velence and the city of Adon on the Danube. 30 artillery regiments were removed from unattacked sectors of the front and thrown into the breakthrough area. Here a density of up to 32 guns and mortars was created per 1 kilometer of front. As a result, the SS Viking and Totenkopf tank divisions were stopped. Maneuver groups of corps, army and front artillery quickly moved into the areas of advance of German tanks. In this case, the density of artillery in some areas reached 50–100 or more guns per 1 kilometer of front.

From the evening of January 17 to January 19, 1945, the 10th anti-tank brigade of Colonel A.V. Prince fought fiercely with enemy tanks south of Szekesfehervár. As a result of uninterrupted air raids, tank fire and enemy artillery, the brave brigade lost half of its guns.

On January 20, the 3rd Panzer Division, advancing on the right flank, reached the Danube. On January 21, the 1st Panzer Division took Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg), advancing on the city from the southeast. Due to the threat of encirclement, the Soviet infantry was forced to retreat to the Chala area. The retreat was covered by the 338th IPTAP, two combined infantry battalions and a combined company of captured tanks. The rearguard was also joined by the lost convoys of the 4th Guards Army and some of the infantry units that were retreating in disarray and had lost their combat effectiveness. IPTAP set fire to a tank and an armored personnel carrier, but was forced to leave behind four guns and three tractors during the retreat. All captured Panthers, for which there was no fuel, were also abandoned.

At 10 a.m. on January 23, two groups of machine gunners of 50–60 people each, supported by 4 tanks, in the area of Chala station bypassed the positions of the 338th IPTAP.

As a result, the 3rd Ukrainian Front was cut in two, and its grouping in the Székesfehérvár area was threatened with encirclement. Ice drift began on the Danube, demolishing pontoon bridges and ferry crossings. Soviet troops on the right bank of the Danube were supplied only by cable cars. However, the ice drift ultimately saved the 3rd Ukrainian Front from even greater trouble, since it prevented the troops of the IV SS Panzer Corps from crossing the Danube and seizing a bridgehead for the attack on Budapest. As usual, the Soviet infantry covering the guns fled at the sight of the tanks, crossing the canal located in the rear of the positions. At the same time, sappers blew up bridges across the canal. The artillerymen of the 338th IPTAP, with the help of one self-propelled gun, which had several sappers on its armor, were able to repair one of the bridges and use a self-propelled gun to transport nine tractors and three guns across the canal. The remaining guns and tractors had to be abandoned. At 16:00 the 762nd IPTAP approached the canal, preventing the Germans from crossing it.

The Viking was only able to reach the Danube near Adoni on January 23, after heavy fighting. Soviet troops retreated to the Zamol - Chala - Lake Velence line.

On January 21, due to the deterioration of the situation in the area of Lake Balaton, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command entrusted the coordination of the actions of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts to Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, freeing him from coordinating the actions of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The marshal sent part of General Goryunov's 5th Air Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front to support the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which was repelling an enemy counterattack. On 22 January, 1,034 sorties were flown, aided by improved weather. However, the actions of aviation did not lead to the cessation of the German offensive. Let us note that the 17th Air Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front made 16,501 sorties in January and, according to pilot reports, shot down 280 enemy aircraft.

About 100 German tanks, supported by infantry, advanced between Lake Velence and the Danube. But they were able to advance only 3–4 km.

The command of the 6th German Army again had to regroup. On January 25, the IV SS Panzer Corps was turned to attack Budapest along the right bank of the Danube. The offensive was to begin from the line of the Foley River. In turn, the 57th Army was deployed to the north. Between Lake Velence and the Danube, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps and parts of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, reinforced by 13 artillery and mortar regiments collected from various sectors of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, quickly deployed. Two brigades of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, equipped with Sherman tanks, which immediately entered the battle, lost 70% of their military equipment. The Shermans, with their narrow tracks, found it difficult to maneuver in the mud caused by frequent thaws. The complete defeat of the corps was prevented by the SU-100 regiment urgently thrown to its aid. And the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps was helped to hold its position by an engineering assault brigade and a howitzer division.

Gille was a supporter of the attack on Budapest. However, the commander of the 6th Army, Balck, proposed continuing the offensive to the northwest and west against a strong group of Soviet troops concentrated west of the Danube.

On January 25, the IV SS Panzer Corps launched an offensive from the Zamol area to Miklos at 9 a.m. 12 “Panthers” and 10 “Royal Tigers” took part in it. Their opponent was the 1272nd IPTAP. Having lost 16 guns, 39 killed and 47 wounded in 6 hours of battle, he, according to a report from his commander, destroyed 10 “royal tigers” and “panthers”, as well as three medium tanks and 6 assault guns (it is not very clear where they came from) . There were supposedly 119 corpses of German soldiers left on the battlefield. And again, it is not clear who counted them if the battlefield remained with the Germans. During these battles, tanks of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps mistakenly crushed 5 Soviet guns, mistaking them for German ones.

On January 26, two German infantry regiments and up to 60 tanks made a breakthrough in the Kapolnash-Barachka area. During these battles, Soviet infantry knocked out 4 Soviet Shermans, mistaking them for enemy tanks. To meet them, in the Val-Verteshach area, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front advanced the 104th Rifle and 23rd Tank Corps, as well as the SU-100 lolk, the 1501st and 184th ITPAP and the 1669th SAP (Su- 76). As a result, the advancing German group was stopped 26–29 km from Budapest.

On January 27, the offensive of Soviet troops began from the Nagy-Dunapentele area, reaching the communications of the IV SS Panzer Corps. The German command began to turn the corps to the south. On January 27–28, the 110th Tank Brigade ran into an ambush by German tanks and assault guns and lost 15 tanks.

On January 29, the offensive of this Soviet group began from the Vertes Aska area. A large tank battle took place at Pettend. The Germans estimated Soviet losses at 200 tanks. Such large losses were a consequence of the qualitative superiority of German armored vehicles and tank crews. The commanders of the 18th and 23rd tank corps, contrary to instructions from above, used tanks rather than self-propelled and anti-tank artillery to fight enemy tanks, and suffered heavy losses.

On January 30, the positions of the 2nd German Tank Army south of Lake Balaton were also attacked. Due to flank threats, the IV SS Panzer Corps was forced to retreat to the west on both sides of Velence. But German troops were able to hold the area between Velence and Tsamola, forming a front along the line Lake Velence - Lake Balaton.

The German-Hungarian group surrounded in Budapest included low-combat-ready and inactive formations (especially Hungarian divisions), which were unable to deliver an effective blow towards the relief group. Therefore, Hitler insisted on defending Budapest to the last possible opportunity. He knew that the troops defending him were not suitable for maneuverable actions and would be easily destroyed if they tried to escape from the city on their own. As Friesner noted, “in addition to the Hungarian units, troops of the 3rd Panzer Corps, consisting of the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions, the 13th Panzer Division and the Feldherrnhalle motorized division, were brought into the Budapest bridgehead, and on the island of Szentendre, located north of the city - the 357th Infantry Division, reinforced by a separate machine-gun battalion "Saxony". He admitted: “The 18th SS Cavalry Division, formed mainly from Hungarian Germans, was completely demoralized and surrendered piece by piece to the enemy.” The 22nd SS Cavalry Division defending Budapest, which also consisted of Hungarian Volksdeutsche, was little better. The Budapest group attempted a breakthrough on the night of February 11-12, 1945, when all hope of outside help had already evaporated and ammunition had run out. Only 785 people reached their own, including 170 SS men. The remaining units capitulated, including the 8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian Geyer". Its commander, SS Brigadeführer Joachim Rumohr, committed suicide. It should be noted that although the 8th SS Cavalry Division was formed back in June 1942, its combat effectiveness was low. It was based on the Fegelein cavalry brigade, which was mainly engaged in punitive operations against partisans. In total, during the battle for Budapest, more than 100 thousand German and Hungarian soldiers surrendered.

Former commander of the 17th Air Army, Air Marshal V.A. Sudets recalled that during the liquidation of the Budapest garrison an incident occurred that quarreled F.I. Tolbukhin and R.Ya. Malinovsky. On February 13, 1945, Malinovsky reported to Headquarters about the capture of Budapest. But he made a reservation that 16–20 thousand German and Hungarian soldiers were still resisting in the city.

The next day, the commander of one of the anti-aircraft regiments of the 17th Air Army, transferred to Budapest to fight the remnants of the encircled group, contacted the air army commander by telephone and said:

Comrade commander, a large fascist formation has been defeated. One lieutenant general and with him several other generals and officers were captured. What do you want to do with them? Where to deliver them?

The judge, who was next to Tolbukhin and Nedelin, informed them about this report. Tolbukhin ordered the German generals to be immediately delivered to the front command post. But they never arrived to Tolbukhin. And in the evening, the Sovinformburo reported that on February 15, troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front defeated the remnants of the encircled enemy group in the Budapest area, capturing its commander and two more generals.

Tolbukhin demanded an explanation from Sudets. He could only name the exact time when the commander of the anti-aircraft regiment with the German generals departed from the place of their captivity. At the request of the Marshal, Sudets called Malinovsky and asked him to inform Moscow about how the situation really stood.

It's done, why talk about it now? - Malinovsky said irritably.

Then Tolbukhin immediately called Headquarters and reported to Stalin about who captured the last German generals in Budapest. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, according to Sudets, decided as follows:

We will not give a refutation, but we will consider that it was yours, the 3rd Ukrainian Front, who won the final victory over the enemy in Budapest.

When the commander of the anti-aircraft regiment of the 17th Air Army finally arrived at the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, he said that, following the order of the commander, he was transporting captured generals with reinforced security in two passenger cars. However, on the way he was stopped by employees of the Special Department of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and ordered to take the prisoners to the Malinovsky command post. This is how the marshals divided the laurels of the conquerors of Budapest two months before Zhukov and Konev argued about who took Berlin.

On February 19, 1945, the artillery headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front received an order from the Art Directorate of the Red Army and the People's Commissariat of Armament “On conducting a survey of new types of German tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed during defensive battles in the area of Lake. Balaton - lake Velence - r. Danube". At the end of February 1945, a commission led by the chief of artillery of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, M.I. Nedelin, consisting of 14 people, with the participation of representatives of the People's Commissariat of Armaments, as well as the headquarters of the artillery and armored forces of the Red Army, recorded, marked and examined 90 different types of German armored vehicles , including heavy new types of medium tanks and various types of assault guns and armored personnel carriers.

A total of 7 Royal Tigers, 31 Panthers, 12 T-IVs, 4 T-IIIs, 32 assault guns and 4 armored personnel carriers were discovered. Of the 90 armored vehicles, 86 were hit by artillery fire and 4 were blown up by mines. Very significantly, not a single tank was hit from the air, which indicates the relatively low effectiveness of Soviet aviation against tanks, despite its air supremacy. Undoubtedly, Soviet irretrievable losses in tanks were much higher, if only because the battlefield remained with the Germans, and they were able to evacuate damaged armored vehicles before retreating to the line of lakes. A different situation developed, as we will see later, towards the end of the second battle in the area of Lake Balaton, when, due to the lack of fuel and the threat of encirclement, the Germans were forced to abandon not only damaged, but also a significant part of serviceable armored vehicles.

In total, 7 burnt Tiger II tanks, 31 Panther tanks, 12 T-IV tanks, 4 T-III tanks, 32 various self-propelled guns and 4 armored personnel carriers were examined. Of the 90 armored units examined, 86 were destroyed by artillery fire and 4 were blown up by mines, and 80 vehicles were burned. On all samples, 152 shell holes, 35 cases of damaged tracks, 5 cases of gun barrels being shot through, and two cases of tank turrets being dropped were found. Of the 152 holes, 100 (65.8%) were on the sides of tanks and self-propelled guns, 27 (17.8%) on the stern and 25 (16.4%) on the front of the hull. 49 holes were made by armor-piercing shells of 76-mm guns, 30–57-mm shells, 50 by shells of an unknown type (most likely by the cores of sub-caliber shells), three holes were made by cumulative mines of “faustpatrons”, and only 20 holes were made by shells of all other types. However, the examined samples of equipment also had numerous “abrasions” and “scars” from a wide variety of shells, bullets and other ammunition (for example, melted non-through “ulcers” from “faust cartridges”), which did not lead to penetration of the armor.

According to German data, in the January battles, the Viking and Death's Head divisions lost about 8 thousand people killed, including about 200 officers. They bore the brunt of the offensive.

After the completion of the battles for Budapest, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts began to prepare for an offensive in the Bratislava-Brnovsky direction. For this purpose, the 27th Army of General Trofimenko was transferred from the 2nd Ukrainian Front to the 3rd, and the 46th Army and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, on the contrary, from the 3rd to the 2nd. The 2nd Ukrainian Front was further reinforced by the 9th Guards Army and the Danube Military Flotilla.

According to S. M. Shtemenko, “already on February 17 - three days after the capture of Budapest - the Headquarters gave directives to the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts for the preparation and conduct of the Vienna offensive operation. The main role in it was given to the troops of R. Ya. Malinovsky. Their main forces were to attack north of the Danube, where the enemy, as scouts claimed, did not have tanks, and its defense relied mainly on infantry. According to intelligence data, the troops of F.I. Tolbukhin, operating to the south, were opposed by seven tank divisions. These troops were initially given a modest task: to assist their neighbor on the right - the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Some changes were made in the composition of the fronts due to the mutual transfer of troops. The strong 9th Guards Army of General V.V. Glagolev was sent from the General Headquarters reserve to the disposal of R. Ya. Malinovsky (to the Szolnok area). The 1st Bulgarian Army, subordinate to F.I. Tolbukhin, was given the task of supporting the front's operation from the south, operating along the northern bank of the Drava. The start of the offensive was scheduled for March 15.”

It was planned that the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts would liquidate the German Army Group South and capture the cities of Bratislava, Brno and Vienna, taking possession of the last industrial region still remaining in German hands.

However, the planned offensive was prevented by a new German counterattack, for which the 6th SS Panzer Army was transferred from the Western Front.

Paul Hausser recalled: “On the further use of the 6th SS Panzer Army after the failure in the Ardennes, views in Berlin differed sharply. While the Army High Command (Heinz Guderian) proposed a pincer operation from Silesia (Glogau-Cottbus) and Pomerania to ensure effective defense of Berlin, the Wehrmacht High Command (Adolf Hitler) ordered the deployment of the army in Hungary. The outcome of the war was not decided here! Military-economic reasons and oil near Lake Balaton were not a sufficient basis for such a strategy. Thus, at the end of January, the order was given to transfer the army from the Western Front. The situation on the railway allowed only four echelons to be transported at a time, so the army headquarters arrived in the area near Raab (Győr) on February 20, and the last units arrived only at the beginning of March. The divisions were somehow replenished.”

Strictly speaking, the use of the 6th SS Panzer Army in Silesia or Pomerania would still not lead to a turning point on the Eastern Front. Of course, in this case, the Soviet offensive in the Berlin direction would slow down. However, it was already stopped until April 16, but not because of fears that the 6th SS Panzer Army would be transferred to Berlin or Pomerania. And it would have been able to get there in full force, as Hausser testifies, only at the beginning of March, which in order to prevent the Soviet attack on Berlin, which, according to the estimates of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front, should have begun on February 9–10, would have been too late. The reason for the cancellation of this offensive, already developed at Zhukov’s headquarters, was that Stalin ordered, before the attack on Berlin, to concentrate all efforts on capturing Pomerania and East Prussia. He feared that the Western allies might land there, as well as in Courland, and the German troops would willingly surrender to them. And thus the prey will slip out of your hands.

If the 6th SS Panzer Army had been sent to Silesia or Pomerania, as Guderian proposed, then Soviet troops in Hungary would have launched an offensive in mid-March, as planned, and would have captured oil fields and refineries in Hungary and Austria, as well as the Austrian capital no more than two weeks. This is exactly how events developed at the end of March - beginning of April, after the collapse of the German counteroffensive in Hungary. And this despite the fact that then the 6th SS Panzer Army remained in the south and continued to fight on Hungarian and Austrian territory. Without it, Soviet troops would have moved even faster. And if Sepp Dietrich’s army had operated in Pomerania, it would very soon, by the end of March, be left without fuel.

From Hitler’s point of view, there was not only a military-economic, but also a military-strategic logic in the transfer of the 6th SS Army to Hungary. Until mid-April, the Fuhrer planned to defend himself not in Berlin, but in the “Alpine Fortress,” which included Austria and Bavaria, as well as adjacent areas of Italy and the Czech Republic. Hungary was just covering the “Alpine Fortress” from the East. And it is no coincidence that the most loyal and combat-ready SS divisions concentrated in the south. They were supposed to defend the “Alpine Fortress”. Hitler hoped, with the help of Sepp Dietrich's army, to push back Soviet troops to the Danube. He did not expect to encircle and destroy the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, taking into account the limitations of his own forces.

Taking these considerations into account, we can say that the defeat of the 6th SS Panzer Army at Lake Balaton was one of those events that predetermined the collapse of the “Alpine Fortress” idea.

According to the testimony of officers of the 6th SS Army who were captured by the Soviets, their army was supposed to reach the Danube, cut the 3rd Ukrainian Front in half, and then, turning north and south, destroy the main formations of this front. After this, the 6th SS Panzer Army was supposed to go to Czechoslovakia in the rear of the advanced formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in order to subsequently operate in the central sector.

These testimonies and their interpretation by intelligence agencies and the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front raise great doubts. Neither in German documents, nor in the memoirs of those involved in planning the operation, Guderian and Dietrich, are such ambitious tasks as the destruction of the main forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front mentioned. Thus, Guderian defines the goals of the offensive at Lake Balaton much more modestly. He notes that Army Group South “had its task: after the approach of reserves from the west, go on the offensive on both sides of Lake Balaton in order to capture the right bank of the Danube, strengthen the southern flank of the Eastern Front and cover the oil-bearing areas.” It is easy to see that Guderian does not say anything about any destruction of the opposing Soviet forces. Both he and Hitler understood perfectly well that in order to arrange new Cannes for the Soviet troops in Hungary, the Germans did not have enough strength, especially taking into account the catastrophic situation for the Wehrmacht on other fronts. And the idea that the 6th Tank Army was supposed to go to Czechoslovakia under its own power behind Soviet rear lines generally looks absurd. Such a march, especially in conditions of spring impassability and inevitable clashes with Soviet troops, threatened the 6th SS Panzer Army with the loss of almost its entire fleet of armored vehicles.

The offensive of the 6th SS Panzer Army at Lake Balaton is often compared to the German offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. In terms of the number of forces involved on the German side, including tanks, these operations turn out to be comparable, but their goals were of a completely different order. During the Ardennes Offensive, Hitler hoped to capture Antwerp, paralyze the supply of the Allied forces and force them to evacuate from the continent. The depth of the Western theater of military operations was small compared to the Eastern one, which made it possible to cherish such ambitious plans, although there was no real chance of achieving them. In Hungary, the offensive at Balaton pursued only a purely tactical goal - access to the Danube, which was supposed to improve the conditions for the defense of the oil-bearing regions of Hungary and Austria and prevent a Soviet offensive on this section of the front in the near future.

There were conflicting reports about where the 6th SS Panzer Army was being transferred from the West. So, on February 20, 1945, the head of the American Military Mission in Moscow, Brigadier General John R. Dean, asked the Chief of the Soviet General Staff (GS), Army General A. I. Antonov, to receive him on an important matter. During the meeting, J.R. Dean conveyed American intelligence data, from which it followed that the Germans were creating two groups for a counter-offensive against the Red Army: one in Pomerania for an attack on Thorn, the second in the Vienna, Moravska Ostrava area for an attack in the direction of Lodz. At the same time, it was planned to include the 6th SS Panzer Army in the southern group. A week earlier, A. I. Antonov received similar information from the head of the army section of the British Military Mission in Moscow, Colonel Brinkman. But, strictly speaking, these data could not influence Stalin’s decision to abandon an immediate attack on Berlin, which was made in early February.

True, on January 27, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General I. I. Ilyichev, reported: “It has been established that the 1st, 2nd and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which are part of the 6th SS Panzer Army, were transferred from the Ardennes to the northern and northeast direction, but the appearance of 6 TASS on the Soviet-German front is not excluded.” The primary source of this data was Lieutenant General A.F. Vasiliev, head of the Soviet Military Mission in Great Britain, who in turn received it from the British War Department. It must be emphasized that these data, reported by Ilyichev to the leadership of the General Staff, were too vague to make any final decision on their basis.

On January 31, 1945, Ilyichev sent a more specific special message to I.V. Stalin:

“1.6 SS Panzer Army is urgently transferred from the Western European to the Soviet-German front.

The loading of army units into echelons was to begin in the area of Düsseldorf, Wupertal and Cologne on January 27 and end by February 3–5, 1945.

The unloading of 6 SS TAs will apparently take place in the Central sector of the front, and not in Silesia. This assumption was made on the basis of the following data: ... - officers of the 12th SS Panzer Division, part of the 6th SS Panzer Army, were ordered to report from vacation to the Schneidemühl area;

The Fuhrer convoy brigade, part of the 6th SS Panzer Army, was ordered to receive tanks and personnel reinforcements in Cottbus...”

“... 1 SS TD “Adolf Hitler” - 11,000 people, 40 tanks; 2 SS Reich TD - 12,500 people, 60 tanks; 9 SS Hohenstaufen TD - 10,000 people, 40 tanks; 12 SS "Hitlerjugend" TD - 9000 people, 40 tanks; convoy brigade "Fuhrer" - 6000 people, 20 tanks; infantry brigade "Fuhrer" - 4000 people, 20 tanks. The transfer of the 6th SS Panzer Army to the Soviet-German front is coded in German messages under the code name Operation Grey.

2. There are signs that part of the forces of the 5th Tank Army and the 19th Army may also be transferred from the Western European to the Soviet-German front. Both armies received instructions that gave instructions on the procedure for the disembarking troops against the attacking enemy.

From the indicated armies the following can be transferred to the Soviet-German front:

Of the 5th Tank Army - 11, 116th tank divisions, 3rd and 5th artillery divisions;

Of the 19th army - the 17th artillery division."

Concluding the report, I.I. Ilyichev reported:

“...According to official data from the British, transmitted on January 30, 1945 to the head of our Military Mission in England, Lieutenant General Vasiliev, a significant part of the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army on January 24–26, 1945 was transferred from the areas of Düsseldorf, Neisse, Krefeld to Osnabrück. The British believe that the 6th TA SS should be completely concentrated in the Frankfurt am Main area by February 7, 1945. To date, the army has a little over 200 tanks. By the time of concentration, due to the replenishment of 6 TA SS, it can have up to 400–500 tanks ... "

However, on February 21, 1945, I. I. Ilyichev sent an urgent special report to I. V. Stalin, N. A. Bulganin and A. I. Antonov, the data of which contradicted the materials that the day before had been received from the American General J. R. Dean , because it turned out that “the entire 6th SS Panzer Army was heading to Hungary.”

In support of this conclusion, the head of the GRU cited the following evidence:

“...On February 2, 1945, the commander of the Southern Army Group received an order from Berlin to supply the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and a copy of the order was sent to the commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army, Colonel General Sepp Dietrich;

The operational department of the SS troops, in its order dated February 8, 1945, indicated that the areas of concentration of cargo for the 1st Panzer Corps (which includes the 1st and 12th Panzer Divisions) are Vienna and Gänserndorf (35 km northeast of Vienna);

On February 9, 1945, the operational department of the SS troops gave the order to send two officers through Vienna to the reconnaissance units of the 1st and 9th SS Panzer Divisions;

On February 9, 1945, the commander of the Southern Army Group gave the order to keep in absolute secrecy, under penalty of death, everything related to the “rest and replenishment group” (meaning the 6th SS Panzer Army consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions) .

The location of this group should not be shown on any maps...”

Further, I. I. Ilyichev reported that “the German High Command (OKW), in an order dated February 10, 1945, indicated to the commanders of the German troops located in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front that operations in Southern Hungary would require the transfer of part of the forces from Croatia (Croatia. - B.S.). In this regard, some local offensive operations in Croatia must be suspended and put on the defensive... The operations in Hungary will involve the 1st Mountain Division, the 7th SS Mountain Division "Prince Eugene" and the 11th Artillery Division, which will be withdrawn from subordination Army Group F.

This information about the transfer of the 6th SS Panzer Army to Hungary by Soviet military intelligence officers was received through Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov from the British source “X”. It is not entirely clear whether it was one of the famous “Cambridge Five” or an official representative of British intelligence. This information was based on the interception of German reports, since British specialists were able to simulate a German encryption machine and read German codes.

The head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, Colonel General F.T. Kuznetsov, immediately received the task of clarifying and verifying the information from the British source, as well as organizing operational reconnaissance in areas of the possible appearance of formations of the 6th SS Panzer Army.

In turn, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent instructions to the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front F.I. Tolbukhin: without stopping the preparation of the offensive operation on Vienna, take measures to repel a possible enemy counterattack.

By that time, formations of the 6th SS Panzer Army had already appeared against his front, so the information from the center was to some extent outdated.

Hausser describes the concept of Operation Spring Awakening as follows: “The Russians were in front of Army Group South west of the Danube: the front line made a large deep salient from the Drava to the western edge of Lake Balaton - at the narrow passage between this lake and Lake Velence - then, jutting out onto west, to the mountain scale of Vertes - then an open arc to the west to the Danube at the Hron. North of the Danube, the Russians held a bridgehead west of the Hron River. The following were deployed against them: south of Lake Balaton - the 2nd Panzer Army, immediately to the left of it the 6th Army of General Hermann Balk, on the Danube - the 1st Hungarian Army, north of it - the 8th Army.

It was necessary to find a place in this battle order for the 6th SS Panzer Army. Its task was to destroy the Russian forces west of the Danube, moving our line of defense forward to the river line in order to free up reserves for the decisive battle.”

In Hausser's presentation, the final goal of the offensive at Lake Balaton looks rather ridiculous. Why launch an offensive in order to free up reserves for action in the Berlin direction? Wouldn't it be easier to immediately throw the 6th SS Panzer Army near Berlin? And where is the guarantee that the Russians will calmly wait until Sepp Dietrich’s army deals with the Soviet troops in Hungary! After all, at any minute they can go on the offensive against the capital of the Reich. But. everything becomes logical if we assume that Hitler, if successful, was going to leave the 6th SS Panzer Army in the south, and then transfer additional troops there and join them together with the imperial government in order to defend to the last in the “Alpine Fortress”.

Hausser characterizes the composition of the 6th SS Panzer Army as follows: “The army initially consisted of the I and II SS Panzer Corps with the divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Hitler Youth, Reich and Hohenstaufen.” All of them were disguised as training units. This camouflage became unnecessary when, from 17 to 22 February, elements of the I SS Panzer Corps north of the Danube were used in the 8th Army sector to destroy the Soviet bridgehead on the Hron. The consequence of this was a regrouping of the enemy, who significantly strengthened his group south of Budapest.”

The I SS Corps of Gruppenführer Hermann Otto Priess, in cooperation with other Wehrmacht formations, launched an attack on the Soviet bridgehead on Gron on February 18 and was liquidated by February 25. Priss's corps lost about 3 thousand people killed and wounded. The losses of Soviet troops thrown from the bridgehead were significantly greater.

Thus, by February 21, when intelligence reports arrived from England, the Soviet command already knew for sure that the 6th SS Panzer Army was in Hungary. The Germans sacrificed surprise in order to eliminate the dangerous Soviet bridgehead and thereby eliminate the possibility of an immediate Soviet attack on Vienna.

According to Hausser, “Army headquarters resisted the plan in which the army would advance from a narrow pass north of Lake Balaton in a south-easterly direction, and repeatedly proposed alternatives. But, unfortunately, the plan of the army group headquarters, supported by the OKW, won in this dispute. The weather and terrain were not favorable for the operation. As early as March 1, the territory that was to be attacked was flooded. Despite this, the OKW insisted on the previous date for the start of the offensive - March 6. The target of the attack was Dunafeldvar on the Danube.

The 6th SS Panzer Army consisted of:

Cavalry Corps with two or three cavalry divisions;

I SS Panzer Corps with the 1st "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler") and the 12th ("Hitler Youth") SS Panzer Divisions;

II SS Panzer Corps with the 2nd (Reich) and 9th (Hohenstaufen) SS Panzer Divisions, and later with the 44th Grenadier Division of the Wehrmacht "Hoch-und-Deutschmeister";

III Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht under General Hermann Breit with two tank divisions. There were no reserves."

From the air, the offensive was supported by the 4th Air Fleet, which on paper, according to Soviet estimates, had up to 850 aircraft, but extremely limited fuel reserves.

And here is what the former chief of the operational department of the General Staff S. M. Shtemenko recalled about the situation preceding the second Battle of Balaton: “February 17 - three days after the capture of Budapest - Headquarters gave directives to the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts for the preparation and conduct of Vienna offensive operation. The main role in it was given to the troops of R. Ya. Malinovsky. Their main forces were to attack north of the Danube, where the enemy, as scouts claimed, did not have tanks, and its defense relied mainly on infantry. According to intelligence data, the troops of F.I. Tolbukhin, operating to the south, were opposed by seven tank divisions. These troops were initially given a modest task: to assist their neighbor on the right - the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Some changes were made in the composition of the fronts due to the mutual transfer of troops. The strong 9th Guards Army of General V.V. Glagolev was sent from the General Headquarters reserve to the disposal of R. Ya. Malinovsky (to the Szolnok area). The 1st Bulgarian Army, subordinate to F.I. Tolbukhin, was given the task of supporting the front's operation from the south, operating along the northern bank of the Drava.

As always happens in war, the enemy tried to direct the course of military operations in his own way, create a favorable turning point in the situation, defeat the Soviet troops in Hungary, push them back beyond the Danube and prevent them from reaching the southern borders of Germany.

On the day when the instructions from Headquarters went to the troops, the fascist German command moved large forces of tanks into the zone of R. Ya. Malinovsky’s troops. The attack was directed from the Komarno region along the northern bank of the Danube against the 7th Guards Army of General M.S. Shumilov, which occupied an operational bridgehead west of the Gron River, which was very important for the upcoming attack on Vienna. The guards stubbornly resisted for several days, but the enemy still forced them to retreat to the eastern bank of the Hron.

During the battles, it was possible to establish that one of the tank corps of the 6th SS Panzer Army, which had previously fought in the west and was known as the best strike force of Hitler’s troops, was operating near Komarno. It was commanded by General Sepp Dietrich, the favorite of the Fuhrer himself. The armament of this army consisted of heavy tanks "Panther", "Tiger" and "Royal Tiger".

The appearance of the 6th SS Panzer Army on our front was a very serious new element of the situation. No one expected it here, since our allies specifically warned Headquarters that this army was on the Western Front. Obviously, the regrouping of the army to the east was connected with some particularly important plan of the enemy. This is how we assessed the intelligence information received then from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, but for the time being we could not find out what goals the Nazi command was pursuing.

Having used only part of the forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army against the troops of General M.S. Shumilov, the enemy acted recklessly. True, he deprived us of an advantageous starting point for the attack on Vienna, which was the bridgehead behind the Throne, but he himself lost the most important factor of success - surprise. Our attention was drawn to the tank armada, and this ultimately made it possible to determine the intentions and plans of the German command. Soviet intelligence, using various methods, tirelessly obtained new information about the enemy.

Purposeful reconnaissance work made it possible to gradually reveal that a very large group of German forces and assets, the core of which were tanks, was concentrated southwest of Budapest in the area of Lake Balaton. Here, as it later became known, there were 31 divisions (of which 11 were tank) and some other troops. Their total number exceeded 430 thousand soldiers and officers. They were armed with almost 900 tanks and assault guns, over 5,600 guns and mortars, and 850 aircraft. Such a strong enemy group could be concentrated and most likely intended for a counter-offensive.

Headquarters immediately ordered the General Staff to warn the troops and closely monitor the enemy. But preparations for the attack on Vienna continued at full speed.

Gradually the enemy's plan was revealed. The scouts' map showed the likely directions of his attacks. The main one is from the border between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton to the southeast, in order to cut through the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and reach the Danube along the shortest route (30 km). Here the main forces of the 6th SS Panzer Army and the 6th Field Army were expected to attack. The 26th Army of General N.A. Gagen resisted the enemy.

Auxiliary strikes were planned: one - from the Nagykanizsa area to the east by the forces of the 2nd Tank Army with the aim of defeating the 57th Army of General M.N. Sharokhin; the other - part of the forces of Army Group "F" from the southern bank of the Danube against the 1st Bulgarian Army of General V. Stoychev. The directions of the auxiliary attacks converged with the direction of the main attack in the Szekszard area.

Now the question of what goals the enemy could pursue was gradually becoming clearer. After the loss of Budapest, the most obvious was the desire of the Nazi command to retain the last large oil fields of Hungary and preserve the Vienna industrial region, from where various weapons were still coming, including tanks, aircraft, and ammunition. It was also possible that Nazi Germany would move the center of resistance to the mountainous regions of Austria and Czechoslovakia. This territory was the most convenient for defense. In addition, if resistance turns out to be impossible, it will be possible to capitulate here to the Anglo-Americans, and not to the Red Army. The concentration of the 6th Panzer Army in the Balaton area could serve all these purposes.

It was clear from everything that the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were facing great trials, and they were carefully preparing for them. Headquarters ordered the creation of a deep defense, especially strong in anti-tank terms. By the beginning of active enemy operations, the 3rd Ukrainian Front had about 400 thousand soldiers and officers, 400 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, almost 7 thousand guns and mortars, and over 950 aircraft. Thus, with equality in numbers, the enemy had more than double superiority in tanks and assault guns, but was inferior to us in artillery and aviation. All this allowed Headquarters to confidently make a decision on a defensive operation.”

Here, Sergei Matveevich significantly reduced the number of Soviet troops. As we will see later, at the beginning of the fighting there were 465 thousand soldiers and officers in the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. But Shtemenko correctly identified the enemy’s plan.

Meanwhile, on February 20, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front received an order from Headquarters, without abandoning preparations for the attack on Vienna, to pay special attention to anti-tank defense in the event of a possible enemy counterattack involving the 6th SS Panzer Army. This duality of the task, when simultaneously it was necessary to prepare for both offensive and defensive, had a negative impact on the ability of the front troops to repel an enemy attack. In anticipation of an enemy offensive, F.I. Tolbukhin held a meeting of the leadership of the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, at which he demanded that the head of front intelligence, Major General A.S. Rogov to find out the most likely directions of a possible enemy counteroffensive. It was soon established that the most likely direction of the German advance was north of Székesfehérvár on Budapest and between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton on Dunapengel. Here the enemy was 25–30 km from the Danube, and his attacks on units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front could be the most dangerous.

Tolbukhin ordered the concentration of troops in the defense zones of the 4th Guards Army of General Zakharov and the 26th Army of General Hagen. Each army was assigned 11 anti-tank regiments of the RVGK. The 27th Army of General S.G. Trofimenko was located in the second echelon of the front behind the junctions of the 4th Guards and 26th armies. In total, together with the artillery of the 27th Army, 50 artillery and 13 mortar regiments, as well as 4 cannon brigades of the RVGK, were concentrated in this direction.

In the zone of the 4th Guards Army of Lieutenant General K.D. Zakhvataev, who replaced G.F. Zakharov, and the 26th Army of Lieutenant General N.A. Gagen, defending in the first echelon in the direction of the probable main attack of the enemy, there was a concentration of more than 90 percent of all artillery of the reserve of the Supreme High Command, transferred to the disposal of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. In the area of the front edge it was planned to create a continuous zone of multi-layered gun and mortar fire. But they did not have time to do this by the beginning of the German offensive.

But they were equipped with company anti-tank strong points, which had 3-5 guns and 4-6 anti-tank rifles, battalion anti-tank units, anti-tank areas and mobile artillery anti-tank reserves of regiments, divisions, corps and armies. Battalion units were reinforced with individual tanks and self-propelled artillery units. Anti-tank areas, which had from 12 to 24 guns, were organized in threatened tank-dangerous directions, as well as at the junctions and flanks of formations. About 30 thousand anti-tank mines were used in minefields.

In addition to the 4th Guards and 26th, the 1st Bulgarian Army of General Stoychev and the 57th Army of General Sharokhin were located in the first echelon of the front. The front reserve included the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, the 18th and 23rd Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps. Together they totaled 142 tanks, of which 12 required repairs. The 23rd Tank Corps was reinforced by the 207th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade with 63 SU-100s, and the 18th Tank Corps by the 208th Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade with 65 SU-100s. The 23rd Tank Corps was located in the Lovasvereni area, 18- 1st tank - in the area of Adoni, Sharashd, 1st Guards Mechanized Corps - in the area of Karachoni, Dunafeldvar, which was the target of the German offensive, and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps - in the area of Alap, Shimontarinia, Pintsekhel. The commanders were ordered to pay special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense, to create strong anti-tank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments in the troops. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had 5,535 guns and mortars, of which 2,976 could be used to fight tanks.

The greatest density of defense was at the line Gant - Lake Velence. Here the division on average had a defense sector of 3.3 km, and there were 24.7 guns per 1 km of front.

Along the entire front of the proposed German offensive, an average of 700–750 anti-tank and 600–690 anti-personnel mines were installed per kilometer. Mobile barrage detachments were organized on captured armored personnel carriers.

A few days before the start of the offensive, on March 2, Sepp Dietrich met with Joseph Goebbels. The Reich Minister of Propaganda wrote in his diary: “In a conversation with me, Sepp Dietrich explains to me the immediate tasks assigned to him by the Fuhrer. He hopes that in six days he will be able to begin the operations already often mentioned here in the Hungarian area. He expects these operations to last approximately 10 to 12 days. If everything goes well, you can expect huge success. And then, he believes, after 14 days he will be ready for further operations in Germany. Until now, it was also possible to hide from the enemy the deployment of the 6th Tank Army on Hungarian territory; at least for now there is no reason to talk about him taking countermeasures. Therefore, in general, it can be expected that larger operations will also be possible in East Germany at the end of March. But before that time we will still have to endure great difficulties.

In his statements, Dietrich quite frankly criticizes the Fuhrer's activities. He complains that the Fuhrer gives too little freedom to his military comrades and this has already led to the fact that now the Fuhrer even decides the issue of putting each individual company into action. But Dietrich has no right to judge this. The Fuhrer cannot rely on his military advisers. They deceived and let him down so often that now he must deal with each department. Thank God he is doing this, because otherwise things would be even worse.”

It is completely incomprehensible how Dietrich could hope at the beginning of March for the surprise appearance of his army in Hungary, since his divisions were already fighting for the Gronsky bridgehead two weeks before the conversation with the Reich Minister of Propaganda. And dreams of defeating Soviet troops west of the Danube in 10–12 days smack of obvious Manilovism.

Based on the results of the offensive, on March 21, Goebbels stated with regret in a conversation with Hitler that “Sepp Dietrich also does not belong to the first class. He is a good military commander, but by no means a strategist.” Absolutely correct definition! Another thing is that a real strategist like Manstein could hardly have done anything under those conditions.

The leaders of the Third Reich pinned great, clearly exaggerated hopes on the offensive in the Lake Balaton area. On March 5, Goebbels wrote down his conversation with Hitler in his diary: “On March 6, next Tuesday, our offensive in Hungary begins. The Fuehrer fears that the enemy has already learned about the concentration of our troops in this area and has accordingly prepared to fight back. Nevertheless, he hopes that our offensive will end in complete success. After all, here we have selected troops under the command of Sepp Dietrich ready to attack.

The General Staff is now aware of the need for our strike in Hungary, although until now it strongly resisted the idea that we first need to be active here. But now, primarily in connection with the problem of providing gasoline, he realized that we must, under any circumstances, stay in Hungary if we do not want to completely abandon motorized warfare. The Fuhrer is right when he says that Stalin has a number of outstanding military leaders, but not a single brilliant strategist; for if he had it, then the Soviet blow would have been delivered, for example, not at the Baranów bridgehead, but in Hungary. If we were deprived of Hungarian and Austrian oil, we would be completely unable to carry out the counter-offensive that we are planning in the east.”

Hitler was much more perceptive than Dietrich and understood that by the beginning of March the Soviets would probably already know about the presence of the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary, if only because two of its divisions participated in the liquidation of the Gronsky bridgehead. The Fuhrer also emphasized that Hungary is the only remaining source of gasoline for the Reich. With the loss of Western Hungary and the surrounding areas of Austria, resistance could last only a few weeks until fuel supplies ran out. If the last refineries are lost, it will be impossible to defend either Berlin or the “Alpine Fortress” for a long time.

On March 6, the day the offensive in Hungary began, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “It would be urgently necessary to achieve success again in at least one place. I hope this will happen in Hungary in the coming days.” But he immediately made a reservation: “We are now preparing our major counterattack in Pomerania. I hope it can be applied soon. Our offensive in Hungary is expected on Tuesday. If both operations were successful, it would, of course, be wonderful. But the hope that both of them could come true would perhaps be too great.” In reality, neither of the two counterattacks produced significant results. But even if all the divisions intended for both counterattacks were used only for one of them, for example, in Hungary, this would still not lead to a turning point.

Hausser recalled: “The offensive from the area between lakes Velence and Balaton began early on the morning of March 6 without artillery preparation and without any air support.

The territory was divided into two parts by a wide canal and marshes west of the Stuhlweissenburg (Székesfehérvár) - Tsetse highway. The main direction of the impact was on the right side. The terrain made it possible to use only infantry here. Tanks and artillery could only operate along roads and in populated areas.

Despite this, those attacking west of the canal advanced as far as the Shio canal and Shimontorinia, while to the east the Russians fiercely held every inch of land. Here I and 11 SS Panzer Corps managed to advance only slightly. The commander of the Das Reich division, Gruppenführer Werner Ostendorf, was seriously wounded (this happened on March 9 - B.S.) and subsequently died.

This offensive was planned as concentric: units of the Army Group "Balkans" were supposed to strike from the Drava in a northern direction, the 2nd Tank Army south of Lake Balaton - in an eastern direction; The 16th Panzergrenadier Division was also involved here.

North of Lake Velence, on the right flank of Balck’s army, Gille’s SS Corps with the 3rd and 5th SS Divisions took part in heavy defensive battles. Everything happened as it should have happened: a turning point came in the battle; two days after the start of the offensive, strong blows were struck along the front of Balck’s army from Lake Velence to the Danube, the main force of which fell on the area north of Stuhlweissenburg (Szekesfehervár). The neighboring troops to the left of Balck's army were under threat. The 6th SS Army immediately stopped the offensive and began a forced retreat.

Gille's corps was able to prevent an enemy breakthrough in a courageous defensive battle, which, unfortunately, failed to the north of it, where the Hungarians defended Vertesi. Thus, strong advanced Russian tank detachments found themselves on the Stuhlweissenburg-Mohr road, and the left flank of Gille's corps was surrounded.

By this time, the Reich Division under the command of Standartenführer Rudolf Lehmann was already moving through Veszprém to intercept the enemy west of Kisber and liberate the rear of the 6th SS Panzer Army.

Army headquarters planned to throw troops into rearguard positions, approximately from Veszprém to the Danube. While he directed the withdrawal of troops and their passage through the area between the lakes, the army group ordered the armies of Dietrich and Balck to change their area of responsibility. The first was to take command of the front sector from the area north of Veszprém to the Danube over the Hungarian formations. In the south, Balk commanded, who, one after another, gave the units liberated here to Dietrich to the north. These maneuvers, when viewed today, seem inexplicable. They can only be seen as a sign of mistrust. The liberated units were individually thrown against the Russians. Only the SS division "Das Reich" acted as a single unit and completed its task.

But in this way it was impossible to protect either the rearguard positions east of the Pope, or the Shavriz Canal, or the Raab. Soviet troops were already stationed everywhere to the west of these positions. Now it was no longer possible to stop: without communication with other troops, the I and II SS Panzer Corps fought back to the border. Further retreat - as once in Normandy - was prohibited from above. For the sake of historical truth, it is worth mentioning here that Adolf Hitler, without completely understanding the facts, ordered the cuff tapes to be taken away from the SS divisions. However, this order was not transmitted to the authorities.”

On the night of March 6, suddenly, without artillery preparation, German troops crossed the Drava and attacked units of the 3rd Yugoslav and 1st Bulgarian armies. The first blow by the forces of three divisions of Army Group "F" was delivered from the line of the Drava River in the direction of Mohács. German troops crossed the Drava in the area of Dolni Miholyac and Valpovo. Units of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav armies were pushed back from the river. The Germans captured a small bridgehead on the northern bank of the Drava. If the offensive continued, the enemy could reach the crossings on the Danube and to the rear of the 57th Army. Therefore, Tolbukhin ordered the acceleration of the transfer of the 133rd State Rifle Corps to the 57th Army and, by organizing its counterattack in cooperation with the Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops, to restore the defense along the Drava. The counterattack was unsuccessful, but further German advance in this area was stopped. However, they did not intend to introduce large forces here. The attack on the Drava was of an auxiliary nature and was intended to divert the attention and forces of the Soviet command from the main offensive in the inter-lake region. This strike achieved its goal, since the 133rd Rifle Corps was transferred to the 57th Army.

The Germans launched a second diversionary strike at 7 o'clock on March 6, after a 55-minute artillery preparation, by the 2nd Tank Army in the direction of Kaposvár. They wedged themselves into the defenses of the 57th Army on a narrow section of the front to a depth of 5 km. Further advance of the enemy in this direction was stopped by counterattacks of the second echelons of divisions and powerful artillery fire.

At 8:45 a.m. the attack began on the main direction between Lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. If Soviet sources claim that it was preceded by a powerful half-hour artillery barrage, then Hausser and other German sources insist that there was no artillery or air preparation before the offensive. The attack was led by the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 12th SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend" and the Hungarian 25th Infantry Division. Over 300 tanks and assault guns took part in the offensive. Some of them, together with the infantry, made their way to the junction of the 4th Guards and 26th armies and by the end of the day had wedged themselves into the positions of the 30th Rifle Corps to a depth of 3–4 kilometers. There was a threat of a breakthrough in the main line of Soviet defense.

It is not surprising that the German offensive achieved its greatest success west of the Charviz Canal. There, between Lake Balaton and the canal, where the left flank formations of the 26th Army defended, the density of Soviet defense was weakest. The division had a defense sector of 4.7 km, and there were only 9.7 guns per 1 km of front. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps was located here in the rear of the defenders. The command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front considered this area unsuitable for operations by large groups of tanks.

According to reports from Soviet troops, in the inter-lake region they were attacked by up to 600 German tanks, which significantly exceeded their true number. The 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions moved quickly along the western bank of the Charwize Canal in the direction of Tsetse. The 356th Infantry and 23rd Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht, with much greater difficulty, advanced along the eastern bank of the canal to Sharkerestur and Sharashd. Here they advanced only 2–3 km and were stopped by concentrated artillery fire. But on the western bank of the canal, German tank units, skillfully finding passages between impassable sections of terrain, quickly moved forward. Particularly fierce battles took place for large populated areas and highways. The Soviet infantry, again, as in January, often retreated under the pressure of tanks, abandoning the artillerymen to their fate.

By the end of the day on March 6, units of the 6th SS Panzer Army captured the town of Sheregelesh, located at the junction of the 4th Guards and 26th armies. This was explained by the fact that the enemy took units of the 1st Guards fortified area by surprise, as well as poor provision of its junction with the 30th Rifle Corps. The two armies were never able to establish cooperation here. First, the Germans pushed back the 1st Guards fortified area, which retreated and opened the right flank of the 155th Rifle Division. Having struck it, German motorized infantry burst into Sheregelesh. Soviet counterattacks launched by one of the rifle regiments of the 155th Division and the 110th Tank Brigade ended in failure.

Having captured Sheregelesh at 10 a.m., the Germans in a narrow area wedged themselves into the Soviet defense to a depth of 3–4 km, and west of the Sharviz Canal advanced only 1–1.5 km. In other areas, German enemy attacks were successfully repelled.

Meanwhile, two brigades of the 18th Tank Corps occupied a prepared line east and south of Sheregelesh. A tank regiment from the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps occupied a pre-prepared line in the Sharkerestur area. One division of the 27th Army was moved to the second line of defense east of Sheregelesh.

On March 7, to strengthen the defense, at the direction of the front commander, units of three divisions of the 27th Army moved to the second zone south of Lake Velence. Artillery units maneuvered widely. During two days of fighting, three anti-tank artillery regiments were transferred from the front reserve and from unattacked sectors of the 4th Guards Army to the area south of Lake Velence. In connection with the penetration of enemy troops into the defenses west of the Sharviz canal, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps took up defense along the eastern bank of the Sharviz canal and along the southern bank of the Elusha and Kaposh canals. The 33rd Rifle Corps began moving to the right bank of the Danube.

After the fall of Sheregelesh, a threat was created to the flank of the 155th Infantry Division. She had to deploy one rifle regiment to the north and reinforce it with IPTAP from the corps reserve.

The 436th Infantry Regiment was ordered to withdraw and take up defensive positions in the third position. The corps' artillery stopped the further advance of the Germans. On the left flank of the corps, enemy tanks broke into the main zone of the 68th Guards Rifle Division. Units of the division, turning their front to the west, retreated to the eastern bank of the Charviz Canal on the night of March 8. However, the Germans could not go further.

West of the Sharviz Canal, formations of the 135th Rifle Corps were unable to hold their positions, and enemy tank divisions broke through the second line of defense, pushing back the troops of the 26th Army in the direction of Simontornia.

To stop the enemy, a number of urgent measures were taken. The defense of the area from Lake Velence to the Sharviz Canal was entrusted to the 27th Army, to which the 30th Rifle Corps (155th, 36th Guards, 21st and 68th Guards Rifle Divisions) and 206th Guards Rifle Divisions were transferred. I am a rifle division from the 33rd Rifle Corps. The 1st Guards Mechanized, 18th and 23rd Tank Corps were transferred to the operational subordination of the army. An artillery maneuver was carried out south of Lake Velence, as a result of which the artillery density increased significantly.

On the morning of March 10, the German 3rd Tank Corps was brought into battle south of Lake Velence. He managed to break through the main line and wedge into our defenses south of Lake Velence to a depth of 10 km. West of the Charviz canal, the Germans reached the Elusha and Kaposh canals, where they were stopped by artillery fire.

On the morning of March 7, fierce fighting broke out in the Kaloz area. The 1964, 1965 and 1966 ITPAPs distinguished themselves here. As usual, left without cover by the retreating infantry, they courageously held back the onslaught of German tanks. When several tanks were knocked out, the Germans began to fire at the artillerymen with assault guns from long distances. Then they were attacked by infantry. On March 7, three regiments, according to their reports, knocked out and burned 44 tanks and 5 armored personnel carriers, losing 32 guns, 3 tractors and 4 off-road trucks. After this, the 1965th and 1966th regiments were withdrawn to the rear for replenishment, and the 1964th was again thrown into battle near Charsentagot. Two divisions of captured assault guns were assembled there, having 8150 mm assault guns and 8 88 mm anti-aircraft assault guns. In the battle on March 9, these divisions lost all military equipment. And on March 12, near Enying, a battalion of captured tanks was thrown into battle, which had 4 Tigers and 7 Panthers, as well as 2 75-mm assault guns. This battalion was unlucky. Even on the way to the battlefield, he was attacked by Soviet attack aircraft, who did not see the stars and red flags on the turrets of captured tanks. As a result, two cars were burned, and five, fleeing from “friendly fire,” drove off the road and got stuck in the mud. The Germans subsequently recovered the stuck vehicles and used them to advance towards the Tsetse-Kapos Canal line on 13–15 March. Later, in this area, the Soviet captured team discovered a “Panther” abandoned by the Germans with a star covered with plywood - a three-time captured tank. On March 13, the 23rd Tank Division was transferred to the Kaposh canal from the Abo, Sharashd area, but it was never able to overcome the line of the Elusha-Kaposh canals. By noon on March 15, the German offensive here finally stopped.

On the right flank of the 26th Army, the SS divisions were unable to achieve noticeable success in the first two days of the offensive. Here, north and east of Sheregelesh, the 170th Tank Brigade of the 18th Tank Corps, the 3rd Guards Airborne Division and the 1016th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment successfully defended.

On March 7, Dietrich's army advanced only 2–5 kilometers. The next day, March 8, army reserves were brought into battle - the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions, attacking the positions of the 26th Army. By the end of the day they had inflicted heavy losses on the 63rd Cavalry Division on the east bank of the Charviz Canal. The 1068th and 1922nd self-propelled artillery regiments, as well as a large number of attack aircraft, were hastily rushed to her aid. The 236th Rifle Division, 60th Tank and 1896th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps were additionally brought into the battle. The German advance was stopped. However, the very next day, Soviet troops were forced to retreat.

By March 9, all army and front reserves of the 3rd Ukrainian Front were used up, and the Headquarters prohibited the use of the 9th Guards Army to repel an enemy attack. By the end of the day, German tanks and infantry had knocked down 159.0 units of the 110th Tank Brigade from an important height, but further advance of the enemy was stopped due to darkness.

On March 10, having thrown previously unused units of the 1st and 3rd Panzer Divisions into battle, the command of the 6th SS Panzer Army launched a new blow on a narrow section of the front. He was met by regiments of the 209th self-propelled artillery brigade and four anti-tank fighter regiments transferred from the Headquarters reserve. The artillery density in the German attack area was increased to 49 guns per 1 km of front. On this day, according to a report from the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the enemy lost 81 tanks and assault guns, 25 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 36 guns and mortars, 21 aircraft and up to 3.5 thousand soldiers and officers.

On March 14, German troops tried to break through along the shore of Lake Velence. Here they were opposed by the 23rd Tank Corps, supported by the SU-100 brigade. They counterattacked the enemy, but suffered heavy losses, since the counterattacks were carried out without proper reconnaissance and preparation. However, our tankers were able not only to stop enemy tanks, but also in some places to push them back by 1–3 km.

Sepp Dietrich recalled: “My left flank (II SS Panzer Corps) did not achieve any noticeable success. The enemy was well entrenched on the western bank of the Danube; The swampy terrain, impassable for tanks, hindered our progress. The attack fizzled out in the area of Sharashd and Sharkerestur. The center - the first tank corps and cavalry divisions - reported success, but when the tanks began to develop it, they found themselves in impassable terrain. It was assumed that the marshes would freeze, as General von Wöhler had promised, and would become passable. In fact, there was dampness and swamps everywhere. To ensure surprise, I forbade preliminary reconnaissance of the area. Now 132 tanks were stuck in the mud, and 15 “Royal Tigers” were buried up to their turrets. Only infantry could continue the attack, and their losses were great.”

In this case, the former commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army, either through forgetfulness or deliberately sinned against the truth. The group, stopped in the Sharashd-Sharkerestur area, was just advancing through relatively passable terrain for tanks, and was stopped not by swamps, but by the fortress of dense Soviet defense. It is also unclear why Dietrich refused to reconnoiter the area. After all, after the 1st SS Panzer Corps showed up in the battles for the Gronsky bridgehead in mid-February, there was no longer any need to talk about the sudden appearance of its army in Hungary. In essence, Dietrich made the same mistake as Rotmistrov at Prokhorovka when he went on the offensive without reconnaissance.

Goebbels described the first day of the German offensive at Lake Balaton in his diary: “Sepp Dietrich’s army began a major offensive in Hungary. It is not yet possible to make any predictions. The first reports do not say anything - except that our troops met very strong resistance and therefore did not advance very far on the first day. The enemy is already taking countermeasures, first of all, attacking heavily from the air.”

The next day, the Reich Minister of Propaganda noted with optimism that “in Hungary, several strong local attacks between Balaton and the Drava produced good results, and our troops advanced in the Kaposvár area about six to eight kilometers in the direction of Osijek. At the same time, from the south from the Virovitizar (Virovititsa) area through the Drava to the north, an advance of six to eight kilometers was also noted (these were auxiliary strikes carried out by Army Group “E” against the Yugoslav and Bulgarian armies. - B.S.). Attacks from the eastern part of Lake Balaton, in the area south of Stuhlweissenburg (Székesfehérvár), also achieved good initial results.”

However, these local successes did not yet create serious threats to Soviet troops. And Goebbels’ optimism evaporated by the evening of March 7, when Hungary reported that “our troops are meeting exceptionally fierce resistance there. That’s why they haven’t been able to capture much space yet.”

On March 9, Goebbels perked up again: “Our offensive continues throughout Hungary. The successes were especially noticeable near the Malom canal and southwest of Székesfehérvár... Good news came from Hungary. The 6th Tank Army managed to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s defenses. Now an attempt is being made to go behind enemy lines in order to destroy his troops and thereby achieve the collapse of a significant part of his front. The Soviets, of course, are defending themselves with all their might, but I hope Sepp Dietrich will be able to carry out the Fuhrer’s plan.”

On March 10, according to Goebbels, events in Hungary were developing just as favorably for the Germans: “In Hungary, during the German offensive operations yesterday, new local successes were achieved. Events are developing especially gratifyingly between Balaton and the Danube, where our offensive along the Malom Canal continues on a broad front. Strong enemy counterattacks on the flanks were repulsed... Our attack aircraft in Hungary and in the central sector of the Eastern Front again achieved great success.” Surprisingly, the German aviation, which was small and starved of gasoline rations, acted more effectively than the Soviet aviation in the Battle of Balaton, causing losses to Soviet tanks and artillery. Goebbels hoped that day that decisive success was about to come: “In the east, events are developing favorably so far in Hungary. Our wedge is extended further to the west. Here we can almost talk about a breakthrough. We broke through the enemy’s defenses at a 25-kilometer front and advanced 25 kilometers in depth as well. Our wedge in the direction of Lake Balaton has also expanded, so here too we can talk about significant initial success.”

On March 12, Goebbels was still rejoicing at the successes of the 6th SS Panzer Army: “Our offensive in Hungary has started well. True, the progress forward is not yet great enough to completely perk up. We must wait, perhaps, a few more days to be able to finally evaluate this offensive... Our offensive in Hungary is yielding slow but sure results. In general, the development of events there can be called favorable; we have made significant progress. We have also advanced at Lake Velence, so now we can talk about a really big offensive.” A day earlier, in a conversation with Hitler, Goebbels connected the topic of the successful offensive in Hungary with the atrocities of Soviet troops in East Germany and Europe: “I report in detail to the Fuhrer about the impressions of my trip to Lauban (a city in Silesia that had just been recaptured from the Red Army. - B.S. .), describing in detail the horrors that he himself encountered there. The Fuhrer believes that from now on we need to widely propagate the idea of \u200b\u200brevenge on the Soviets. We must now throw our offensive forces to the east. Everything is decided in the east. The Soviets must pay with blood for blood; then, perhaps, it will be possible to bring the Kremlin to reason. Our troops are now obliged to stand and overcome the fear of Bolshevism. If we really launch a massive offensive, we will achieve success, as evidenced by the developments in Hungary, which the Fuehrer considers very promising. We can only hope that it will remain like this in the future. In any case, the Fuhrer believes that the propaganda I started about atrocities is absolutely correct and should be continued.”

During the same conversation with Goebbels, Hitler outlined German goals in the East, within the framework of which the offensives in Hungary and Pomerania were undertaken: “So, our goal would be to drive the Soviets back in the east, inflicting on them the heaviest losses in manpower and technology. Then the Kremlin might have shown more compliance towards us. A separate peace with him, of course, would radically change the military situation. Naturally, this would not be the achievement of our goals of 1941, but the Fuhrer still hopes to achieve the division of Poland, annex Hungary and Croatia into the German sphere of influence and gain a free hand to conduct operations in the West.

Such a goal is certainly worth the effort. Ending the war in the east and freeing one's hands to launch operations in the west - what a great idea! Therefore, the Fuhrer also believes that revenge against the East and hatred against the West should be preached. After all, it was the West that caused this war and brought it to such terrible proportions. To him we owe our destroyed cities and cultural monuments lying in ruins. And if it were possible to push back the Anglo-Americans, having cover from the east, then, without a doubt, the goal would be achieved, which would be to oust England from Europe for all time as a troublemaker.”

Goebbels was delighted. It seems that the Fuhrer's speech had a magical effect on him and made him believe in the possibility of success in the most hopeless circumstances. The Reich Minister wrote in his diary: “The program outlined to me here by the Fuhrer is grandiose and convincing. It still lacks the potential for implementation. This opportunity must first be created by our soldiers in the east. Several impressive victories are necessary as a prerequisite for its implementation; and, judging by the present situation, they are probably achievable. For this you need to do everything. For this we must work, for this we must fight, and for this we must at all costs raise the morale of our people to the previous level.”

Most likely, Hitler put forward such projects only to encourage his own circle. It is unlikely that he himself believed in their reality.

But already the situation that developed in Hungary on March 12 begins to worry Goebbels. He wrote in his diary: “In Hungary, as a result of our attacks, only partial and insignificant progress was achieved. The Soviets strengthened their position due to the approach of Bulgarian and Romanian units." The only consolation for the Reich Minister was that in Hungary and on the Central Front the Luftwaffe allegedly shot down 65 enemy aircraft.

But by the end of the day, under the influence of new reports, optimism again prevailed: “As for the east, events in Hungary are developing very encouragingly. We crossed the Shio River and created two bridgeheads on the other bank. This is satisfactory news. Now we must try to finally put the enemy to flight. We also made a breakthrough in the upper reaches, so from here, obviously, we can move on.” However, the Minister of Propaganda was supposed to be an optimist by virtue of his position.

On March 13, the situation did not seem to inspire much alarm. Goebbels writes: “Significant progress has been made in Hungary southeast of Lake Balaton. Two bridgeheads have been created across the Shio River. Southeast of Balaton, advances were also noted at Aba. East of Székesfehérvár, our tank column, led by the Tigers, advanced as a result of the attack about eight kilometers in an easterly direction.” But by evening, sobering set in. Describing the situation at that moment, Goebbels wrote in his diary: “In Hungary, our troops achieved only minor success. I get the impression that our offensive has stalled, which could have fatal consequences. Sepp Dietrich managed to create one bridgehead across the Shio River, but it remains a big question whether he will be able to launch further operations from it. At Headquarters, at least, they express the opinion that now it would be necessary to attack. But there is still no consistency in operations at all.”

Already on March 14, the German offensive actually stopped. Goebbels is forced to state: “Numerous attacks on our new positions have been repulsed in Hungary... Quite depressing news is coming from Hungary. Our offensive there, it seems, cannot develop. Our divisions are stuck in Soviet defensive positions and are now facing significant Soviet counterattacks. Everything seems to be going down the drain. Not a single one of our military operations, no matter how well prepared, has recently led to success. Stalin has every reason to honor, just like movie stars, Soviet marshals who showed outstanding military abilities. News is coming from Moscow about this, almost reminiscent of customs from the lives of the pashas... In Hungary they are now talking about powerful enemy counterattacks against our advancing troops. In any case, there is no progress now. Both sides regroup. But we know what this could mean.” Goebbels knew only too well that generals often call retreat a regrouping.

The last hope broke out on March 15th. Goebbels wrote: “In Hungary we are expanding the front of our attacks with attacks between Kaposvár and the western coast of Lake Balaton, where we, on a front of 20 to 30 kilometers, have advanced three to four kilometers through heavily mined terrain (but this was a secondary direction, on which success has already did not play a significant role - B.S.). We created one bridgehead on the Shio River and destroyed several enemy bridgeheads on our bank of this river.” On this day, 37 enemy aircraft were shot down in Hungary, including 4 heavy Allied bombers operating from Italy.

That evening, Goebbels noted: “In Hungary, unfortunately, only minor local successes have been achieved. There is no need to talk about systematic progress. On the contrary, our 6th Army has now gone over to the defensive.”

On March 15, the last day of the German offensive, Goebbels wrote: “In Hungary, as a result of the offensive between the western tip of Lake Balaton and Kaposvár, our troops on a broad front advanced two to three kilometers, but in other areas - in particular in the Székesfehérvár area - the enemy counterattacked, mainly with infantry units. All attacks, with the exception of the penetration into our positions between Székesfehérvár and Felsögalla, were repulsed."

And on March 20, Goebbels recognized the success of the Soviet offensive that had occurred the day before: “In Hungary, between Székesfehérvár and Felsögalla, the enemy, acting in the western and northwestern directions, attacked the weak positions of the Hungarian troops on the Vertes mountain range and wedged into them in many places to a depth of 15 to 20 kilometers. Attacks on Pestilence are thwarted. Between Mor and Szekesfehervár the enemy reached the Székesfehérvár - Komorn (Komarno) railway. Our attack south of Lake Balaton culminated in an advance at Marzali.”

Only now Goebbels admitted the obvious: “In Hungary we went completely on the defensive. North of Lake Velence, the enemy again managed to move forward a little. There is no more talk about the offensive of our shock army.”

The next day, as Goebbels noted, the situation became even grimmer: “In Hungary our offensive has finally stalled. Here we were forced to go on the defensive, which, in addition, turned out to be extremely weak, which already led to deep penetrations and serious losses. The city of Székesfehérvár fell into enemy hands. True, we are launching counterattack after counterattack, but these operations are not successful.”

This is how S. M. Shtemenko characterized the current situation: “On March 6, the enemy’s counter-offensive, which we expected, began, especially powerful in the main direction. The fighting did not stop for nine days and was extremely fierce. Although Hitler's troops had very significant forces, they were unable to break out to the Danube, despite the fact that at times they brought up to 450 tanks into battle on one sector of the front.

The defensive battle of Balaton became another example of the greatest courage, unbending perseverance and heroism of Soviet soldiers. During the defense in two days - March 6 and 7 - the enemy lost almost 100 tanks and assault guns, and during the entire battle (March 6–15) - almost 500! The massive heroism of the soldiers and officers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front dispelled the last hopes of the Nazi command to restore the situation in the center of Europe. Our victory also assisted the Anglo-American troops in Italy and helped complete the defeat of the invaders in fraternal Yugoslavia.

The firm belief that the enemy’s counter-offensive in the area of Lake Balaton would be repulsed did not leave the General Staff and Headquarters for a minute. Here they could clearly imagine what heavy battles had unfolded on the western bank of the Danube and what extraordinary difficulties the Soviet soldiers were overcoming. During the battle, the headquarters strengthened the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front at the expense of its right neighbor. But the Soviet Supreme High Command did not remove the task from the fronts to launch a decisive offensive after the completion of the defensive battle. It also had fresh forces ready for action.

...We cannot forget the alarming days of March 1945. Then the Soviet strategic leadership more than once or twice weighed the enemy’s chances under various options for the troops’ actions. We assessed the possible conditions and outcome of the struggle, especially in the case of a tough defense on the right bank of the Danube, where our troops had to hold a bridgehead. Here the battle promised to be especially difficult and bloody. Another option was also discussed: to retreat from the right bank of the Danube to the left, abandoning the bridgehead. In this case, hiding behind a wide water barrier, it was possible to guarantee the retention of positions across the river.

But the question inevitably arose: how to proceed? After all, it was necessary to end the war and bring down the most sensitive blows on the enemy, and advance further to the west. This is where it turned out that defense on the right bank of the Danube was much more profitable and promising than on the left. It would be immeasurably more difficult to go on the offensive later: the enemy would also hide behind the river. And of course, we would lose time.

Headquarters and the General Staff assessed all the pros and cons and decided that the first option should be implemented - to defend on the right bank of the Danube and immediately after the end of the defensive battle go on a counter-offensive.

This issue was also related to the second one - about the 9th Guards Army of General V.V. Glagolev.

On March 9, F.I. Tolbukhin telephoned to Headquarters for permission to use the 9th Guards Army, which had just been transferred to his front, for defensive purposes. He also asked whether his troops and, as a last resort, his headquarters should retreat to the left bank of the Danube so as not to lose control.

A.I. Antonov and I were at that time in the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. J.V. Stalin listened to the considerations of the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, hesitated a little and said something like this in an even voice:

Comrade Tolbukhin, if you are thinking of prolonging the war for another five or six months, then, of course, withdraw your troops beyond the Danube. It will definitely be quieter there. But I doubt you think so. Therefore, you should defend on the right bank of the river and you and your headquarters should be there. I am confident that the troops will fulfill their difficult tasks with honor. You just need to lead them well.

Then he expressed the idea of the need to knock out enemy tanks during a defensive battle, and said that the enemy should not be given time to gain a foothold on the lines he had reached and organize a strong defense.

F.I. Tolbukhin said that he understood the order and hung up.

The General Staff was ordered to confirm the tasks of the fronts with a directive, which we did. The directive stated: “The commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in defensive battles to exhaust the enemy tank group advancing from the Székesfehérvár area, after which no later than March 15–16 this year. g. the right wing of the front goes on the offensive with the goal of defeating the enemy north of Lake Balaton and developing an attack in the general direction of Papa, Sopron.

The 9th Guards Army should not be drawn into defensive battles, but used to develop a strike and the final defeat of the enemy.”

The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was ordered to go over to a rigid defense north of the Danube, and to attack Gyor with the left flank, that is, where the front was directly adjacent to the strike group of F.I. Tolbukhin’s troops.

So, generally speaking, the Headquarters outlined actions aimed at defeating the main enemy forces in the area of Lake Balaton. Here it was supposed to lay the foundations for the success of the Vienna operation. Note that the preparation for the operation took place in the context of an ongoing difficult defensive battle.

As we expected, the enemy’s forces were completely exhausted, and on March 15 he abandoned the offensive. Now our time has come. On March 16, F.I. Tolbukhin’s troops, reinforced by the 6th Guards Tank Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, moved forward. Thus, without an operational pause after the defensive battle, the Vienna offensive operation began, during which very significant results were achieved.”

Perhaps Dietrich had no idea how close he was to his intended goal. After all, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front on March 9 was already ready to consider the possibility of withdrawing troops beyond the Danube. In addition, it asked to be allowed to use the 9th Guards Army, a strategic reserve intended for the attack on Vienna, in a defensive battle. If these proposals of Tolbukhin had been implemented, Hitler's goal would have actually been achieved. Soviet troops would have been pushed back to the Danube and would have been forced to use a significant part of their strategic reserves in a defensive battle. This could prolong the war, if not for six months, then at least for two or three months. However, such a development of events seems absolutely incredible.

In his memoirs, Shtemenko, willingly or unwillingly, dramatizes the situation that developed by March 9 in the Lake Balaton area. After all, the Headquarters had at its disposal significant reserves here, the 6th Guards Tank and 9th Guards armies. With these forces, the Danube bridgehead would certainly be able to be held. Another thing is that both of these armies would have suffered losses in defensive battles and, probably, the attack on Vienna would have had to be postponed for another two or three weeks. However, German troops would have suffered additional losses in battles with two Soviet armies and would have been even more weakened by the beginning of the Vienna operation, which would have reduced their resistance. So the war could drag on for a maximum of a week or two, but not for six months.

Already on March 11 and 14, Dietrich asked Hitler to stop the offensive due to the fact that the terrain had become impassable for tanks due to mud, but was refused. The German offensive only ceased after the Soviet advance on Vienna began on 16 March.

While defensive battles were going on, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command concentrated the 9th Guards Army and other reserves for the attack on Vienna. On March 16, this army, with the support of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 4th Guards Army, launched an offensive north of Székesfehérvár, covering the German group advancing in the inter-lake region. On March 19, the 6th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breakthrough. Due to the threat of encirclement, the 6th SS Panzer Army had to quickly retreat to the Veszprém-Papa-Tarkan line.

Sepp Dietrich recalled: “The Russians threw their divisions at General Balck’s 6th Army, which was on my left, and achieved a breakthrough. Aerial reconnaissance reported the movement of 3-4 thousand trucks with infantry and tanks from the Budapest area. The Army Group command immediately ordered the 12th SS Panzer Division to move to and north of Stuhlweissenburg (Székesfehérvár) to close the Russian breakthrough there. Meanwhile, the Russians reached Zamol, Oshakvar and the Bakony Forest. The road between Stuhlweissenburg, Warpolota and Veszprem had to be held by the 12th SS Division in order to be able to localize the Russian breakthrough. The Russian attack from the southwest towards Lake Balaton was aimed at separating my army and Balck’s army. A difficult battle ensued. We identified the enemy as having four mechanized brigades, five tank corps and ten guards divisions, consisting of young, well-trained and armed soldiers.”

Here, the commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army did not exaggerate the number of Red Army formations operating against him, but exaggerated the degree of training of the Red Army soldiers. On the contrary, young, recently drafted Red Army soldiers, especially from among the residents of the occupied territories, as well as former “eastern workers,” rushed into battle untrained and were inferior in combat training to German soldiers, although in 1945 veterans with extensive combat experience there, I repeat, it was also much less than in 41–42.

Hitler hesitated to launch Dietrich's army into a counterattack against the advancing Soviet formations, as demanded by the commander of Army Group South, General Wöhler. The Fuhrer could not come to terms with the fact that the widely planned operation in Hungary had failed. As a result, Soviet troops advanced so far to the west that the counterattack of the 6th SS Panzer Army was hopelessly late. The SS divisions had to hastily retreat to the southwest along the Balaton coast.

On April 2, the oil fields and refineries of Western Hungary were lost. This meant the agony of the German resistance.

Thus, the failure of the counter-offensive of the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary buried the last hopes for the possibility of a successful defense of the “Alpine Fortress”.

As a result of ten days of fierce fighting, the 6th SS Panzer Army wedged itself into the defenses of the Soviet troops up to 12 km south of Lake Velence, and up to 30 km west of the Charviz Canal. On March 15, the German offensive was stopped. And the very next day, forces of the 3rd Ukrainian and left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian fronts began the Vienna strategic offensive operation with the aim of completing the defeat of the Nazi troops in the western part of Hungary and liberating the capital of Austria - Vienna, which Dietrich’s army left on April 13. Now the idea of "Alpine

14 - Falcon Fortress" has lost all meaning. These events influenced the decision to remain in Berlin, contrary to the initial intention to evacuate with the government to the south, to Berchtesgaden, to continue the fight “in the Alpine fortress.” The Fuhrer realized that the agony in the south would not last long, and it would be much more honorable for him to die in Berlin than in some unknown Alpine village. It is no coincidence that intensive construction of fortifications in and around Berlin began at the end of March, when it became clear that it would not be possible to hold out in Hungary.

The entire result of the actions of the 6th SS Panzer Army in Hungary came down to the fact that the start of the Soviet offensive on Vienna was delayed by ten days. In addition, in the oncoming tank battle, Dietrich's army inflicted significant losses on the 6th Guards Tank Army and did not allow it to build on its success and close the encirclement south of Székesfehérvár. All this only postponed the capture of the oil refineries in Western Hungary and Austria, as well as the Austrian capital, by the Red Army by a few days.

Of course, this prolongation of the war for a couple of weeks could not have any strategic significance. But it should be recognized that the 6th SS Panzer Army, although objectively unable to solve the ambitious task of defeating the 3rd Ukrainian Front and reaching the Danube, nevertheless came quite close to solving another more realistic task - to weaken the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front as much as possible. of the Ukrainian Front and force it to use at least part of the forces intended for the attack on Vienna to repel the German counteroffensive. Tolbukhin really had to use all army and front reserves to repel the attack of the 6th SS Panzer Army. A little more - and the strategic reserve - the 9th Guards Army - would have to be brought into battle. And with his quick retreat and oncoming battle, which stopped the advance of the 6th Guards Tank Army, Dietrich saved his own army from inevitable defeat. But with his withdrawal, carried out without orders, he aroused the wrath of Hitler. On March 27, Hitler had another conversation with Goebbels, as stated in the latter’s diary: “And on the Hungarian sector of the front the situation is becoming very critical. Here we are apparently in danger of losing an important oil production area. Our SS formations showed themselves to be very unimportant here. Even the Leibstandarte, because the old cadres of its officers and enlisted personnel were killed. The current Leibstandarte has retained only its honorary name. And despite this, the Fuhrer decided to teach the SS troops a lesson. Himmler, on his instructions, flew to Hungary to take away the sleeve patches from these units. For Sepp Dietrich this will, of course, be the worst shame imaginable. The generals from the ground forces are terribly happy about this: such a blow for their competitors! The SS troops in Hungary not only failed to carry out their own offensive, but also retreated, and some even fled. The poor quality of the human material manifested itself here in the most unpleasant way. One can only feel sorry for Sepp Dietrich, but one can also sympathize with Himmler, who, being the chief of the SS troops, who does not have any military awards, must carry out this difficult action in relation to Sepp Dietrich, who wears diamonds (to the Knight's Cross - B.S.). But what’s even worse is that our oil production area is now under severe threat. We must at any cost retain at least this base, which we need to wage war.”

And here is what the German military historian General Kurt Tippelskirch wrote about this in “History of the Second World War”: “An event occurred that struck Hitler like a bolt from the blue. The SS tank divisions used for the offensive, as well as the detachments of his personal guard, on which he relied like a rock, could not stand it: their strength and faith were exhausted. In a fit of boundless rage, Hitler ordered the sleeve insignia with his name to be removed from them.”

After the end of the fighting, from March 29 to April 10, 1945, a commission created by the artillery headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and a number of central people's commissariats examined the battlefield in the areas of Lake Balaton, Székesfehérvár, Tsetse and the Kapos, Sárviz and Elusha canals. She found 968 enemy tanks and assault guns, as well as 446 armored personnel carriers and off-road trucks, knocked out, burned or abandoned by the Germans during the retreat. This number also included equipment taken into account during the February inspection. In addition, armored vehicles lost by the Germans during the Vienna offensive operation, in particular during the battles with the 6th Guards Tank Army, were partially included here. 968 tanks and assault guns are the irretrievable losses of the 6th SS Panzer Army, the 6th Army and the 2nd Panzer Army during the fighting in Hungary in March - early April 1945. In addition, this includes 86 tanks and assault guns and 4 armored personnel carriers lost by the Germans in the January battles. It should also be taken into account that many tanks and assault guns were abandoned by the Germans during the retreat due to lack of fuel or the inability to pull them out of the mud. Before this, they tried to render them unusable by blowing them up, although some fell into the hands of the Red Army in good condition.

Among the 400 burnt tanks and assault guns studied, 19 Tiger II tanks, 6 Tiger tanks, 57 Panther tanks, 37 T-IV tanks, 9 T-III tanks were discovered (tanks of this type were flamethrower, command tanks and artillery observer tanks), 27 tanks and self-propelled guns of Hungarian production, as well as 140 assault and self-propelled guns and 105 engineering vehicles, armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles. Among the examined samples, those damaged by artillery fire predominated (389 vehicles), and only a small part was blown up by mines or disabled by other means (for example, one Panther tank, by all indications, was burned by a bottle of KS). According to the main statistical indicators, these studies basically repeated the February ones. What was new was that the number of shell holes made by 76-mm and 57-mm guns was approximately equal, and the number of holes made by large-caliber (100-122 mm) ammunition also increased slightly (by 2.5–3.2%).

Among the 968 destroyed and abandoned armored vehicles, the commission examined 400 of the most interesting samples. Of these, 389 were disabled by artillery fire, 10 were blown up by mines and one tank was destroyed by a Molotov cocktail. There is no reliable data in published sources about the losses of Soviet armored forces in the two battles at Lake Balaton.

968 tanks and assault guns irretrievably lost by the Germans in Hungary is a huge number. The power of the German tank formations that retreated to Austria was thoroughly undermined. Later, Sepp Dietrich sadly joked that his army was called the 6th Panzer because it had only six tanks in service.

The German troops intended for the offensive in the area of Lake Balaton were armed, according to Soviet intelligence estimates, with 807 tanks and assault guns (including up to 300 heavy tanks of the "Tiger" and "Royal Tiger" types and up to 240 tanks of the "Panther" type ), 816 armored personnel carriers and 3,280 guns and mortars. In addition, the 2nd Tank Army had 70 tanks and assault guns. The exact number of German and Hungarian troops participating in the Battle of Balaton is unknown. Intelligence of the 3rd Ukrainian Front believed that in front of the front troops there were 35 enemy formations numbering 431 thousand soldiers and officers. They were armed with 5,630 guns and mortars, 877 tanks and assault guns, and 900 armored personnel carriers.

The 3rd Ukrainian Front had 37 rifle and airborne divisions (the latter were used only as rifle divisions), 6 infantry (Bulgarian) and 3 cavalry divisions, as well as 2 tank and 1 mechanized corps and 1 fortified area. The front had over 465 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers, in addition, the 1st Bulgarian Army, which was part of the front, numbered more than 100 thousand people. Front troops, excluding Bulgarian formations, numbered 6,889 guns and mortars, 407 tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 965 aircraft.

According to official data from the Russian Ministry of Defense, given in the reference book “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces,” the number of Soviet troops in the 3rd Ukrainian Front at the beginning of the Balaton operation was 465 thousand people. Irreversible losses amounted to 8,492 people (unfortunately, it is not indicated how many were killed and how many were missing), sanitary losses - 24,407 people, and a total of 32,899 people. According to Soviet estimates, German losses in the Battle of Balaton in February - March 1945 amounted to up to 45 thousand soldiers and officers, about 500 tanks and assault guns, up to 300 guns and mortars, almost 500 armored personnel carriers and 250 aircraft. The Germans took 4,400 prisoners. If we accept the German data about 4,400 prisoners as close to the truth, then the number of dead can be estimated at 4,092 people. It turns out that there were six times more wounded than killed (the share of sick people in sanitary losses during fierce battles was negligible). Usually the number of wounded exceeds the number of killed by 3–4 times. If we assume that in fact the excess of wounded over killed in the Soviet troops in the Battle of Balaton was at least four times, this will increase the number of killed by at least 6 thousand people. It should also be taken into account that the 3rd Ukrainian Front included the 1st Bulgarian Army, which numbered about 100 thousand people and also suffered certain losses in killed and wounded.

By the time the Vienna offensive operation began on March 16, 1945, the composition of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had increased significantly. The fresh 9th Guards Army from the Headquarters reserve was introduced into its composition. The number of rifle divisions increased to 42, 4 airborne divisions were added, the number of tank corps increased from 2 to 3, the number of mechanized corps - from 1 to 2, and the number of cavalry divisions and fortified areas remained the same - 3 and 1, respectively. , the front received an additional separate mechanized and one separate self-propelled artillery brigade. The total number of front troops increased to 536,700 people. If we take the tank and mechanized corps to be equal in strength to a full-blooded rifle division, and the two brigades are equated in strength to one division, then from the start of the second Battle of Balaton to the start of the Vienna operation, the total number of calculated divisions increased from 43.5 to 55.5 (fortified we take the area equal to half a division), not counting the 1st Bulgarian Army. At the same time, the newly arrived formations and army units of the 9th Guards and 6th Guards Tank Armies were much more full-blooded than the formations already part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Only due to the replenishment of new formations, the number of troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, compared with what it was by March 6, 1945, by March 16 should have increased by at least 27.6%. And this does not take into account march reinforcements. If there had been no losses in the Balaton operation, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front would have numbered about 593.3 thousand people by March 16, i.e., by the day the Vienna operation began, but only 536,700 people were part of the front. Thus, without taking into account march reinforcements, the total Soviet losses can be estimated at at least 56.6 thousand people.

Experience shows that the bulk of the under-accounting of losses in the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War was accounted for by irretrievable losses (killed and missing), which were taken into account much worse than sanitary losses. If we assume that the entire undercount in the event of the second Battle of Balaton falls on the irretrievable losses of the Red Army, then their total size can be estimated at 23.7 thousand. If we subtract 4.4 thousand prisoners from this figure, then the share of those killed is 19.3 thousand people.

The losses of the 1st Bulgarian Army in the second Battle of Balaton can be assessed as follows. In total, Bulgarian troops during the fighting on the side of the Anti-Hitler coalition lost about 7 thousand killed and about 25 thousand wounded. The 1st Bulgarian Army suffered its main losses in three operations - Budapest, Balaton and Vienna. In the Vienna operation, she lost 2,698 killed and missing and 7,107 wounded. It can be assumed that the remaining losses occurred in two other operations, in which the role of the Bulgarian troops was purely auxiliary. In the Budapest operation, the Bulgarians fought 6 times longer than in the Balaton operation, but in the latter they suffered a much stronger blow from the Germans. Therefore, it can be assumed that the army’s losses in these two operations were approximately the same. Then the second Battle of Balaton would account for approximately 2.15 thousand killed and missing and about 9 thousand wounded Bulgarians.

There is no data on the losses of the Yugoslav army in the second Battle of Balaton. Since her combat activity was small, let us assume that her losses were half those of the Bulgarian army. Then its losses can be estimated at 1.1 thousand killed and 4.5 thousand wounded. In this case, the total losses of the Soviet side, taking into account the losses of the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs, will amount to 73.4 thousand people, including irrevocable ones - 27 thousand.

We know German losses only in the Soviet estimate - 45 thousand people, without division into killed and wounded. If we assume that the advancing German troops suffered almost no losses in prisoners, then we can assume that the sanitary and irretrievable losses of the Germans and Hungarians were approximately 3:1. Then the losses of the German-Hungarian troops in killed and missing can be estimated at 11.3 thousand killed and missing. In this case, the ratio of the total losses of the Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav troops and the German-Hungarian troops in the second Battle of Balaton will be 1.6:1, and irretrievable losses - 2.4:1. It turns out to be unfavorable for the Soviet side.

The weak point of the Soviet anti-tank defense has traditionally been the low resistance of the infantry cover, which often could not withstand even the initial attacks of German tanks and retreated in disorder. A significant part of the replenishment of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, like other Soviet fronts in the last two years of the war, were conscripts from the liberated regions, with practically no training in military affairs. This also significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of Soviet troops. All this, as well as shortcomings in management and interaction, led to large human losses.

Undoubtedly, in the Vienna offensive operation the ratio of losses was much more favorable for the Red Army, primarily due to the large losses of Hungarian troops killed and captured. And the success of the Vienna operation was largely ensured by the staunch defense of the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front during the Balaton defensive operation. The large losses of German armored vehicles during the Vienna operation, when the Germans, in particular, had to abandon almost all the tanks and assault guns damaged during the second Battle of Balaton, have already been mentioned above. Of the 1,024 tanks and self-propelled guns of the German-Hungarian troops that participated in the Battle of Balaton, as well as those that opposed Soviet troops at the first stage of the Vienna operation, when the fighting took place on the territory of Hungary, 515 were destroyed by artillery fire, and 185 were captured in good condition. This was mainly equipment abandoned during the retreat.

According to the testimony of S. M. Shtemenko, conveyed in the biography of the former commander of the artillery chief of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, M. I. Nedelin, written by V. F. Tolubko, when, after the capture of Vienna, Colonel General of the Artillery Nedelin was nominated for the rank of Hero The Soviet Union, Tolbukhin and especially Nedelin at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command were accused of large unjustified losses during the Balaton defensive operation, as a result of which the front lost a significant number of people, artillery and tanks. True, Mitrofan Ivanovich still received the Hero star then. According to Shtemenko, I.V. Stalin, having received the materials of the Vienna operation from F.I. Tolbukhin and having studied it, summoned A.M. Vasilevsky and S.M. Shtemenko to his office and told them:

“It is quite obvious that the artillery of the 3rd Ukrainian in the Balaton operation brilliantly fulfilled its tasks. And the German losses far exceeded ours. The front artillery headquarters did a good job, and Nedelin led the troops skillfully, with a great understanding of the situation. “I think that the artillery commander is worthy of the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.” Of course, the marshal and the colonel general tried to convince Stalin that the enemy had lost much more than our troops, at least in armored vehicles. And the German-Hungarian losses in people, if you believe the reports of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, were greater than the Soviet ones - 45 thousand versus 33. But Tolbukhin received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously, in 1965. It turns out that Stalin was not so pleased with his generals and marshals who fought at Lake Balaton, as Goebbels wrote in his diary.

This episode is also evidence that official data on Soviet losses in the second Battle of Balaton are significantly underestimated. Indeed, according to these data, the average daily irretrievable losses of Soviet troops amounted to 849 people, or 0.18% of the total number of armies participating in the battle. Meanwhile, in the Vienna operation, the average daily irretrievable losses on the same 3rd Ukrainian Front, according to the same official, clearly underestimated data, amounted to 1060 people, or 0.20% of the total number of front troops, i.e. it was noticeably higher than in the Battle of Balaton. However, this circumstance did not cause Stalin’s anger, and Stalin did not scold the marshals for the Vienna operation.

The offensive of the 6th SS Panzer Army and the SS divisions of the IV SS Panzer Corps at Lake Balaton in March 1945 was the last major operation of the SS troops in World War II. It pursued the goal of prolonging German resistance, creating conditions for the effective defense of the “Alpine Fortress” and the possible prolongation of the war until contradictions between the USSR and the Western allies emerged. The collapse of this offensive made German capitulation inevitable less than two months later. With it, the SS troops ceased to exist, the most combat-ready divisions of which were defeated on the Eastern Front by the Red Army.

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Anyone who has visited Hungary has probably either personally seen or heard from others about Lake Balaton, the favorite vacation spot of all Hungarians and not only them. This area is located in the southern part of this small, cozy and beautiful European country. It was in these places that in March 1945, Nazi Germany, being on its last legs, decided to launch its last tank strike, the last, as it later turned out, in the entire Second World War. As a result of the offensive in Hungary, Hitler planned to solve several strategic problems at once: firstly, to block the path of the rapidly advancing Red Army troops into Austria and, in general, into the southern regions of Germany itself, and secondly, to defend the last oil fields remaining under Nazi control, otherwise there would be no more fighting on which, since there was nowhere else to get fuel for the equipment, and thirdly, if the Germans had managed to defeat or even temporarily stop the Red Army, then some prerequisites would have been created so that they could be forced to sit down at the separate negotiating table Western allies, who still could not come to their senses after the Arden horror, so the stakes were high, and therefore the Wehrmacht allocated considerable forces for its last offensive operation, for example, according to information received by Soviet military intelligence, on the eve of the German offensive, in In general, the German strike force consisted of two tank armies, one field army, one separate army corps and one Hungarian army, all of which were covered by the 4th Air Fleet. Our 3rd Ukrainian Front opposed this armada, the forces of the opposing sides were almost equal in personnel, guns and mortars; however, the Germans had quite a noticeable superiority in tanks; against our 400 tanks and self-propelled guns they prepared almost 900 tanks and assault guns for battle , our troops had a slight superiority in aircraft.

The Germans pulled almost 35 divisions to this section of the front, including 11 of them tank divisions. These were one of the most combat-ready and equipped formations of the Wehrmacht, especially the 6th TA of the SS troops. After the Battle of Kursk, the battle in the Balaton area was the second battle with such a large concentration of tank forces on such a narrow sector of the front.

The armored vehicles of the German tank formations were mostly new models, "tigers", "royal tigers", "panthers", and even the main workhorse of the Panzerwaffe, the T-IY, was no longer the same as it was at Kursk, armed with a 75mm long-barreled gun, with bulwarks and other technical bells and whistles, it was essentially a new tank, but the main know-how of the Germans was their night vision devices, which they installed mainly on their heavy tanks, the Germans were preparing to fight around the clock, even at night, which had previously they were not noted.

Before the start of the transfer of its main forces, German intelligence undertook a large-scale injection of misinformation, for example, our high command received information directly from the Western allies that the Germans allegedly began transferring their 6TA SS to Pomerania and even to Selesia, but this information was later not confirmed, but was established that German tank formations were being transferred to a completely different direction, namely to southern Hungary, as a result, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had to prepare to repel the advance of enemy troops in an accelerated manner, since the front was preparing to attack and not defend.

And yet, despite the short time frame, the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front decided to meet the enemy from the defense; for this, the experience of the Battle of Kursk was widely used; in the direction of the expected main attack by Soviet troops, a deep-echelon anti-tank defense was created, reaching a depth of up to 25 -30 km, this is of course not the same scale as at Kursk, but nevertheless, they were preparing to meet the Germans seriously, for example, more than 60 special anti-tank areas alone were created along over 80 km of the front, in which over 65% were concentrated the entire artillery of the front, and in the most dangerous directions the density of guns reached 60-70 per 1 km of front! In total, four Soviet combined arms armies were concentrated in the Balaton direction: the 4th Guards, 26, 27, 57, as well as our allies, the 1st Bulgarian and 3rd Yugoslav armies; the 9th Guards Army was in the front reserve, which the Headquarters strictly forbade the front command to touch , since it was intended for an offensive operation in the Vienna direction.

On the morning of March 6, the Germans began their offensive with attacks in secondary directions against the Bulgarian and Yugoslav troops, as well as the 57th Soviet army, then the German troops delivered their main blow between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton, on some sections of the front 1.5-2 km wide Up to 70 tanks and assault guns simultaneously participated in the attacks. Fierce fighting broke out. By the end of the day, the attackers had advanced to a depth of almost 4 km. In the zone of the 26th Army, with the support of aviation, about 200 tanks and assault guns were already advancing. Continuously maneuvering along the front, the German command persistently looked for weak points in the defense of the Soviet troops, but this was very difficult to do, since in response, the Soviet command, in turn, promptly transferred anti-tank reserves to threatened areas, as a result of stubborn resistance of Soviet troops and measures, taken to strengthen the defense, the enemy failed to break through the tactical zone in the first two days of the offensive, but only wedged 4-7 km into it.

However, the German command, with the tenacity of the doomed, continued to introduce more and more new forces into the battle, so on the morning of March 8, the main forces of the 6th TA SS and the 6th Field entered the battle, concentrating 40-50 tanks and assault guns per kilometer of front, and subsequently and 100 or more units of heavy tanks, the Germans, like their distant ancestors, dog-knights like on Lake Peipsi, tried again and again to break through the Soviet defense, but the Soviet troops stood to the death. The situation at certain moments began to somewhat resemble the battle in the Prokhorovka area, but only now Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns, acting mainly from ambushes, shot the German armored monsters, the Soviet command used artillery especially competently, thanks to the maneuver, the density of artillery in certain directions reached 160-170 guns on 1 km of front, as a result of this, a fiery barrage of fire and steel covered the battle formations of the advancing motorized infantry and enemy tanks, everything around exploded, died and burned.

Unfortunately for the 3rd Ukrainian Front, due to the thick fogs that often covered the airfields at that time, the aviation of the 17th Air Army assigned to the front seriously limited its actions to support troops on the battlefield, so the front was rescued by the aviation of its neighbors, the 5th air army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

The fighting did not subside around the clock. Counting on the low effectiveness of Soviet artillery in the dark, the Germans continued to attack even at night, actively using night vision devices, but in response, Soviet artillery widely used illumination shells and rockets at night, so much so that such illumination of the battlefield provided the ability of Soviet troops to conduct defensive battles quite effectively even at night. As a result of fierce battles, during the five days of the offensive, German troops still managed to break through or simply break through the main and second lines of defense with their armored fist, but at what cost? And most importantly, this did not ensure their further success, since there was simply no one to bring into the breakthrough, there were no fresh troops, there were also no operational reserves, at the final stage of the battle, individual German infantry units even began an unauthorized retreat to their original positions and only SS tankers Until the very end they continued to fight, now covering the withdrawal of their infantry divisions, and in front of them were still located the rear army and front lines of defense of the Soviet troops, which the Germans were never able to reach.

As a result, in ten days of fierce fighting, the attackers managed to advance 15-30 km. The battle was characterized by high intensity and saturation of equipment; on average, the Germans threw into battle up to 50-60 tanks per 1 km of front, making extensive use of heavy tanks from their menagerie of “royal” and ordinary tigers, as well as panthers. However, the resistance of Soviet soldiers and the strong anti-tank defense they created did not allow German units to break through to the Danube. In this battle, the main role in the fight against enemy tanks was played by self-propelled guns and anti-tank artillery, so after the end of the operation, a special technical commission arriving from the main technical department of the Red Army determined that out of all over 500 enemy tanks destroyed, 389 units were hit by shells from 57mm and 76mm anti-tank guns or from SU 100, the rest were blown up by mines or were destroyed in other ways, and one Panther tank was even burned by our infantrymen as in early 1941. using fire bottles with COP, just ONE.

By the end of the war, during the operation at Balaton, the adventurism of the German command was evident; when embarking on such a large-scale operation, the Germans did not have the necessary reserves to develop its success, that is, they carried out an offensive for the sake of an offensive and nothing more, it turns out that the losses they suffered were large losses of over 40 thousand people were essentially in vain and already on March 15, German troops stopped their offensive. The battle at Balaton was disastrous for the German tank forces; the main German tankman of that time, Guderian, called the battle at Balaton the real grave of the Panzerwaffe. Losses of 500 units. tanks and assault guns became essentially irreparable losses, since German heavy tanks were produced at the end of the war almost one at a time, the last hope and support of Hitler's 6TA SS troops was defeated, in general, the operation in the Balaton area turned out to be the last for the Panzerwaffe , after Balaton one could say that Nazi Germany no longer had its main pride - its tank troops.

The losses of the 3rd Ukrainian Front as a result of the Balaton operation were also significant and amounted to about 32,899 Soviet soldiers, of which 8,492 were irrecoverable. After a short operational pause, the Red Army continued its offensive, unlike the German command, the 3rd Ukrainian Front retained its main reserve of the 9th Guards. army. Eternal memory to all the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army who gave their lives in fierce battles with the enemy at Lake Balaton.

Having defeated at the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945. Debrecen and Budapest enemy groups, Soviet troops entered Western Hungary and created favorable conditions for continuing the offensive. In the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, by directive of February 17, 1945, set the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts the task of striking in the Vienna direction, defeating the German Army Group South and transferring hostilities to the territory of Southern Germany. A new offensive operation was planned to begin on March 15.

By coincidence, on the day the Headquarters directive was issued, February 17, a strong enemy group, the basis of which was the 1st SS Panzer Corps, attacked formations of the 7th Guards Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the western bank of the river. Gron. As a result of fierce fighting, they suffered heavy losses and were forced to abandon their bridgehead by February 24. At the same time, intelligence agencies of two fronts established a concentration in the lake area. Balaton of enemy tank divisions. It became obvious that the command of Army Group South was preparing a large-scale offensive against the 3rd Ukrainian Front. And indeed, trying to seize the initiative, it planned to defeat his troops on the western bank of the river. Danube and prevent the advance of the Red Army into Austria and the southern regions of Germany. The following were involved in the implementation of this plan: the German 6th SS Panzer Army (transferred from the Ardennes), 6th Army, 2nd Panzer Army and Army Group “E”; Hungarian 3rd Army. They numbered up to 35 divisions, including 11 tank divisions, 431 thousand soldiers and officers, up to 6 thousand guns and mortars, 877 tanks and assault guns, 900 armored personnel carriers and about 850 aircraft.

The strongest group, uniting three infantry, two cavalry and nine tank divisions, five separate battalions of heavy tanks, two brigades and one division of assault guns, was concentrated between Lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. It had 147 thousand people, 807 tanks and assault guns and more than 800 armored personnel carriers. The task of this group was to dissect the 3rd Ukrainian Front, reach the Danube and, in cooperation with the 2nd Tank Army and Army Group “E,” which carried out other attacks, complete its defeat piece by piece. Success in the operation was to be achieved through the sudden massive use of armored vehicles, aviation and artillery in narrow areas, breaking through defenses in the shortest possible time, and rapidly developing an offensive in depth in order to stun the Soviet command and troops, paralyze their will and ability to resist.

Timely identification of the enemy’s intentions allowed the Supreme High Command Headquarters to make a decision that was expedient in those conditions: it ordered the 3rd Ukrainian Front to gain a foothold on the achieved line, repel the advance of Army Group South on it, and only after that strike in the Vienna direction. By that time, the front, whose troops were led by Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin, included the 4th Guards, 26th, 57th, 27th and Bulgarian 1st Armies, 17th Air Army, two tank, one mechanized and one cavalry corps - a total of 37 rifle, 3 cavalry and 6 infantry (Bulgarian) divisions, more than 407 thousand people, about 7 thousand guns and mortars, 407 tanks and self-propelled artillery units (SPG), 965 aircraft. In the previous battles, the rifle divisions suffered heavy losses, as a result of which their average strength was only 4.7 thousand soldiers and officers. The mobile units were also poorly equipped. The number of armored vehicles in them was in the range of 35-75 units.

In accordance with the decision of the front commander of February 20, the main efforts in defense were concentrated on the right wing and in the center, in the zones of the 4th Guards and 26th Armies of Lieutenant General N.D. Zakhvataeva and N.A. Hagena. The 57th and Bulgarian 1st armies of Lieutenant General M.N. were supposed to operate on the left wing. Sharokhin and V. Stoychev. The second echelon included the 27th Army of Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, and in reserve - the 18th and 23rd Tank, 1st Guards Mechanized and 5th Guards Cavalry Corps.

The essence of F.I., elected Marshal of the Soviet Union. Tolbukhin's method of repelling the enemy's offensive was to stubbornly hold defensive lines, inflicting maximum damage on him during a fire attack, the widespread use of engineering obstacles, and timely prepared maneuvers of combined arms and special reserves in threatened directions. In order to preserve forces and resources, army and front-line counterattacks were not planned, and counterattacks were allowed to be carried out only in exceptional cases, if their success was guaranteed.

On March 6, at 8:47 a.m., after powerful artillery preparation, the 6th SS Panzer Army, with the support of infantry formations, struck in the zone between Lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. During the day, German troops, during fierce fighting, were able to penetrate the defenses of the 26th Army in two small areas. South of Lake Velence, on the adjacent flanks of the 1st Guards fortified area and the 30th Rifle Corps, their advance was 3-4 km, and west of the Sharviz Canal - 1.5-2 km. In order to prevent the enemy from further spreading in depth and expanding the breakthrough, the commander of the front forces, as provided for in the plan of the defensive operation, promoted from the second echelon and reserve one rifle division, two brigades of the 18th Tank Corps (Major General P.D. Govorunenko ) and a tank regiment of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps (Lieutenant General I.N. Russiyanov).

On the morning of the next day, the enemy resumed the offensive, bringing up to nine infantry regiments and over 170 tanks and assault guns into the battle. The main role in repelling their attacks was played by anti-tank artillery, fire from tanks and self-propelled guns from ambushes, the actions of attack aircraft and a wide maneuver towards the threatened areas of additional forces and means. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of Lieutenant General S.I. arrived here and took up defense on the second line of the 26th Army. Gorshkov, parts of three rifle divisions, fighter anti-tank artillery regiments, two regiments of the 208th self-propelled artillery brigade. In two days, Soviet troops destroyed up to 4 thousand German soldiers and officers, about 100 tanks and assault guns. But, despite heavy losses, the enemy persistently tried to make a hole in the formation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. By the end of March 7, he increased the wedging west of the Sharviz Canal to 7 km.

Trying at all costs to break through to the Danube, the distance to which was 20-30 km, the command of Army Group South brought the 2nd SS Panzer Division into battle on the morning of March 8th. Now over 250 tanks and assault guns were operating simultaneously between lakes Velence and Lake Balaton. In some areas their density reached 40-50 units per 1 km. The next day, when the enemy offensive group was reinforced by the 9th SS Panzer Division, the number of tanks and assault guns increased to 320.

The most dangerous situation developed in the defense zone of the 135th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army, where the German 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions broke through the main and second defense lines in a narrow area. Gaps formed in the battle formations of the rifle corps and divisions, which threatened the enemy's entry into the operational depths. In order to streamline the command and control of troops, Marshal of the Soviet Union F.I. Tolbukhin assigned responsibility for the conduct of hostilities in the area from the lake. Velence to the Sharviz Canal to the commander of the 27th Army, and from the Sharviz Canal to Lake. Balaton - for the commander of the 26th Army. At the same time, he strengthened the group at the forefront of the enemy penetration with a tank regiment, the 209th self-propelled artillery brigade and two anti-tank artillery regiments.

As a result of the measures taken, the losses of German troops on March 9 increased by another 3.5 thousand people, 150 tanks and assault guns. However, continuous four-day battles significantly weakened the 3rd Ukrainian Front. Almost all reserves were brought into the battle, including tank, mechanized, self-propelled formations and units, as well as the second echelon. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command prohibited the use of the 9th Guards Army transferred to the front during the defensive operation, indicating that it was intended for a subsequent strike in the Vienna direction. Therefore, increasing defensive efforts could only be carried out through maneuver from unattacked areas. So, during March 9, they were transferred from the 4th Guards Army zone and took up defense between the lake. Velence and R. Danube 35th Guards Rifle and 23rd Tank (Colonel A.V. Voronov) Corps.

On the morning of March 10, the enemy command increased the force of the attack in the 27th Army zone by introducing the 3rd Tank Division into the battle north of the village of Sheregelesh. This made it possible to increase the total number of tanks and assault guns in the inter-lake space to 450 units. Despite active opposition from artillery and aviation, the enemy managed to push back Soviet units through the massive use of armored vehicles in narrow areas. Another attack, in the 26th Army zone, was carried out along the western bank of the Charviz Canal with up to five infantry regiments supported by aviation and 170 tanks and assault guns. They began to slowly advance towards the village of Simontornia. In just five days, the 6th SS Panzer Army broke through the main and second defense lines of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, but it was never able to cut it into two isolated parts and reach the Danube.

German troops tried to solve this problem on March 11, when the offensive in the space between Lakes Velence and Lake Balaton was carried out by seven tank, two infantry and two cavalry divisions, numbering over 500 tanks and assault guns. By that time, some formations had already lost more than 60% of people and military equipment, and their replenishment was carried out mainly through individual tank battalions.

The enemy persistently tried to find weak points in the defense of the Soviet troops. First, after thirty minutes of artillery preparation, he launched an attack in the area south of the lake. Velence against the 78th and 163rd rifle divisions of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, concentrating for this purpose up to three infantry regiments, 50 tanks, 56 artillery and mortar batteries, 12 six-barreled rocket launchers. The first failure did not stop the German units. Until the evening, they tried to break through the defense six more times, but were able to penetrate only 500-600 m deep. The offensive of two tank, two cavalry and one infantry divisions west of the Charviz Canal was also unsuccessful. In the afternoon they captured the Simontornia station, but after a few hours they left it under the influence of formations of the 26th Army.

On March 12, a strong enemy group, having deployed two infantry divisions and 150 tanks from the 1st, 3rd and 23rd tank divisions against the 35th Guards and 30th Rifle Corps of the 27th Army, reached the army zone as a result of fierce battles defense On the same day, developing an offensive in the zone of the 26th Army, the enemy crossed the Elush Canal and captured a small bridgehead on its southern bank.

Subsequently, the main events took place in the area south of the lake. Velence. Throughout the day on March 13, German troops attacked the 35th Guards Rifle Corps formation with 120 tanks and assault guns, but did not achieve significant results. The success of defensive battles was due to the timely maneuver of artillery fire from two armies at once - the 4th Guards and the 27th, as well as the widespread use of mobile barrage detachments. They laid mines on the main directions of movement of enemy armored vehicles and thereby forced them to be drawn into “fire bags”. For another two days, March 14 and 15, without stopping hostilities either day or night, enemy tank divisions (more than 300 tanks and assault guns) struck on the right flank and in the center of the 27th Army zone, but brought a decisive turning point during the battle they were no longer capable.

During the period March 13-15, the German command also did not abandon attempts to develop an offensive in the direction of the greatest penetration of its troops, in the area west of the Charviz Canal. Here they managed to first expand the bridgehead on the Elusha Canal, transporting up to two infantry regiments and several tanks to it, and then cross the Kaposh Canal. To make it difficult for the enemy to build up his forces on the bridgeheads, on the instructions of the commander of the front troops, the locks of the Elusha canal near Lake were raised. Balaton, as a result of which the water level increased by 60 cm. This, together with air strikes of the 17th Air Army, made it possible to finally stop the advance of the 6th SS Panzer Army. As a result of persistent ten-day battles, its formations were able to break through the defenses of the 3rd Ukrainian Front south of Lake. Velence and west of the Charviz canal to a depth of 12 and 30 km, respectively, but the task they faced to reach the Danube was never completed.

Army Group South operated even less successfully in the axes of other attacks. The enemy struck the first of them on the night of March 6 in the zone of the Bulgarian 1st Army. Secretly crossing the river in the dark. Drava, he attacked the Bulgarian and Yugoslav units and captured two bridgeheads on the northern bank, up to 10 km wide and about 5 km deep each. Thus, German troops created a threat of reaching the rear of the 57th Army and capturing the crossings of the 3rd Ukrainian Front across the river. Danube.

To exclude such a development of events, the commander of his troops ordered the 133rd Rifle Corps to be transferred to the subordination of the 57th Army, whose task was to eliminate enemy bridgeheads by the end of March 8 and restore the lost position. Taking into account the fact that the corps was still marching at that time, its formations entered the battle at different times, as they arrived. The 84th Infantry Division was the first to attack the enemy on March 8, but was only able to push it back by 1-1.5 km. The next day, the 122nd Infantry Division began hostilities, but did not achieve tangible results. For almost two weeks the corps fought heavy battles. It was possible to complete the task only by March 22.

The second attack by three German divisions, supported by tanks, was launched from the Nagybajom area in the direction of Kaposvár. On March 6, at 7 a.m., after an hour of artillery preparation, they attacked formations of the 64th Rifle Corps of the 57th Army and during the day penetrated 5 km into the depth of its defense. Army Commander Lieutenant General M.N. Sharokhin deployed nine artillery divisions (136 guns and mortars), mobile barrage detachments and rifle units to the threatened direction. As a result of the counterattack of the 113th Infantry Division, the situation was partially restored, but this did not force the enemy to abandon the continuation of the offensive.

He resumed it on the morning of March 8, bringing four infantry regiments and up to 50 tanks and assault guns into the battle. The entire artillery of the 64th Rifle Corps and the Bulgarian 12th Infantry Division attached to it, including large calibers (122- and 152-mm), was involved in the fight against them. In the following days, the enemy continuously strengthened his group in the Kaposvár direction and twice tried to make a breakthrough in other areas, but all these measures were in vain. By March 15, his maximum advance in the defense zone of the 57th Army was from 6 to 8 km. Until March 25, there were still isolated battles here, but they could no longer influence the change in the operational situation.

The Balaton operation, carried out by troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in March 1945, was the last major defensive operation of the Great Patriotic War. During its course, the attempt of the Wehrmacht high command to stop the advance of the Red Army on the southern wing of the German Eastern Front and to restore the defense along the river line was thwarted. Danube in order to retain economically important areas of Western Hungary, especially its oil fields. According to the front headquarters, in the period from March 6 to March 15, the enemy lost up to 45 thousand soldiers and officers killed and captured, over 280 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks and assault guns, 50 aircraft, almost 500 armored personnel carriers, more than 1.3 thousand .cars.

Aviation and artillery played a significant role in achieving the goal of the operation. As a result of powerful strikes by air units and massive artillery fire on tank groups, the enemy suffered heavy losses and was forced to frequently change the directions of his attacks, as a result of which he lost time for regrouping, which negatively affected the overall course of his offensive.

Despite the significant superiority in tanks and assault guns, the German troops were never able to develop the tactical success achieved in certain areas into operational success and reach the river. Danube. The repulsion of their attacks was facilitated by the deep echeloning of defensive zones and lines, their advance engineering preparation, and the timely buildup of defense efforts in threatened areas. During the operation, 45 different artillery units and formations carried out maneuvers, both within the army zones and between them. The maneuver of engineering barriers has found wide application. In the period from March 6 to March 15, the enemy lost 130 tanks and assault guns, over 850 people, and a significant number of armored personnel carriers and vehicles in minefields laid by mobile barrage detachments.

Intense battles with superior enemy forces became a difficult test for the Soviet troops. Reflecting powerful attacks from tank and infantry groups, showing unsurpassed courage and heroism, they lost 32,899 people, of which 8,492 were killed, dead or missing.

Valery Abaturov,
Leading Researcher at the Scientific Research Institute
Institute (military history) of the Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Type

Balaton battle. Battles at Lake Balaton

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